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Cited by 16Economic and Fiscal StudiesConsumer Market Behavior and PricingTaxation and Compliance Studies

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Taxes and Consumer Behavior

Olivola, Christopher Y., Sussman, Abigail B.·2015·The Cambridge Handbook of Consumer Psychology
DOI 10.1017/cbo9781107706552.021
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Metadata

Authors
Olivola, C. Y., & Sussman, A. B.
ORCID
Venue
The Cambridge Handbook of Consumer Psychology
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Published
2015-09-09
Pages
564-588
DOI
10.1017/cbo9781107706552.021
OpenAlex
W2486928835
Cited by
16
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 3 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 2 · 2016: 1
FWCI
6.09
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 26 d)
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
Keywords
taxation, consumer behavior, demand, price elasticity, tax incidence

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