Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization

“However, scholars find that allowing opposition parties to participate in multiparty legislatures and elections does not promote, and perhaps undermines, survival (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008).”

“This constraint forces the rulers to implement favorable policies and distribute spoils to the masses to some extent (Brownlee 2007; Lust-Okar 2005; Magaloni 2006).”

“Enduring post-coup autocratic regimes in countries such as Egypt and Iraq rested in significant part on the establishment of ruling political parties (Brownlee 2007).”

“…stay in power by reducing the risk of coups (Geddes, 2005; Lehoucq and Perez-Linan, 2013), ensuring the cooperation/cooptation of potential rivals (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Lust-Okar, 2005; Svolik, 2012), or maintaining good relations with international allies and benefactors (Levitsky and…”

“…with the recent institutionalist literature that highlights how autocratic regimes can also rely on party structures, parliaments, judiciaries and elections, but also informal rules, to maintain their rule (Magaloni 2006; Brownlee 2007; Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008; Schedler 2013; Morgenbesser 2016).”

“…with democratic political systems, including multiple political parties, partially competitive elections and parliamentary assemblies; these are also adopted in autocracies and may play a role in reinforcing authoritarian rule (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Levitsky and Way, 2002).”

“…and personalist regimes as the main types of autocracies, studies have shown that regime type has important consequences for regime durability (Brownlee, 2007; Dimitrov, 2013; Geddes, 1999), economic development and investment (Wright, 2008), human rights conditions (Davenport, 2007), state…”

“On the one hand, prominent studies of authoritarianism such as those by Geddes (2003), Brownlee (2007) and Gandhi (2008) are engrossed with the question of regime durability and collapse, while paying little attention to the inner workings of authoritarian institutions (Pepinsky 2014, 649).”

“…coercive apparatus (Way 2005), the inclusion of key social groups with the help of institutions such as a one-party system (Geddes 1999; Smith 2005; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008) and co-optation, economic growth (Przeworski and Limong 1997), the stability of state spending toward key social groups…”

“…reduce the prospects for political liberalization by dividing oppositions and demonstrating incumbent strength (Lust- Okar 2005, Magaloni 2006, Brownlee 2007), while others argue that elections under autocratic rule promote liberalization by providing incentives for the opposition to unify…”

“…Egypt’s 1952 revolution, the Revolutionary Command Council of the Egyptian military launched waves of domestic repression (Abdel-Malek, 1968; Brownlee, 2007, pp. 52–53; Dekmejian, 1971; El Kosheri Mahfouz, 1972) that resembled somewhat their actions in the face-offs with protesters in 2011.”

“Empirical studies have shown that having a powerful and highly institutionalised political party really matters for the durability of these regimes (Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008).”

“…enterprises to undergird the ruling party’s dominance (Arian & Barnes 1974; Schedler 2002; Smyth 2002; Gel’man 2005; Riggs & Schraeder 2005; Sakwa 2005; Smith 2005; Scheiner 2006; Magaloni 2006; Oversloot & Verheul 2006; Greene 2007; Brownlee 2007; White 2007; McElwain 2008; Levitsky & Way 2010).”

“Reflecting a recent trend in the academic literature, Brownlee (2007), Schlumberger (2007), Lust-Okar (2005) and Kassem (2004) focus on the sources of continued authoritarian resilience.”

“Legislators’ freedom of manoeuvre is a legacy of the historic inability of the Philippine elite to cohere into a partymachine capable of functioning, likeUMNO, to mediate their incessant squabbling over the material spoils of power (Brownlee 2007).”

“Discussing the rare occasions when authoritarian ruling parties have in fact splintered and suffered electoral defeat – paving the way for democratizing transitions – Brownlee, for example, looked at Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party and Taiwan’s Kuomintang, but never mentioned Turkey’s Republican People’s Pa…”

“5 Brownlee 2007.”

“The ruling party’s occupation of state institutions (Greene 2010) eases the enforcement of the power-sharing agreement, multiplies the ways in which elite members can be rewarded, and lengthens their time horizon, ‘so that no single faction suffers permanent defeat by another’ (Brownlee 2007, 16).”

