The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent
Abstract
Of all the different types of civil war, disputes over self-determination are the most likely to escalate into war and resist compromise settlement. Reputation and Civil War argues that this low rate of negotiation is the result of reputation building, in which governments refuse to negotiate with early challengers in order to discourage others from making more costly demands in the future. Jakarta's wars against East Timor and Aceh, for example, were not designed to maintain sovereignty but to signal to Indonesia's other minorities that secession would be costly. Employing data from three different sources - laboratory experiments on undergraduates, statistical analysis of data on self-determination movements, and qualitative analyses of recent history in Indonesia and the Philippines - Barbara F. Walter provides some of the first systematic evidence that reputation strongly influences behavior, particularly between governments and ethnic minorities fighting over territory.
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Cites
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
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Making the most of statistical analyses: improving interpretation and presentation
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Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country*
Fearon, J. D. (2003) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1024419522867 · Cited by 1,829
Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model
Camerer, C., & Weigelt, K. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911840 · Cited by 572
Cited by
Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War
Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Buhaug, H. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139084161 · Cited by 978
Bargaining Failures and Civil War
Walter, B. F. (2009) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.135301 · Cited by 457
Self-citationCan the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?
Jo, H., & Simmons, B. A. (2016) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818316000114 · Cited by 370
Reputation and Status as Motives for War
Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., & Huth, P. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421 · Cited by 322
Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict
Cunningham, K. G. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12003 · Cited by 227
Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?
CEDERMAN, L.-E., HUG, S., SCHÄDEL, A., & WUCHERPFENNIG, J. (2015) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055415000118 · Cited by 221
Pietraszewski, D. (2022) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x21000583 · Cited by 45
Why do civil wars occur? Another look at the theoretical dichotomy of opportunity versus grievance
TAYDAS, Z., ENIA, J., & JAMES, P. (2011) · Review of International Studies · doi:10.1017/s026021051100012x · Cited by 32
Metadata
- Authors
- Walter, B. F.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2009-08-27
- OpenAlex
- W4233408352
- Cited by
- 242
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 5.63
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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