Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
Open accessAbstract
Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDA s) are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of evaluative beliefs to undermine their justification. This paper aims to clarify the premises and presuppositions of EDAs—a form of argument that is increasingly put to use in normative ethics. I argue that such arguments face serious obstacles. It is often overlooked, for example, that they presuppose the truth of metaethical objectivism. More importantly, even if objectivism is assumed, the use of EDAs in normative ethics is incompatible with a parallel and more sweeping global evolutionary debunking argument that has been discussed in recent metaethics. After examining several ways of responding to this global debunking argument, I end by arguing that even if we could resist it, this would still not rehabilitate the current targeted use of EDAs in normative ethics given that, if EDAs work at all, they will in any case lead to a truly radical revision of our evaluative outlook.
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The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5 · Cited by 270 · see citing works
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Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification
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DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS GAIN LITTLE FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION
Launonen, L. (2021) · Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science · doi:10.1111/zygo.12683 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
“Kahane (2011) presents the basic structure of a debunking argument like this: Causal premise .”
BackgroundAre Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Self-Debunking?
Kyriacou, C. (2016) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9780-1 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Tersman, F., & Risberg, O. (2022) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-022-10275-y · Cited by 2 · see citing works
- Authors
- Kahane, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Kahane, Guy
- ORCID
- Kahane, Guy
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-09-24
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 103-125
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- PMC
- PMC3175808
- OpenAlex
- W2162667960
- Cited by
- 282
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 43 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 26 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 69.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Noûs (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (087208, 086041)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
- Keywords
- evolutionary debunking arguments, normative ethics, metaethics
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