The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Investment in Rural China
Open accessAbstract
Do informal institutions, rules, and norms created and enforced by social groups promote good local governance in environments of weak democratic or bureaucratic institutions? This question is difficult to answer because of challenges in defining and measuring informal institutions and identifying their causal effects. In the article, we investigate the effect of lineage groups, one of the most important vehicles of informal institutions in rural China, on local public goods expenditure. Using a panel dataset of 220 Chinese villages from 1986 to 2005, we find that village leaders from the two largest family clans in a village increased local public investment considerably. This association is stronger when the clans appeared to be more cohesive. We also find that clans helped local leaders overcome the collective action problem of financing public goods, but there is little evidence suggesting that they held local leaders accountable.
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Cites
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Ostrom, E. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511807763 · Cited by 20,653
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Field, B. C., & Ostrom, E. (1992) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146384 · Cited by 18,859
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Sufrin, S. C., & Olson, M. (1966) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2521228 · Cited by 11,518
Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda
Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592704040472 · Cited by 3,175
Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions
Alesina, A., Baqir, R., & Easterly, W. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556269 · Cited by 2,328
Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions
Alesina, A., Baqir, R., & Easterly, W. (1999) · Policy Research Working Papers · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2108 · Cited by 2,179
Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?
HABYARIMANA, J., HUMPHREYS, M., POSNER, D. N., & WEINSTEIN, J. M. (2007) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055407070499 · Cited by 1,319
History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India
Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054825574 · Cited by 1,268
Rightful Resistance in Rural China
O'Brien, K. J., & Li, L. (2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791086 · Cited by 1,104
Cited by
Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China
Chen, J., Pan, J., & Xu, Y. (2016) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12207 · Cited by 636
Self-citationLiu, L., Wang, Y., & Xu, Y. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3555463 · Cited by 142
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Metadata
- Authors
- XU, Y., & YAO, Y.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2015-04-23
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 371-391
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W3121644536
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 95.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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