How many kinds of consciousness?

“I hypothesize that the percept needs to register only in phenomenal consciousness for the basic emotion to become functional (cf. Block, 2001, 2005; Lambie & Marcel, 2002; Rosenthal, 2002).”

“A fourth kind of conscious state is called reflexive consciousness by Block (synonyms: monitoring/interospective consciousness Block, 2001), and is characterized by the presence of Higher-Order Thoughts (Rosenthal, 2002), i.e., “thoughts about thoughts.””

“For example, as stated by Rosenthal: ‘On the HOT hypothesis, a conscious state is a compound state, consisting of the state one is conscious of together with a HOT.”

“…determining decision strategy (Foote & Crystal, 2007; Hampton, 2001; Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003), and may even be a central property of awareness (Cleeremans, Timmermans, & Pasquali, 2007; Dienes, 2008; Rosenthal, 2000, 2002).”

“To non-professional ethicists, the various perspectives on the meaning of sentience would seem highly nuanced and rarefied (For an introduction to the topic see Rosenthal 2002 ).”

“…consciousness also includes forms of meta-consciousness, where one is conscious and aware of the contents of consciousness as proposed in higher-order theories (see Rosenthal, 2002); it also includes self-consciousness, which helps differentiate the self as distinct from other things in the world.”

“And philosophers are carefully describing different types of higher conscious states and uncovering the thought processes that make them possible (e.g., Carruthers, 1996; Rosenthal, 2002).”

“One could make other distinctions—for instance between experiential consciousness and meta-consciousness (i.e., something could be experienced consciously with or without the experiencer reflecting on this experience; see, e.g., Rosenthal, 2002; Winkielman & Schooler, 2011).”

“, 2014; Hohwy, 2012)) or Higher Order Thought Theory, HOT (Rosenthal, 2002).”

“There is no (conscious) specific 5 In fact, Rosenthal has himself suggested that there may be merely a terminological dispute between himself and Block (Rosenthal, 2002).”

“See, e.g., Block (1980, 1995), Rosenthal (2002b) .”

“Dienes and Perner (2007) proposed a theory of hypnotic responding based on Rosenthal (2002)’s higher order thought theory.”

“In higher-order thought (HOT) theory, these experiences are referred to as thoughts (e.g., landscape), and these thoughts define phenomenal consciousness (Rosenthal, 2002).”

“Whether animals lacking access consciousness may still be phenomenally conscious rests on the perspective one takes toward the evidence of human phenomenal consciousness occurring without access consciousness, which is debated (Block 1995, 2001; Rosenthal 2002).”

“Based on the higher-order thought model (Rosenthal, 2002; Rosenthal, 2006), Dienes and Perner (2007) distinguished first-order thoughts from second and third-order thoughts.”

“While other philosophers require metacognition or reflexive consciousness in a system in order to attribute consciousness (see for example Rosenthal 2002 or Lau & Rosenthal 2011 for a recent review defending this view), we do not want and cannot get into this discussion as it is not our goal to…”

“Furthermore, the difference between these kinds of consciousness has been challenged as conceptually ambiguous (Rosenthal, 2002, 2007, 2009, 2010) and incapable of scientific investigation (Kouider et al., 2012).”

“Recursive/subjective self-awareness is, to many, the primary and defining characteristic of consciousness (Wundt, 1896; Pieron, 1951; Nagel 1974; Weimer, 1976; Ey, 1978; Searle 1980, 1992; McGinn, 1983; Lycan 1987; Jackendoff, 1987; Kunzendorf, 1988; Schacter 1989; Strehler; 1991, Gallup, 1991; Edelman, 1992; Damasio,…”

“Indeed, psychologists and philosophers of mind remain engaged in an intricate debate regarding the concept of “consciousness” (e.g., Antony 2002; Rosenthal 2002; Silby 1998).”

“We will also not concern ourselves here with phenomenal consciousness or qualia [20], which Dennett [20], Rosenthal [29] and others argue against.”

“3 It is important to note that not everyone accepts the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and reflective consciousness (Rosenthal, 2002).”

“In addition we use the more cumbersome ‘what it is like for one’ phraseology both to keep in line with Rosenthal’s usage and also to indicate that there is some kind of higher-order awareness involved in ordinary conscious experience (cf. Rosenthal 2002).”

“For Rosenthal on Block’s distinction, see Rosenthal 2002.”

“(Rosenthal, 2002, p. 656)19 However, nothing said here implies anything about inner-awareness, inner-content, or any such notion.”

“…to the nature versus nurture problem raised by brain scientists in the 1950ies and, ultimately, to the question raised since the dawn of the science of consciousness: “what exactly is phenomenal consciousness” (Gray, 1971; Dennett, 1991; Rosenthal, 1986; Roth, 2000; Zeman, 2001; Rosenthal, 2002)?”

“Helekar’s assumption that the subjective nature of phenomenal consciousness per se is genetically determined thus leads us right back to the old “nature versus nurture” problem raised by brain scientists since the 1950ies and, ultimately, to the question raised at the beginning of this essay: “what exactly is phenomen…”

“However, Rosenthal [45] istinction between access and phenomenal consciousness is untenable; common sense does not count any state as conscious if the subject is wholly unaware of it.”

“…articulation from two to four levels, therefore it would be appropriate to distinguish between a “phenomenic consciousness” and an “access consciousness,” or between “perceptive consciousness,” “introspective consciousness,” “monitoring consciousness,” and “self-consciousness” (Rosenthal 2002).”

“Rosenthal (1986, 1993a, 1993b, 2002) has developed a theory of consciousness which implies that being conscious of an introspected mental state would be a fourth-order monadic state.”

“In this case, we take under consideration rather meta- consciousness which must be experienced consciously with the experiencer reflecting on this experience (Rosenthal, 2002; Winkielman & Schooler, 2011).”

“Later theoretical models, such as global neuronal workspace (Dehaene et al., 2006) and higher-order thought theory (Rosenthal, 2002) refined distinctions among nonconscious, preconscious, and conscious processing.”

“…Theory (IIT) needs someone experiencing the integration quantified by Φ [87]; Higher-Order Thought theory (HOT) needs someone whose mental state is the object of a higher-order representation [71]; Attention Schema Theory (AST) needs someone whose attention is being schematically modeled [26].”

“Selon le théoricien de la HOT en effet, « nous sommes conscients de nos états mentaux conscients en vertu du fait que nous avons des pensées (d’ordre supérieur) à propos de ces états mentaux » (Rosenthal, 2002a, p. 409 ; 1986).”

“(See Rosenthal, 2002, p. 657.)”

“Further advancements were seen in theories such as the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) [5] and Attention Schema Theories [6], which introduced the pivotal concepts of subjective experience and self-awareness.”

“This can be cashed out in terms of an acquaintance relation, such as Russell's original notion or Tye's (2009b) revival of it, or in terms of the use of a demonstrative (which is acquired ''on the basis of'' perception), and so on.”