Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization

“For decades, the dominant paradigm of explaining how democracies emerge and became sustainable emphasized the actions and motivations of political elites (e.g., Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005; Brownlee, 2007).”

“China does not have competitive elections for the most important political posts, and therefore its leaders do not have to manipulate those elections or employ power-sharing arrangements to stay in power (Brownlee, 2007; Magaloni, 2008; Gandhi, 2008; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Slater, 2010).”

“…has been largely silent on how ethnic politics affects authoritarian survival.1 This is surprising given that authoritarianism has been one of the most well-studied topics in recent scholarship on the Middle East (Bellin 2004; Brownlee 2007; Fish 2002; Lust-Okar 2005; Posusney and Angrist 2004).”

“…in a process of democratic transition, but reflected a global trend where polities were either hybrid regimes stuck in a political grey zone between democracy and full autocracy, or had moved towards fully consolidated authoritarian regimes (Carothers 2002; Brownlee 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010).”

“…form clientele networks from national to grassroots level, deliver clientele goods to achieve the acquiescence of the poor, prevent opposition leaders’ coalitions, and show overwhelming power with lopsided electoral victory (Brownlee, 2007; Lust-Okar, 2005; Magaloni, 2006; Schedler, 2006).”

“…societies appear to be an increasingly common regime subtype, but the explicit study of this form of authoritarianism has primarily rested on a handful of cases such as China, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009).”

“…may still resist the kinds of substantive reforms that allow people to speak or associate freely; others that maintain exclusive political processes may nevertheless extend these more accessible means of expression to their citizens (Brownlee, 2007; Magaloni, 2008; Gandhi, 2010; Slater, 2010).”

“Extant studies have focused on the role of other actors besides ministers in ruling coalitions, notably military elites (Albrecht 2015; Bellin 2004, 2012; Bou Nassif 2015a, 2015b), businessmen, and dominant party leaders (Brownlee 2007; Stacher 2012).”

“Current studies have argued that the key to maintaining regime persistence is largely determined by the capacity of the ruling party to build a strong governing coalition and weaken the democratic opposition (Brownlee, 2007; Ottaway, 2003).”

“Internally, the PM’s position over the period in question was further strengthened by the ruling party’s centralization and strong internal discipline (Brownlee, 2007; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Slater, 2010).”

“…of empirical studies compare regime durability and the likelihood of democratization between closed and electoral autocracies (Geddes, 1999, 2006; Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Brownlee, 2009; Lindberg, 2009), there exists little theoretical work on what country-level…”

“Both had functioned as major coopting institutions under the Sadat and Mubarak regimes (Brownlee, 2007).”

“…dissent: some suggest that the explanation lies in the strength of the opposition and their ability to mobilize (Gandhi, 2008; Gel’man, 2015; Schmotz, 2015), others look to the characteristics of the regime and its capacity to control anti-regime sentiment and actors (Brownlee, 2007; Bunce, 1999).”

“Dominant ruling parties can help co-opt elites, allow elites to resolve their conflicts, and work as a platform for elites to credibly share power and spoils (Svolik 2012; Brownlee 2007; Reuter and Remington 2009; Magaloni 2008).”

“Contemporary research on authoritarian institutions suggests that far from being inconsequential, they do contribute to the efficacy and longevity of dictatorial regimes (Brownlee 2007; Geddes 2003).”

“7 Brownlee 2007; Carothers 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010; Ottoway 2003; Schedler 2006.”

“…1986) to protest mobilisation (Bunce 2003) to a mediation between the two (Teorell 2010), while comparative authoritarianism turned from ‘big man’ rule that assigned leaders excessive agency (Hyden 2012) to contextual analyses situated within political institutions (Brownlee 2007; LeVan 2014).”

“…typically associated with democracies, such as elections, have an important function in relation to providing benefits for authoritarian regimes is not new (Pempel 1990; Wintrobe 1998; Lust-Okar 2005; Gandhi & Przeworski 2006; Geddes 2006; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Magaloni & Kricheli 2010).”

“…institutions such as elections, legislatures, parties, and the bureaucracy as tools of buying support, sharing rent and power, and ultimately political control and survival (e.g., Blaydes 2011; Brownlee 2007; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Geddes 1999; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2006; Slater 2003).”

“…of democracy vis- a-vis the rule of law (Weingast 1997);14 on presidential democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996), on party systems and constitutional frameworks (Stepan and Skach 1993; Mainwaring 1999); on the European welfare state (Baldwin 1992), among many others (Rothstein 2001; Brownlee 2007).”

“Similarly, assumptions about the role and impact of the military (Owen, 2004) and dominant parties (Brownlee, 2007) may be questioned again.”

“…authoritarian ruling coalition to become an effective and self-sustaining mechanism that reduces incentives among elites to defect from the leadership (Boix and Svolik 2013; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008), institutions must genuinely serve the interests of those who are potential enemies.”

“20 Boix and Svolik 2013; Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999; Gehlbach and Simpser 2015; Magaloni 2008; Reuter and Remington 2009; Svolik 2012; Wright and Escrib-Folch 2012; Zakharov 2016.”

“…Seeberg, 2018), the ruling party’s control over state resources (Greene, 2007, 2010; Magaloni, 2006), its ability to resolve intra-party conflicts (Brownlee, 2007a; Langston, 2006; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011), the mobilization strategy of the opposition (Bunce and Wolchik, 2010; Howard and…”

“Moreover, regular elections may also weaken and obstruct the democratic opposition as they give the regime an opportunity to gather information about who its political opponents are and their capacity (Brownlee 2007).”

“Often, loyalist political parties provide a framework to contain such social coalitions, binding elites and citizens institutionally to a regime (Brownlee, 2007).”

“But in presenting new ‘institutional’ and ‘resource’ theories, Jason Brownlee (2007) and Kenneth Greene (2007) show how a single dominant party can perpetuate cohesiveness.”

“Pro-regime parties that offer long-term benefits for sustained participation have been identified as ideal instruments to generate a large and loyal base of followers (Brownlee, 2007; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012).”

“In his investigation of authoritarian durability, Brownlee (2007) also takes an institutional approach.”

“As far back as 1978, the opposition’s ‘‘moderate political stance positioned the group as a viable alternative to Marcos, friendly to both domestic capitalists and U.S. interests’’ (Brownlee 2007, 183).”

“…on authoritarian regimes, a one party dictatorship is seen as more stable because of its ability to credibly deliver benefits to members of the ruling coalition and to provide incentives for lower level officials to maintain the status quo (Brownlee 2007; Svolik 2012; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010).”

“This is what scholars view as the fallacy of electoralism (Brownlee 2007).”

“Brownlee (2007) argues that elite cohesion due to the institutionalization of parties ensures that authoritarian regimes survive.”

“This article thereby rejects some arguments of recent scholarship on authoritarianism that diminish the significance of electoral rules (Brownlee 2007) or claim that electoral engineering constitutes an ‘impenetrable black box’ (Schedler 2006, p. 9).”

“Several studies link co-optation to peace in autocracies (Brownlee, 2007; Fjelde, 2010; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Lust-Okar, 2007; Yom and Gause, 2012).”

“These institutional differences among authoritarian regimes shape divergence in a wide range of important outcomes, from economic development (Gehlbach and Keefer 2012) to war propensity (Weeks 2014) to the durability of authoritarianism itself (e.g. Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008).”

“These include institutions of elections, legislatures and ruling parties (Nathan 2003; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010).”