The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs: Coordination, Public Signals, and Punishment Dilemmas
Abstract
How can one analyze collective action in protests or revolutions when individuals are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution? We model a “calculus of protest” of individuals who must either submit to the status quo or support revolt based only on personal information about their payoffs. In deciding whether to revolt, the citizen must infer both the benefit of successful revolution and the likely actions of other citizens. We characterize conditions under which payoff uncertainty overturns conventional wisdom: (a) when a citizen is too willing to revolt, he reduces the incentives of others to revolt; (b) less accurate information about the value of revolution can make revolt more likely; (c) public signals from other citizens can reduce the likelihood of revolt; (d) harsher punishment can increase the incidence of punishment; and (e) the incidence of protest can be positively correlated with that of repression.
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Cites
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
Boix, C. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804960 · Cited by 2,211
State Repression and Political Order
Davenport, C. (2007) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216 · Cited by 1,564
The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91
Lohmann, S. (1994) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2950679 · Cited by 1,035 · cited 3×
“In this model, seeing enough individuals take an action can tip optimal actions, causing others to take the action (see Granovetter 1978; Kuran 1991; and especially Lohmann 1994, who extends Kuran’s model to integrate intertemporal information aggregation in a signaling context).”
BackgroundSparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution
Kuran, T. (1989) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00116762 · Cited by 905
How “Free” is Free Riding in Civil Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem
Kalyvas, S. N., & Kocher, M. A. (2007) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2007.0023 · Cited by 616
Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Edmond, C. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt020 · Cited by 433
The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion
Moore, W. H. (2000) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002700044001006 · Cited by 361 · cited 1×
“Both accommodation and repression are costly, and the state’s optimal policy weighs their relative costs (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Moore 2000; Shadmehr 2010).”
Background
Cited by
Przeworski, A. (2019) · doi:10.1017/9781108671019 · Cited by 599
Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · doi:10.1257/mac.1.2.88 · Cited by 576
Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Edmond, C. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt020 · Cited by 433
Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Allow Citizens to Voice Opinions Publicly?
Chen, J., & Xu, Y. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/690303 · Cited by 242
Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Antiauthoritarian Movement*
Cantoni, D., Yang, D. Y., Yuchtman, N., & Zhang, Y. J. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjz002 · Cited by 209
Metadata
- Authors
- SHADMEHR, M., & BERNHARDT, D.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2011-11
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 829-851
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W3125023345
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 7.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.