The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization
Abstract
Far from sweeping the globe uniformly, the 'third wave of democratization' left burgeoning republics and resilient dictatorships in its wake. Applying more than a year of original fieldwork in Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, and the Philippines, in this 2007 book Jason Brownlee shows that the mixed record of recent democratization is best deciphered through a historical and institutional approach to authoritarian rule. Exposing the internal organizations that structure elite conflict, Brownlee demonstrates why the critical soft-liners needed for democratic transitions have been dormant in Egypt and Malaysia but outspoken in Iran and the Philippines. By establishing how ruling parties originated and why they impede change, Brownlee illuminates the problem of contemporary authoritarianism and informs the promotion of durable democracy.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“And Brownlee (2007: 218f.) has observed that parties often play a vital role in facilitating the maintenance of electoral authoritarian regimes.”
From Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (2008) · cites this paper as Brownlee 2007: 218f.
Citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Elections Under Authoritarianism
Gandhi, J., & Lust, E. (2009) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060106.095434 · Cited by 1,152
“Indeed, Brownlee (2007) finds no evidence that elections affect regime survival in a large-n analysis of authoritarian regimes, although he does find that holding elections under an authoritarian regime increases the likelihood that a subsequent regime will be democratic (Brownlee 2009).”
BackgroundThe three pillars of stability: Legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes
Gerschewski, J. (2013) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.738860 · Cited by 1,053
Boix, C., & Svolik, M. W. (2013) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381613000029 · Cited by 1,059
Political Order and One-Party Rule
Magaloni, B., & Kricheli, R. (2010) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220529 · Cited by 628
“…dictators might find it beneficial to allow political competition in order to gather information about the loyalty of their party cadres and about the actual power their opponents enjoy (Ames 1970, Magaloni 2006, Birney 2007, Brownlee 2007, Cox 2008, Kricheli 2008, Blaydes 2009, Lorentzen 2009).”
BackgroundPower Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes
Svolik, M. W. (2009) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00382.x · Cited by 626
“A growing literature examines the role of parties (Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2006; Smith 2005), legislatures (Boix and Svolik 2007; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Myerson 2008; Wright 2008), elections (Blaydes 2007; Lust-Okar 2006), or the bureaucracy (Slater 2003) in authoritarian regimes.”
BackgroundRemote Control: How the Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule in China
Stockmann, D., & Gallagher, M. E. (2011) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414010394773 · Cited by 575
The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism
Pepinsky, T. (2014) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123413000021 · Cited by 511
“33 See, for example, Brownlee 2009; Weeks 2008; Wright 2008. in response to internal splits’.34 This prediction does not follow from the existence of a co-ordination game, for the mere existence of multiple equilibria has no bearing on the stability of any single equilibrium.”
BackgroundInfluentialStrongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict
WEEKS, J. L. P. (2012) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000111 · Cited by 531
“14 Space does not permit exploring the merits of alternative ways of differentiating among authoritarian regimes, but see Arendt (1951), Brooker (2000), Brownlee (2007), Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), Ezrow and Frantz (2011), Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956), FIGURE 1.”
BackgroundBeyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2012) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592712002861 · Cited by 423
“20 Brownlee 2007, 13.”
BackgroundInfluentialJiang, J. (2018) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12394 · Cited by 418
How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism
Bogaards, M. (2009) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510340902777800 · Cited by 402
After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State
Lynch, M. (2011) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592711000910 · Cited by 388
Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings
Pearlman, W. (2013) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592713001072 · Cited by 382
“147 Brownlee 2007a. 148 Blaydes 2011.”
Authoritarian regime types revisited: updated data in comparative perspective
Wahman, M., Teorell, J., & Hadenius, A. (2013) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2013.773200 · Cited by 360
“During the 1990s and 2000s, several authors have researched the role of these elections in authoritarian regimes (Brownlee 2007, Greene 2007, Gandhi and Lust Okar 2009, Levitsky and Way 2010).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialHyde, S. (2011) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/cornell/9780801449666.001.0001 · Cited by 349
The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?
