EXPERT-ORIENTED ABILITIES VS. NOVICE-ORIENTED ABILITIES: AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
According to a recent account of epistemic authority proposed by Linda Zagzebski (2012), it is rational for laypersons to believe on authority when they conscientiously judge that the authority is more likely to form true beliefs and avoid false ones than they are in some domain. Christoph Jäger (2016) has recently raised several objections to her view. By contrast, I argue that both theories fail to adequately capture what epistemic authority is, and I offer an alternative account grounded in the abilities that different kinds of authorities are required to possess.
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Citations
Cites
Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?
GOLDMAN, A. I. (2001) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x · Cited by 911 · cited 1×
“(Goldman 2001: 91) According to this denition, the expert is required to possess (a) superior reliability to most people within a given domain and (b) the intellectual ability to generate knowledge within that domain.”
BackgroundEpistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief
Zagzebski, L. T. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.001.0001 · Cited by 489 · cited 12×
“4 It is wise to mention that, following Zagzebski, I work under the assumption that S is conscientious as well, that is conscientious enough to realize that he has evidence that some individuals are more conscientious than he is in a given domain (see Zagzebski 2012: 57).”
BackgroundInfluentialElgin, C. (2007) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9054-z · Cited by 309 · cited 1×
“…matters, theories, and bodies of information requiring explanation, rather than mere propositions (“propositional understanding”, Kvanvig 2009: 96).16 Moreover, I take understanding to be an epistemic success that varies along three main dimensions: breadth, depth, and signicance (see Elgin 2007).”
BackgroundWhat to believe now: applying epistemology to contemporary issues
(2012) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.50-1383 · Cited by 274
EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, PREEMPTIVE REASONS, AND UNDERSTANDING
Jäger, C. (2016) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2015.38 · Cited by 144
Cited by
Ferrario, A., Facchini, A., & Termine, A. (2024) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-024-09681-1 · Cited by 64
“The list is not exhaustive; for instance, firmness is also mentioned in the literature (Croce, 2018, 2019a).”
InfluentialArtificial Epistemic Authorities
Hauswald, R. (2025) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2025.2449602 · Cited by 46
“Publications discussing preemption include Benton (2014), Bokros (2021), Boyd (2022), Constantin and Grundmann (2020), Croce (2018, 2019), Dormandy (2018), Grundmann (2021a, 2021b), Jäger (2016), Keren (2014a, 2014b, 2020), Lackey (2016, 2018, 2021), Leefmann and Lesle (2020), McMyler (2014),…”
For A Service Conception of Epistemic Authority: A Collective Approach
Croce, M. (2019) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2019.1577511 · Cited by 27
Self-citationChatGPT, Education, and Understanding
Malfatti, F. I. (2025) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2025.2449599 · Cited by 21
“Epistemic care is, in a first approximation, care about another agent’s epistemic well-being (Croce 2018, 2019; Johnson 2022).”
Lange, B. (2026) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-01377-4_9 · Cited by 12
AI and the Philosophy of Expertise and Epistemic Authority
Hauswald, R. (2025) · A Companion to Applied Philosophy of AI · doi:10.1002/9781394238651.ch5 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Croce, M.
- Venue
- Episteme
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2017-05-23
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 476-498
- ISSN
- 1742-3600 (ISSN-L)
- 1750-0117
- OpenAlex
- W2606846346
- Cited by
- 67
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 25.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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