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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets

Klapper, Leora F., Love, Inessa·2004·Journal of Corporate Finance
DOI 10.1016/s0929-1199(03)00046-4
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Abstract

Recent research studying the link between law, and finance has concentrated on country-level investor protection measures, and focused on differences in legal systems across countries, and legal families. The authors extend this literature, and provide a study of firm-level corporate governance practices across emerging markets, and a greater understanding of the environments under which corporate governance matters more. Their empirical tests show that better corporate governance is highly correlated with better operating performance, and market valuation. More important, the authors provide evidence showing that firm-level corporate governance provisions, matter more in countries with weak legal environments. These results suggest that firms can partially compensate for ineffective laws, and enforcement by establishing good governance, and providing credible investor protection. The authors' tests also show that firm-level governance, and performance is lower in countries with weak legal environments, suggesting that improving the legal system, should remain a priority for policymakers.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 7 references

Research works printed but not linked: 17

  1. Beck, 2003, Law, Endowments and Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00144-2 · DOI · Paper page
  2. Berkowitz, 2003, Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect, European Economic Review, 47, 165, 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00196-9 · DOI · Paper page
  3. Black, 2001, The corporate governance behavior and market value of Russian firms. Forthcoming as does corporate governance matter? A crude test using Russian data, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 149
  4. Black, 1998, Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: Banks versus stock markets, Journal of Financial Economics, 47, 243, 10.1016/S0304-405X(97)00045-7 · DOI · Paper page
  5. Coffee, 1999, The future as history: the prospects for global convergence in corporate governance and its implications, Northwestern University Law Review, 93, 641
  6. Daines, 2001, Does Delaware law improve firm value?, Journal of Financial Economics, 62, 525, 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00086-1 · DOI · Paper page
  7. Doidge, C., Karolyi, A., Stulz, R., 2001, Why are foreign firms listed in the US worth more? Unpublished working paper. NBER no. 8538. · doi:10.3386/w8538
  8. Fuerst, O., 1998. A theoretical analysis of the investor protection regulations argument for global listing of stocks. Unpublished working paper. Yale University. · DOI · Paper page
  9. Himmelberg, 1999, Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 353, 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00025-2 · DOI · Paper page
  10. Himmelberg, C., Hubbard, R.G., Love, I., 2001. Investor protection, ownership and the cost of capital. Unpublished working paper. Columbia University. · DOI · Paper page
  11. Jensen, 1986, Agency costs of free cash flows, corporate finance and takeovers, American Economic Review, 76, 323
  12. La Porta, 1999, Corporate ownership around the world, Journal of Finance, 54, 471, 10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · DOI · Paper page
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  14. Lombardo, D., Pagano, M., 2000. Legal determinants of the return on equity. Unpublished working paper. · DOI
  15. Nenova, 2003, The value of corporate voting rights and control: a cross-country analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00069-2 · DOI · Paper page
  16. Reese, 2002, Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-listings in the United States and subsequent equity offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, 66, 65, 10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00151-4 · DOI · Paper page
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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Klapper, L. F., & Love, I.
Venue
Journal of Corporate Finance
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2004-11
Volume
10
Issue
5
Pages
703-728
ISSN
0929-1199 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/s0929-1199(03)00046-4
OpenAlex
W3124631106
Cited by
2,218
References
7
FWCI
123.09
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0929-1199(03)00046-4
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Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2004). Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets. Journal of Corporate Finance. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0929-1199(03)00046-4

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.