Weyland, K. (2012) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592712002873 · Cited by 333
“52 Brownlee 2007, ch. 1, 3–4.”
The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison
Slater, D., & Ziblatt, D. F. (2013) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414012472469 · Cited by 348
“And why have so many authoritarian regimes in the postcolonial world survived the end of the Cold War whereas many others have collapsed (Brownlee, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Slater, 2010)?”
BackgroundSubnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments
Reuter, O. J., & Robertson, G. B. (2011) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381612000631 · Cited by 341
Democracy prevention: The international collaboration of authoritarian regimes
von Soest, C. (2015) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12100 · Cited by 301
“In addition to these internal characteristics, the revived research on authoritarian regimes has increasingly recognised the international dimensions of authoritarianism (Ambrosio 2010; Brownlee 2007; Bunce & Wolchik 2011; Burnell 2010; Levitsky & Way 2002, 2010).”
BackgroundWhat autocracies say (and what citizens hear): proposing four mechanisms of autocratic legitimation
Dukalskis, A., & Gerschewski, J. (2017) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2017.1304320 · Cited by 297
“Institutions like parties, parliaments, courts, and elections are discussed mainly insofar as they provide the autocratic regime with functioning avenues for co-optation and repression (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012).”
Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects
Brancati, D. (2013) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-052013-115248 · Cited by 284
“Multiparty elections help regimes identify discontent because votes for opposition candidates reveal the constituencies in which regimes have weak support (Brownlee 2007, Magaloni 2008).”
BackgroundCivil Society under Authoritarianism: The China Model
Teets, J. C. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139839396 · Cited by 198
Constituency Service Under Nondemocratic Rule: Evidence from China
Distelhorst, G., & Hou, Y. (2016) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/690948 · Cited by 315
Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy
Wright, J., & Escribà‐Folch, A. (2011) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123411000317 · Cited by 260
Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes
Miller, M. K. (2014) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414014555443 · Cited by 248
“A number of case studies also examine how hybrid regimes manipulate democratic elements (Blaydes, 2011; Brownlee, 2007; Hermet, Rose, & Rouquié, 1978; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Magaloni, 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialElections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes
Donno, D. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12013 · Cited by 247
“Election results matter because they signal the regime’s level of control over the political arena (Brownlee 2007, 3), as well as (more noisily) its level of popular support (Gandhi 2008, 167; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 405).”
BackgroundLaw and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes
Moustafa, T. (2014) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110413-030532 · Cited by 245
“Authoritarian regimes increasingly rely upon institutional forms commonly associated with liberal democracy, first among them relatively independent judiciaries and multiparty elections (Brownlee 2007).”
BackgroundThe Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia
Slater, D., & Wong, J. (2013) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592713002090 · Cited by 228
“5 Levitsky and Way 2010; Smith 2007; Brownlee 2007; and Slater 2010.”
BackgroundUnderstanding Turkey’s democratic breakdown: old vs. new and indigenous vs. global authoritarianism
Somer, M. (2016) · Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies · doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1246548 · Cited by 220
“Among others (McFaul 2002; Brownlee 2007; Stepan 2009; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Diamond 2015).”
BackgroundThe AKP after 15 years: emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey
Yılmaz, İ., & Bashirov, G. (2018) · Third World Quarterly · doi:10.1080/01436597.2018.1447371 · Cited by 213
Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Meng, A. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108877497 · Cited by 215
Gehlbach, S. G., & Keefer, P. E. (2012) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381611001952 · Cited by 215
“Brownlee (2007) argues that parties serve to hold elite coalitions together; the analysis here can be seen as describing organizational prerequisites for elite cohesion.”
BackgroundSvolik, M. W. (2012) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002712449327 · Cited by 201
“See, for example, Boix and Svolik (2011), Brownlee (2007), Gandhi (2008), Gandhi and Przeworski (2006, 2007), Geddes (1999b, 2009), Gehlbach and Keefer (2008), Magaloni (2006), Smith (2005), Weeks (2008), and J. Wright (2008).”
