Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate

“(Some authors have already made a start: e.g., Druckman 2001, 72n11; Iyengar et al. 2008, 195; and Jost et al. 2003.)”

“…influential piece argues that the preferences of party elites shape the preferences of voters by choosing their location in the policy space, and more recently Bullock (2011) and Sohlberg (2017) find that the positions taken by party elites influence voters’ preferences and ultimately behavior.”

“Extending fundamental insights about the political implications of biased beliefs (31, 32), this suggests that public support for diversity reforms can be increased by reducing unfounded optimism about minority representation in policing.”

“This research generates expectations about real-world framing, including the hypothesis that framing effects will be especially pronounced when the frames come from trusted elites within one’s party (Druckman 2003; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010; but see Bullock 2011).”

“Moreover, in line with recent evidence on partisan perceptual biases, we find that providing factual information on the economy does little to reduce the gap in perceptions between Leavers and Remainers (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010; Bullock, 2011; Kuklinski et al., 2000).”

“…leadership can affect political opinions reveal a variety of ways this can occur - such as influencing public opinion through their policy cues (Bullock, 2011), biased perceptions and actions on policy issues as a result of partisanship (Butler and Dynes, 2016; Broockman and Skovron, 2018;…”

“The substance of policies and debates certainly matters and, as argued in recent work [32], perhaps more so than partisanship.”

“Under some experimental conditions, this assertion has recently been confirmed (Bullock 2011), and it directly contradicts the notion that cueing is the most important vehicle through which the mass media may affect public opinion.”

“…of the messaging of party elites (e.g., Bondreau and Mackenzie 2014; Broockman and Butler 2017; Lenz 2009, 2012; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013), but others have argued that personal considerations and information can limit the impact of par-tisanship (e.g., Bullock 2011; Nicholson 2011).”

“…videos, given the generally low level of political involvement among average US citizens (Achen and Bartels 2017) and the general tendency to avoid identity-threatening messages (Bullock 2011), we consider it unlikely that a large share of respondents had already watched the 8-minute videos.”

“…who shares their partisan identity (Zaller 1992; Redlawsk 2002; Cohen 2003; Taber and Lodge 2006; Arceneaux 2008; Goren, Frederico, and Kittilson 2009; Bullock 2011; Druckman, Fein, and Leeper 2012; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012; Nicholson 2012; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013).”

“These findings are corroborated by various studies on party cues (Bullock, 2011).”

“These findings square with earlier research indicating that elite cues can powerfully shape public opinion above and beyond policy outputs (for example, Bullock 2011).”

“As voters often use political parties as ‘reference groups’, parties have considerable influence over public opinion formation (Goren et al. 2009, Slothuus 2010, Bullock 2011, Nicholson 2012).”

“…party cue designs that manipulate in-party and out-party cues in favour or opposed to certain policies to influence attitudes (see, for example Bullock, 2011; Kam, 2005; Malka and Lelkes, 2010; Merkley and Stecula, 2020; Mullinix, 2016; Nicholson, 2012) and outcome switching designs that…”

“In other words, those individuals who affiliate themselves with the Republican party usually follow the policy stances of influential opinion leaders of the same political persuasion; and vice-versa among Democrats (Bullock 2011).”

“Being more ideologically cohesive than liberals (Grossmann and Hopkins, 2015; Lelkes and Sniderman, 2016), conservatives have also found to be more actively engaged in defending their party’s issue stances (Bullock, 2011; Jost, 2017).”

“…surveys (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017), another school of thought contends that a growing segment of the American public does care about issues (Bullock, 2011; Carsey & Lay-man, 2006; Mummolo et al., 2021), and their ability to connect their issue stances to their party evaluations has been…”

“Following previous research, we group together subjects who identify as strong, weak, and leaning partisans (Baum and Groeling 2009; Druckman 2001; Bullock 2011; Keith et al. 1992; Petrocik 2009).19 Figures 2–4 present the results, divided by party identification, for three different outcome…”

“Including the information about the pros and cons allows us to see whether officials exhibited a bias even when they had other information (Bullock 2011).”

“Although informal comparisons suggest that political identities of policy proposers have larger impacts in the United States than in other countries (Bullock, 2011; Colombo & Kriesi, 2017), direct comparisons have been hampered because different countries often confront different policy issues.”

“Recent experimental evidence suggests that perceptual biases among partisans may be diminished when individuals possess specific information about a policy or issue (Bullock, 2011), or when offered incentives for giving “correct” responses (Bullock, Gerber, Hill, & Huber, 2013).”

“While mimicry is the more common interpretation (e.g., Lenz 2012), partisan cues may facilitate independent reasoning (Bullock 2009, 2011; Hill and Huber 2019).”

“Second, people are less likely to adopt positions that contradict their core beliefs, especially as these core beliefs become stronger as well as when the beliefs more relevant for a policy under discussion (Bullock 2011; Cavaillé and Neundorf 2023; Slothuus and Bisgaard 2021b).”

“Furthermore, the relationship be-tween public opinion and the political elites is bidirectional, as the public both notices and reacts to elite cues (Bullock, 2011; Cohen, 2003; Santoro et al., 2021), the perceived effects of new policies (Wlezien & Soroka, 2012), and attempts to sway public…”

“For example, the strength of the endorsement effect varies across experiments (Bullock, 2011).”

