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Cited by 1,028Media Influence and PoliticsMisinformation and Its ImpactsSocial Media and Politics

How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument

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KING, GARY, PAN, JENNIFER, ROBERTS, MARGARET E.·2017·American Political Science Review
DOI 10.1017/s0003055417000144
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Abstract

The Chinese government has long been suspected of hiring as many as 2 million people to surreptitiously insert huge numbers of pseudonymous and other deceptive writings into the stream of real social media posts, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary people. Many academics, and most journalists and activists, claim that these so-called 50c party posts vociferously argue for the government’s side in political and policy debates. As we show, this is also true of most posts openly accused on social media of being 50c. Yet almost no systematic empirical evidence exists for this claim or, more importantly, for the Chinese regime’s strategic objective in pursuing this activity. In the first large-scale empirical analysis of this operation, we show how to identify the secretive authors of these posts, the posts written by them, and their content. We estimate that the government fabricates and posts about 448 million social media comments a year. In contrast to prior claims, we show that the Chinese regime’s strategy is to avoid arguing with skeptics of the party and the government, and to not even discuss controversial issues. We show that the goal of this massive secretive operation is instead to distract the public and change the subject, as most of these posts involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results fit with what is known about the Chinese censorship program and suggest how they may change our broader theoretical understanding of “common knowledge” and information control in authoritarian regimes.

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  • Tipping points in norm dynamics present both opportunities, such as addressing global challenges, and risks, particularly if exploited for social control.

    “tipping points in norm dynamics present both opportunities, such as addressing global challenges (28, 29), and risks, particularly if exploited for social control (76).”

    From Emergent social conventions and collective bias in LLM populations (2025) · cites this paper as [76]

    The Theoretical Implications section describes the Chinese government using fabricated posts and censorship to distract from discussions with collective-action potential, supporting the cited risk of social control. It does not examine tipping points in norm dynamics or show that such tipping points are being exploited. No page number is available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Paid users often help authorities with pro-government framing and manipulation.

    “Oftentimes, this is done with the help of paid users (Han, 2015; King etal., 2017).”

    From How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay (2020) · cites this paper as King et al., 2017

    The Coordination and Content section reports coordinated posts focused on cheerleading and possible distraction, supporting the claim that people help authorities shape online discussion. But Identifying 50c Party Members says nearly all identified posters were government employees and finds no evidence they received extra pay for posting; the description of them as paid users is therefore not established by this paper. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Censorship in China is driven more by a post's capacity to stir collective action than otherwise offensive content.

    “Censorship in China is driven more by a post’s capacity to stir collective action than otherwise offensive content (132).”

    From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [132]

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Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. Bandurski, David. 2008. "China's Guerrilla War for the Web." Far Eastern Economic Review 171(6): 41-44.
  2. Dimitrov, Martin K. 2014b. "Tracking Public Opinion Under Au- thoritarianism." Russian History 41(3): 329-53.
  3. Freedom House. 2009. "China and the Internet: An Uphill Fight for Freedom." Harvard International Review 31(2): 68-73.
  4. Groves, Robert M., Floyd J. Fowler, Jr, Mick P. Couper, James M. Lepkowski, Eleanor Singer, and Roger Tourangeau. 2011. Survey Methodology. Vol. 561. John Wiley & Sons: Please provide publisher location for Groves reference..
  5. Jeffrey N. Wasser- strom. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 301-324.
  6. National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2014. China Statistical Year Book. Beijing, CN: China Statistics Press. http://j.mp/ChinaSY.
  7. Pew Research Center. 2014. "The Political Typology: Beyond Red vs. Blue." Pew Research. http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/26/ the-political-typology-beyond-red-vs-blue/.
  8. Roger Noll. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 231-39.

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Authors
KING, G., PAN, J., & ROBERTS, M. E.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Stanford University (US)
  • University of California San Diego (US)
Corresponding author
  • KING, GARY
  • PAN, JENNIFER
  • ROBERTS, MARGARET E.
ORCID
Venue
American Political Science Review
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2017-07-27
Volume
111
Issue
3
Pages
484-501
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
DOI
10.1017/s0003055417000144
OpenAlex
W2741445211
Cited by
1,028
References
67
Citations by year
2026: 60 · 2025: 111 · 2024: 115 · 2023: 141 · 2022: 158 · 2021: 118 · 2020: 114 · 2019: 84 · 2018: 84 · 2017: 38 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 1
FWCI
224.04
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • American Political Science Review (publishedVersion, public-domain)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
Keywords
Chinese government, social media manipulation, authorship attribution, censorship, information control, authoritarian regimes, common knowledge, communist parties, cheerleading

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