Why are some international agreements informal?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 115 of the 115 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Informal agreements are the most common form of international cooperation and the least studied. Ranging from simple oral deals to detailed executive agreements, they permit states to conclude profitable bargains without the formality of treaties. They differ from treaties in more than just a procedural sense. Treaties are designed, by long-standing convention, to raise the credibility of promises by staking national reputation on their adherence. Informal agreements have a more ambiguous status and are useful for precisely that reason. They are chosen to avoid formal and visible national pledges, to avoid the political obstacles of ratification, to reach agreements quickly and quietly, and to provide flexibility for subsequent modification or even renunciation. They differ from formal agreements not because their substance is less important (the Cuban missile crisis was solved by informal agreement) but because the underlying promises are less visible and more equivocal. The prevalence of such informal devices thus reveals not only the possibilities of international cooperation but also the practical obstacles and the institutional limits to endogenous enforcement.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
(1985) · Cited by 7,244
Stigler, G. J. (1961) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258464 · Cited by 5,155
Connolly, T., & Axelrod, R. (1984) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392957 · Cited by 3,890
Stigler, G. J. (1976) · Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-51565-1_86 · Cited by 3,287
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting
Williamson, O. E. (2007) · Das Summa Summarum des Management · doi:10.1007/978-3-8349-9320-5_6 · Cited by 2,440
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
Becker, G. S., & Stigler, G. J. (1974) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467507 · Cited by 1,843
A Course in Microeconomic Theory
Kreps, D. M. (2020) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.23943/princeton/9780691202754.001.0001 · Cited by 1,592
Walt, S. M. (2019) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9780801469992 · Cited by 1,535
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce
Mnookin, R. H., & Kornhauser, L. (1979) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/795824 · Cited by 1,480
Kratochwil, F. V. (1989) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511559044 · Cited by 1,379
A Course in Microeconomic Theory
Kreps, D. M. (1990) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691215747 · Cited by 1,324
Sovereignty at bay: The multinational spread of U. S. enterprises
Vernon, R. (1971) · The International Executive · doi:10.1002/tie.5060130401 · Cited by 1,193
The Optimum Enforcement of Laws
Stigler, G. J. (1970) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259646 · Cited by 1,147
The Emergence of NormsPreprint
Ullmann‐Margalit, E. (1977) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 781
The Cement of Society: A Survey of Social Order
Elster, J. (1989) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624995 · Cited by 656
The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract
Fried, C., & Atiyah, P. S. (1980) · Harvard Law Review · doi:10.2307/1340627 · Cited by 607
A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements
Telser, L. G. (1980) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296069 · Cited by 603
A theory of self-enforcing agreements
(1987) · A Theory of Efficient Cooperation and Competition · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528378.007 · Cited by 599
Encyclopedia of Public International Law
Max-Planck-Institut (1981) · Cited by 571
Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade
Grieco, J. M. (1990) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9781501725043 · Cited by 523
The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract
Atiyah, P. S. (1985) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198255277.001.0001 · Cited by 417
International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs
Lipson, C. (1984) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010304 · Cited by 375
Self-citationCooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade
Diebold, W., & Grieco, J. M. (1990) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20044527 · Cited by 374
Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation
Atiyah, P. S., & Fried, C. (1981) · Harvard Law Review · doi:10.2307/1340714 · Cited by 357
Young, R. A., Oppenheim, L., & Lauterpacht, H. (1953) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.1177/106591295300600180 · Cited by 345
Young, R., Oppenheim, L., & Lauterpacht, H. (1953) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/443474 · Cited by 340
Fuller, L. L. (1941) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1117840 · Cited by 339
Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981
Smith, G., & Brzezinski, Z. (1983) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20041668 · Cited by 306
Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
Lipson, C. (1985) · University of California Press eBooks · doi:10.1525/9780520378599 · Cited by 305
Self-citationContract as promise : a theory of contractual obligation
Fried, C. (1981) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190240158.001.0001 · Cited by 286
The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898.
