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Cited by 196

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs: Coordination, Public Signals, and Punishment Dilemmas

SHADMEHR, MEHDI, BERNHARDT, DAN·2011·American Political Science Review

Abstract

How can one analyze collective action in protests or revolutions when individuals are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution? We model a “calculus of protest” of individuals who must either submit to the status quo or support revolt based only on personal information about their payoffs. In deciding whether to revolt, the citizen must infer both the benefit of successful revolution and the likely actions of other citizens. We characterize conditions under which payoff uncertainty overturns conventional wisdom: (a) when a citizen is too willing to revolt, he reduces the incentives of others to revolt; (b) less accurate information about the value of revolution can make revolt more likely; (c) public signals from other citizens can reduce the likelihood of revolt; (d) harsher punishment can increase the incidence of punishment; and (e) the incidence of protest can be positively correlated with that of repression.

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Metadata

Authors
SHADMEHR, M., & BERNHARDT, D.
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
2011-11
Volume
105
Issue
4
Pages
829-851
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W3125023345
Cited by
196
References
8
FWCI
7.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs: Coordination, Public Signals, and Punishment Dilemmas. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0003055411000359
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SHADMEHR, M., & BERNHARDT, D. (2011). Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs: Coordination, Public Signals, and Punishment Dilemmas. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055411000359

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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