BackgroundLegitimacy in Autocracies: Oxymoron or Essential Feature?
Gerschewski, J. (2018) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592717002183 · Cited by 209
“4 Brownlee 2007, Magaloni 2006, Smith 2005.”
Ziblatt, D. (2008) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.0.0021 · Cited by 187
Managing Society: Protest, Civil Society, and Regime in Putin's Russia
Robertson, G. B. (2009) · Slavic Review · doi:10.1017/s0037677900019719 · Cited by 191
Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties
Reuter, O. J., & Gandhi, J. (2010) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123410000293 · Cited by 188
Civil Society and the Authoritarian State: Cooperation, Contestation and Discourse
Lewis, D. G. (2013) · Journal of Civil Society · doi:10.1080/17448689.2013.818767 · Cited by 216
“…remains limited in comparison with that devoted to the role of civil society during periods of democratization, but it has expanded rapidly alongside an upsurge of theoretical interest in authoritarianism as a political system (on the latter, see Art, 2012; Brownlee, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010).”
BackgroundStreet Politics in a Hybrid Regime: The Diffusion of Political Activism in Post-colonial Hong Kong
Cheng, E. W. (2016) · The China Quarterly · doi:10.1017/s0305741016000394 · Cited by 144
“The result of these intricate electoral systems is an executive–legislative deadlock, with a pro-regime majority guaranteed in the legislature while the accountability of lawmakers is fragmented and spread among their diverse electorates.24 22 Levitsky and Way 2012, 871–72; Brownlee 2007, 12.”
BackgroundThe new research agenda studying electoral integrity
Norris, P. (2013) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.07.015 · Cited by 180
Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development
Miller, M. K. (2015) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414015582051 · Cited by 185
Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes
Gilbert, L., & Mohseni, P. (2011) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/s12116-011-9088-x · Cited by 188
“Furthermore, rather than call for the abandonment of the concept of hybrid regimes altogether as some scholars have done (Armony and Schamis 2005; Brownlee 2007), it proposes an alternative perspective from which to re-design the conceptual field of political regimes.”
BackgroundParty Strength and Economic Growth
Bizzarro, F., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Hicken, A. D., Bernhard, M. H., Skaaning, S., Coppedge, M., & Lindberg, S. I. (2018) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887117000375 · Cited by 185
“…in the 1950s, reflecting the creation of three ethnically based parties (umno, mca, and mic) and their banding together in the ruling alliance—a pact that has formed the 71 Brownlee 2007; croissant and Volkel 2012; hicken and Kuhonta 2015; hutchroft and rocamora 2003; Quimpo 2005; Ufen 2012.”
BackgroundRegime Threats and State Solutions
Hassan, M. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108858960 · Cited by 188
Shadows From the Past: Party System Institutionalization in Asia
Hicken, A. D., & Kuhonta, E. M. (2011) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414010396460 · Cited by 165
Governing Civil Society: The Political Logic of NGO–State Relations Under Dictatorship
Heurlin, C. (2009) · VOLUNTAS International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11266-009-9103-2 · Cited by 164
The Single‐Party Dictator's Dilemma: Information in Elections without Opposition
Malesky, E. J., & Schuler, P. (2011) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00025.x · Cited by 170
von Billerbeck, S., & Tansey, O. (2019) · European Journal of International Relations · doi:10.1177/1354066118819724 · Cited by 163
“Second, the scholarship in this area remains almost entirely divorced from the large and growing literature on authoritarianism (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012).”
BackgroundEconomic Development, Violent Leader Removal, and Democratization
Miller, M. K. (2012) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00595.x · Cited by 161
“…in coercive capacity (Bellin 2004; Ross 2001; Way 2005), party institutions (Brownlee 2007; Geddes 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010; Magaloni 2008; Smith 2005; Way 2005, 2008), state penetration (Levitsky and Way 2010; Slater 2006), and internal cohesion (Brownlee 2007; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).”
