Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to Restrain Government
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
It is widely believed that rents from windfall revenue undermine accountability. An enduring explanation is that windfalls free leaders from the need to tax, producing a quiescent population. Yet, there is little direct evidence of how windfalls and taxes affect citizen political action. I use novel revenue and information experiments to examine whether and why windfalls (compared to taxes) affect how citizens participate in politics. The experiments were embedded in a public awareness campaign conducted with 1,863 citizens in Indonesia. The results—from an original survey and postcard campaign—indicate that the tax treatment increased monitoring and anti-incumbent political action. Yet, when given spending information, citizens in the windfall treatment cared just as much about misused revenue as those in the tax treatment. The findings have important implications for understanding not only how revenue affects citizen political behavior but also how people acquire and process information on government spending.
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“…that speak indirectly to why windfalls might undermine accountability, including those centered on economic mechanisms like Dutch disease (Cordon and Neary 1982), rent-seeking by social groups (Tornell and Lane 1999), and civil conflict (Humphreys 2005). of the Middle East who sought to…”
BackgroundThe end of the transition paradigm
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Cited by
What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?
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FROM THE LAB TO THE FIELD: A REVIEW OF TAX EXPERIMENTS
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The extractive industries and development: The resource curse at the micro, meso and macro levels
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Tax Me, but Spend Wisely? Sources of Public Finance and Government Accountability
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“views with taxpayers and politicians (see for example Paler (2013)).”
BackgroundNatural Resource Rents, Local Taxes, and Government Performance: Evidence from Colombia
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Metadata
- Authors
- PALER, L.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2013-11
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 706-725
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2115852735
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 33.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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