“…elites and potential opposition forces (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), by providing information about its bases of support (Brownlee 2007), or by alleviating international pressures to democratize and thus securing external economic assistance conditional on at least…”

“For each tradition, see respectively Stepan & Linz, Democratization Theory; Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud & Andrew Reynolds (2013) Why the Modest Harvest?, Journal of Democracy, 24(4), pp. 29–44; and Jamie Allinson (2015) Class Forces, Transition and the Arab Uprisings: A Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, Democra…”

“We have a much better understanding about the effectiveness of mobilizing support through patronage and political institutions than about the effect of state repression (e.g., Blaydes 2011; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2006; Schedler 2002).”

“As scholars such as Jason Brownlee (2007), Dan Slater (2010), Benjamin Smith (2005), and Lucan Way (2005) have pointed out, empirical processes of state and regime-building are often tightly intertwined.”

“…(Lust 2011); exaggerate institutionalist analyses, elite cohesion, and ruling parties, elections, coalitions such as in relation to Egypt (Brownlee 2007); or shadow US foreign policy practices in the region, talking ‘democracy promotion’ (Cofman-Wittes 2008) and ‘democracy assistance’…”

“Elections provide incentives for elites to mobilize their support base, even in authoritarian states (Brownlee, 2007), and provide a “noisy” signal about the mobilization potential and size of different groups (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni, 2006).”

“While the ruling coalition in Malaysia “has proven invincible in the stilted contest of electoral politics” (Brownlee 2007: 5) at least until the 2008 national election, the PAP in Singapore has always held over 90 per cent of parliamentary seats since late-1960s.”

“Prior to 2011, a huge majority of scholars had exemplified the hypothesis on the basis of autocratic regimes such as Egypt (Blaydes 2011; Brownlee 2007; Koehler 2008).”

“…have investigated the benefits that elections can provide for incumbents in authoritarian systems (Gandhi & Lust-Okar 2009): revealing information (Brownlee 2007), co-opting the opposition (Gandhi & Przeworski 2007), distributing spoils (Blaydes 2011) and testing the competence and loyalty of…”

“Prominent party leaders leave the party during times of economic crisis (Reuter and Gandhi 2011) when the incumbent’s fortunes are weakened, and when they feel that their grievances have been neglected (Brownlee 2007).”

“It is well understood that autocrats strategically use political institutions such as parties, legislatures, and elections to stay in power (Blaydes 2011; Boix and Svolik 2013; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Greene 2007; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2006; Slater 2010; Simpser 2005).”

“When economic issues mattered, parties generally used clientelistic strategies (Blaydes, 2011; Brownlee, 2007; Lust-Okar, 2006).”

“…on the ‘ varieties ’ of authoritarianism in comparative politics by highlighting a territorial dimension of authoritarian power-sharing largely neglected in the existing efforts to explain the logic of authoritarian single-party rule (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012).”

“As existing studies note, collecting credible information is a key problem in maintaining authoritarian rule (Ames 1970; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2006; Miller 2015; Truex 2014).”

“…political regimes have proved their capacity to maintain their hold on power by implementing institutional mechanisms that are not authoritarian in essence but actually reinforce regime stability (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2002; Schedler, 2013).”

“…dictators with a channel for negotiation with various groups in society so that they can co-opt members of the opposition (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Lust-Okar, 2005), identify their bases of support, and recruit effective coalition members (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Brownlee, 2007; Magaloni, 2008).”

“…appropriate for the study of participatory development in an authoritarian context, especially as literature on authoritarian resiliency has demonstrated the capacity of autocrats to use participatory devices to reinforce their power (for instance, Brancati, 2014; Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008).”

“However, like many other authoritarian regimes (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009), China‘s leadership introduced democratic procedures such as elections and deliberative processes at the local community level; this was done to co-opt potential contenders for power; to monitor, communicate…”

“With this insight, NGO research mirrors the more general argument from the literature on authoritarian regimes that repression and cooptation are the central tools used by authoritarian governments to secure regime stability (Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2010).”