BackgroundThe Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-Sharing in DictatorshipsPreprint
Boix, C., & Svolik, M. W. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1352065 · Cited by 148
Rosenfeld, B. R. M. (2017) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305541700034x · Cited by 157
“…builds on and contributes to the literature on co-optation in autocracies by looking beyond the role of formal political institutions—regime parties, legislatures, and elections—in co-opting elite actors (Gerschewski 2013; Svolik 2012; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni 2006).”
BackgroundStalin’s terror and the long-term political effects of mass repression
Zhukov, Y. M., & Talibova, R. (2018) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343317751261 · Cited by 157
“…matters greatly for public policy and democratic development, because it shapes the set of preferences and opinions to which the government responds.1 Even in non- democratic states, regimes often look to elections as a source of legitimacy and corrective feedback (Brownlee, 2007; Magaloni, 2006).”
BackgroundElite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia
Reuter, O. J., & Szakonyi, D. (2019) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055419000030 · Cited by 155
“Indeed,elitedefectionplaysacentralroleinmanyofthe mostprominentrecentstudiesofauthoritarian longevity (Brownlee 2007; Hale 2014; Levitsky and Way 2010; Magaloni 2006).”
The Regional Roots of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia
Golosov, G. V. (2011) · Europe Asia Studies · doi:10.1080/09668136.2011.566427 · Cited by 151
“If alteration in power occurs, the underlying mechanisms involve not only elections but rather multidimensional processes of political change (Bunce & Wolchik 2010, p. 43; Brownlee 2007).”
BackgroundThe Power of Counterrevolution: Elitist Origins of Political Order in Postcolonial Asia and Africa
Slater, D., & Smith, N. R. (2016) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/684199 · Cited by 154
Lawson, G. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108697385 · Cited by 159
Slater, D., & Ziblatt, D. (1982) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(82)90242-6 · Cited by 149
Regime legitimation, elite cohesion and the durability of autocratic regime types
Kailitz, S., & Stockemer, D. (2015) · International Political Science Review · doi:10.1177/0192512115616830 · Cited by 153
“In the ‘age of democratization’ (Brownlee, 2007) and a ‘Western’ liberal hegemony in the international system (Levitsky and Way, 2010), establishing a new communist ideocracy or a new ruling monarchy seems hardly possible.”
BackgroundSocial Revolution and Authoritarian Durability
Lachapelle, J., Levitsky, S., Way, L. A., & Casey, A. E. (2020) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887120000106 · Cited by 154
“60 O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007.”
BackgroundInfluentialElectoral Politics in Africa since 1990
Bleck, J., & van de Walle, N. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316676936 · Cited by 152
Comunello, F., & Anzera, G. (2012) · Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations · doi:10.1080/09596410.2012.712435 · Cited by 165
“As scholars have repeatedly pointed out (Linz and Chehabi 1998; Brownlee 2002, 2007, 2009), the neopatrimonial state is not based on a specific ideological system, as its main purpose is the maintenance of personal power; in some cases the ‘sultan’ may concede to formal elections or the formation…”
BackgroundThe Ideological Shadow of Authoritarianism
Dinas, E., & Northmore-Ball, K. (2020) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414019852699 · Cited by 138
Promoting democracy – promoting autocracy? International politics and national political regimes
Burnell, P., & Schlumberger, O. (2010) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569771003593805 · Cited by 137
“…politics and the question of contestation, however limited or constrained, can be incorporated even in authoritarian regimes (Schedler 2006, Brownlee 2007); the ‘management’ of oppositional forces by incumbent regimes (Lust-Okar 2005); the creation of regime legitimacy (Gilley 2009) or…”
BackgroundEducated acquiescence: how academia sustains authoritarianism in China
Perry, E. J. (2019) · Theory and Society · doi:10.1007/s11186-019-09373-1 · Cited by 139
“Such conflict, they suggest, gives rise to the strong political parties that scholars such as Barbara Geddes (1999), Beatriz Magaloni (2006), Jason Brownlee (2007), and Milan Svolik(2012) have identified as critical for authoritarian persistence.”