“Even though survey data makes causal identification difficult, this finding is consistent with past experimental evidence showing that Democrats are more responsive to persuasive appeals that include policy-based ideological cues than Republicans, which was noted as an anomaly by Bullock (2011).”

“Research indicates that elite cues which counter expert opinion lead citizens to go against such guidance (Darmofal, 2005) or at a minimum hold equal weight in citizens minds (Bullock, 2011).”

“…mismatch between parties and voters than assumed because parties are influenced by their voters (Adams et al., 2004; Bernardi et al., 2021; Engler & Zohlnhöfer, 2019; Romeijn, 2020) while parties are also able to shift the preferences of their voters (Bullock, 2011; Slothuus & Bisgaard, 2021).”

“Information effects on attitudes have also been documented in other policy areas, including estate tax eligibility (Sides, 2016), education (Howell & West, 2009), foreign aid (Gilens, 2001), criminal justice, (Gilens, 2001), the environment (Gilens, 2001), and healthcare (Bullock, 2011).”

“While there is debate about whether (or when) substantive information trumps partisan cues among the mass public (Bullock, 2011), experimental research suggests that the directional aspect of motivated reasoning is attenuated only with very strong accuracy inducements (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2012; Druckman, 2012) o…”

“…experts and individuals, often yielding the desired increase in information-seeking, evaluation, and persuasion on polarizing political topics despite partisan biases (Bullock 2011; Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014, 2018; Schuldt and Roh 2014; Bolsen and Druckman 2015; Jang and Hart 2015; Ozer 2020).”

“Second, previous research rarely combines party cues with other types of information (for a discussion, see Bullock 2011; Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014) and reaches conflicting conclusions about whether information benefits the most or least informed.”

“In particular, we expect that populist parties are exercising a cueing effect (Bullock, 2011; Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998) on their followers, by fuelling people’s grievances and suspicion against the elites, with the related willingness to ‘take back the control’ of decision making, as well as…”

“…issues besides regional integration as well as messages other than political explanations (Arceneaux, 2008; Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014; Bullock, 2011; Ciuk and Yost, 2016; Cohen, 2003; Kam, 2005; Mérola and Hitt, 2016; Mullinix, 2016; Nicholson, 2011; Petersen et al., 2013; Rahn,…”

“…al. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 98 (2022) 104231 for policies is influenced by political partisanship (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014; Bullock, 2011; Crawford, Kay, & Duke, 2015; Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979;…”

“John G. Bullock, 2011.”

“Independent “leaners” are grouped with partisans, following prior work (e.g., Bullock 2011; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Levendusky 2010), with pure independents excluded.”

“…both sides of the debate (increase registration and accurate lists) makes this a “hard case” to discern the effects of source cues, because respondents are “pre-treated” by their general knowledge prior to the experiment and by the information in the base question (Bullock, 2011; Slothuus, 2016).”

“Many studies have shown how public opinion tends to get affected by cue from elites (Zaller 1992; Bullock 2011).”

“Indeed, individuals do reach decisions based on the elements of a policy and systematically process the policy information presented to them in the analysed experiment (Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014, Bullock 2011).”

“Rather, the correspondence between social and economic conservatism among a citizenry depends on factors such as political sophistication and exposure to elite rhetoric (Bullock, 2011; Federico & Goren, 2009; Federico et al., 2011; Levendusky, 2009; Malka & Lelkes, 2010).”

“Research also shows that simple partisan cues may be less influential than previously thought, as citizens continue to pay attention to and process detailed policy information even when partisan cues are present (Arceneaux, 2008; Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2011; Bullock, 2011).”

“There is some experimental evidence suggesting elite cues are a substitute for knowledge, and that a well-informed electorate relies less on cues (Boudreau & MacKen-zie, 2014; Bullock, 2011; Grossman 2014).”

“The first is partisanship, which is known to moderate responsiveness to many political cues (Bullock, 2011; Bechtel, Hainmueller, Hangartner, & Helbling, 2015).”

“When citizens have significant information about policies, they are just as likely to use that information as elite cues when coming to their opinion about the policy (Bullock, 2011).”

“2015, p. 1), other research finds that exposure to policy information can weaken and potentially supersede the role of partisanship (Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014, 2018; Bullock 2011).8 In contrast with this latter body of research, however, our argument suggests 8 Druckman et al.”

“4,13,27 – 29)andarguments 23,30,31 presentedtothem.”

“This finding adds another piece of evidence to research on the effects of political elites (e.g., Bisgaard & Slothuus, 2018; Brader et al., 2020; Bullock, 2011; Colombo & Kriesi, 2017; Pannico, 2020) by showing that elite cues can influence not only public opinion and voting behavior, but also…”

“This in-group bias leads voters to discount or disregard new information that conflicts with their party’s stance (Bartels, 2002; Bolsen et al., 2014; Bullock, 2011; Druckman et al., 2013; Jerit and Barabas, 2012; Slothuus and De Vreese, 2010; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011).”

“Previous scholarship suggests that external cues have the strongest effect on those holding weak prior views, making them more susceptible to these messages (Bullock 2011).”