BackgroundMaking It Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation
Way, C. R., & WEEKS, J. L. P. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12080 · Cited by 133
Albertus, M., Fenner, S., & Slater, D. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108644334 · Cited by 136
The Origins of Dominant Parties
Reuter, O. J. (2017) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316761649 · Cited by 129
Peters, A. M., & Moore, P. W. (2009) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/s12116-009-9053-0 · Cited by 128
Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure
Escribà‐Folch, A. (2011) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414011427883 · Cited by 124
“As a result, dominant party systems generate and maintain a cohesive leadership cadre (Brownlee, 2007; Smith, 2005).”
BackgroundDesrosiers, M.-È., & Thomson, S. M. (2011) · The Journal of Modern African Studies · doi:10.1017/s0022278x11000279 · Cited by 124
Slater, D. (2009) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/597796 · Cited by 119
Internal Government Assessments of the Quality of Governance in China
Dimitrov, M. K. (2015) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/s12116-014-9170-2 · Cited by 120
Authoritarian Institutions and Women’s Rights
Donno, D., & Kreft, A.-K. (2019) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414018797954 · Cited by 121
“…political base (Gandhi, 2008, pp. 78-79); “transmit societal concerns” and create an “arena in which those perspectives are renegotiated and reconciled” (Brownlee, 2007, p. 203); and can be used to coopt key segments of the general population (Svolik, 2012, p. 165).8 Military regimes generally…”
BackgroundCapital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic Societies
Arriola, L. R. (2013) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887113000051 · Cited by 120
“…in african countries hardly changed over the ten-year period from 1965 to 1975—only increasing from four banks to five.24 the gatekeeping position that african governments acquired in finance afforded them the discretionary control needed to make the 21 lust-Okar 2005; Magaloni 2006; Brownlee 2007.”
BackgroundDéjà vu? Polarization and Endangered Democracies in the 21st Century
Somer, M., & McCoy, J. (2018) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/0002764218760371 · Cited by 146
“For some time now, scholars have been cautioning that democracies are in danger (Bermeo, 2016; Brownlee, 2007; Diamond, 2015; Schedler, 2002; Stepan, 2009).”
BackgroundStrongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International ConflictPreprint
WEEKS, J. L. P. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1748516 · Cited by 118
Legislative Development in Africa
Opalo, K. O. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108684651 · Cited by 127
Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes
Chang, E. C. C., & Golden, M. A. (2010) · Social Science Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00678.x · Cited by 120
The Politics of Dominant Party Formation: United Russia and Russia's Governors
Reuter, O. J. (2010) · Europe Asia Studies · doi:10.1080/09668130903506847 · Cited by 111
“By providing institutional guarantees about policy making and the distribution of spoils it gives elites an incentive to remain loyal to the regime (Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialWeapons of the Powerful: Authoritarian Elite Competition and Politicized Anticorruption in China
Zhu, J., & Zhang, D. (2016) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414016672234 · Cited by 112
“Second, the current literature on authoritarianism emphasizes the role of elite unity and power sharing in sustaining authoritarianism (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012), whereas our findings suggest that elite cleavage may deter unbridled corruption.”
The Fingerprints of Fraud: Evidence from Mexico’s 1988 Presidential Election
Cantú, F. (2019) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055419000285 · Cited by 105
“…regulate the competition for power, non-democratic elections act as means to distribute the spoils (Blaydes 2011; Magaloni 2006), mitigate intra-regime conflicts (Boix and Svolik 2013; Geddes 2006), or solve information problems (Brownlee 2007; Cox 2009; Lust-Okar 2005; Malesky and Schuler 2011).”
BackgroundDictatorial Institutions and their Impact on Economic Growth
Gandhi, J. (2008) · European Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1017/s0003975608000015 · Cited by 107
“A regime party also serves to maintain stable mechanisms for recruitment and the distribution of patronage among elites (Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2006).”
BackgroundIn Praise of Organization: Egypt between Activism and Revolution
Abdelrahman, M. (2013) · Development and Change · doi:10.1111/dech.12028 · Cited by 105
Ufen, A. (2008) · The Pacific Review · doi:10.1080/09512740802134174 · Cited by 104
Authoritarian Parochialism: Local Congressional Representation in China
Manion, M. (2014) · The China Quarterly · doi:10.1017/s0305741014000319 · Cited by 99
“See Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Magaloni 2006; Schedler 2006; Brownlee 2007.”
BackgroundRegional patrons and hegemonic party electoral performance in Russia
Reuter, O. J. (2013) · Post-Soviet Affairs · doi:10.1080/1060586x.2013.780410 · Cited by 102
“Brownlee (2007) argues that successful dominant parties are those in which rival elite factions put their differences to bed and cooperate within the framework of the ruling party.”
BackgroundState capacity and the paradox of authoritarian elections
Seeberg, M. B. (2014) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.960210 · Cited by 104
Neither repression nor concession? A regime's attrition against mass protests
Hei, S. Y. W., & Wai, E. (2017) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0032321716674024 · Cited by 72
Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks
Wilson, M. C., & Piazza, J. A. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12028 · Cited by 101
“The creation of institutions such as a legislature, political parties, and bureaucratic offices generates positions that elites and opposition members can be used to fill, which is another form of cooptation (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008).”
BackgroundNoble, B. (2018) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414018797941 · Cited by 110
“An alternative account could be that executive actors prefer the relative privacy of party venues for the resolution of policy conflicts (Brownlee, 2007).”
BackgroundHassan, M., Mattingly, D., & Nugent, E. R. (2022) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051120-013321 · Cited by 113
Jackson, N. J. (2010) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569771003593920 · Cited by 98
“Significantly, these hybrid regimes are not all evolving in the direction of liberal democracy (Croissant and Merkel 2004, Brownlee 2007).”
BackgroundPower-Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian RegimesPreprint
Svolik, M. W. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.860744 · Cited by 96
Slater, D. (2008) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/s12116-008-9026-8 · Cited by 92
Power Tool or Dull Blade? Selectorate Theory for Autocracies
Gallagher, M. E., & Hanson, J. K. (2015) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-071213-041224 · Cited by 100
Social services to claim legitimacy: comparing autocracies’ performance
Cassani, A. (2017) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2017.1304321 · Cited by 101
“Conclusion: social service performance and the electoral authoritarianism’s legitimacy advantage hypothesis This research adds to our understanding of how authoritarianism can survive ‘in an age of democratisation’ (Brownlee, 2007).”
BackgroundResponsive Authoritarianism in China -- a Review of Responsiveness in Xi and Hu Administrations
Qiaoan, R., & Teets, J. C. (2019) · Journal of Chinese Political Science · doi:10.1007/s11366-019-09640-z · Cited by 106
El‐Mahdi, R. (2009) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414009331719 · Cited by 94
Mass Organization and the Durability of Competitive Authoritarian Regimes
Handlin, S. P. (2016) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414016628186 · Cited by 92
“Mass organization can enhance autocratic durability through social control and the mobilization of popular support, especially during elections (Brownlee, 2007; Huntington, 1968; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Magaloni, 2006; Zolberg, 1966).”
BackgroundInfluentialDominant Party Rule, Elections, and Cabinet Instability in African Autocracies
Kroeger, A. M. (2018) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123417000497 · Cited by 95
“35 Brownlee 2007, 39.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Brownlee, J.
- Affiliations
- The University of Texas at Austin (US)
- Corresponding author
- Brownlee, Jason
- ORCID
- Brownlee, Jason
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2007-07-16
- OpenAlex
- W4302416674
- Cited by
- 1,070
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 67 · 2025: 64 · 2024: 47 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 54 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 88 · 2019: 117 · 2018: 127 · 2017: 75 · 2016: 62 · 2015: 60 · 2014: 39 · 2013: 44 · 2012: 34
- FWCI
- 29.57
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Asian Studies and History
- Keywords
- authoritarianism, democratization, third wave of democratization, elite conflict, ruling party, democratic transition, soft lining materials, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, Philippines
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review