Bartlett, R., & LaFeber, W. (1964) · The Journal of Southern History · doi:10.2307/2204853 · Cited by 267
Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
Safarian, A. E., & Lipson, C. (1985) · International Journal · doi:10.2307/40202360 · Cited by 259
Self-citationEncyclopedia of public international law
Bernhardt, R., Völkerrecht, M.-P.-I. F. A. Ö. R. U., Bindschedler, R., & Macalister‐Smith, P. (1992) · Cited by 256
The reliance interest in contract damages
Fuller, L., & Perdue, W. (1982) · Readings in the Economics of Contract Law · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528248.019 · Cited by 242
The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements
Schachter, O. (1977) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.2307/2199530 · Cited by 239
Thirteen Days. A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Ruiz, R. E. (1971) · Hispanic American Historical Review · doi:10.1215/00182168-51.3.550 · Cited by 236
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1
Fuller, L. L., & Perdue, W. R. (1936) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/791632 · Cited by 226
The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898
(2017) · The SHAFR Guide Online · doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim280020084 · Cited by 207
The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments
Aust, A. (1986) · International and Comparative Law Quarterly · doi:10.1093/iclqaj/35.4.787 · Cited by 205
International Law in “Her Infinitye Variety”
Baxter, R. R. (1980) · International and Comparative Law Quarterly · doi:10.1093/iclqaj/29.4.549 · Cited by 188
Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre
Diebold, W., & Funabashi, Y. (1988) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20043698 · Cited by 186
Cutler, D. M., & Summers, L. H. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555697 · Cited by 182
Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the International Court of Justice
Briggs, H. W. (1974) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.2307/2198802 · Cited by 177
Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods
Gowa, J. (2019) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9781501745195 · Cited by 148
Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
Lipson, C. (1985) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 144
Self-citationThe Intimate Papers of Colonel House
Paxson, F. L., & Seymour, C. (1929) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1838599 · Cited by 122
Atwater, E. R. (1961) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1952543 · Cited by 115
The State and American foreign economic policy
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-4587 · Cited by 113
Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance
Keal, P. (1983) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-06224-9 · Cited by 113
A century of debt crises in Latin America: from independence to the Great Depression, 1820-1930
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-6372 · Cited by 110
A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America: From Independence to the Great Depression, 1820-1930
Gootenberg, P., & Marichal, C. (1990) · Hispanic American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/2516394 · Cited by 108
Lee, D. R., & Rubin, P. H. (1992) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1060404 · Cited by 102
Schlesinger, A. M. (1967) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20039280 · Cited by 98
The Rules of the Game: Reform and Evolution in the International Monetary System.
McCracken, P. W., & Dam, K. W. (1983) · Journal of money credit and banking · doi:10.2307/1992153 · Cited by 96
Brecher, M. (1989) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956517 · Cited by 90
Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan
Smith, G., & Garthoff, R. L. (1985) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20042503 · Cited by 87
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
Bilder, R. Β., & Henkin, L. (1973) · The American Journal of Comparative Law · doi:10.2307/839090 · Cited by 85
OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics
Diebold, W., & Skeet, I. (1989) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20044134 · Cited by 82
The failure of world monetary reform 1971–1974
Aliber, R. Z. (1978) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/0022-1996(78)90018-1 · Cited by 81
Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control
Schwartz, S. I. (2017) · The SHAFR Guide Online · doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim250060233 · Cited by 79
Repudiations and Confiscations by the Medieval State
Veitch, J. M. (1986) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700045484 · Cited by 77
What Went Wrong with Arms Control?
Schelling, T. C. (1985) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20042570 · Cited by 74
International economic 'soft law'
Seidl-Hohenveldern, I. (2010) · Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law · doi:10.1163/ej.9789028609303.165-246 · Cited by 72
Idelson, V. (1948) · International Affairs · doi:10.2307/3016972 · Cited by 71
Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community
Campbell, J. C., Ravin, D., & Melman, Y. (1990) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20044572 · Cited by 67
The Intimate Papers of Colonel House
Roubik, J. (1929) · Thought · doi:10.5840/thought19294324 · Cited by 66
Extradition in International Law
Kab, H. K., & 김용남 (2008) · Cited by 64
Managing the Risks of International Agreement
Bilder, R. Β. (1982) · Michigan Law Review · doi:10.2307/1288265 · Cited by 61
Diebold, W., & Kenen, P. Β. (1989) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20044135 · Cited by 57
Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan
Dallek, R., & Garthoff, R. L. (1986) · The Russian Review · doi:10.2307/130127 · Cited by 55
Strategy and arms control: Orbis Summer 1963
Pugh, G. E. (1963) · Survival · doi:10.1080/00396336308440436 · Cited by 52
Posner, R. A. (1979) · bepress Legal Repository · Cited by 51
Rogers, C. P., Kronman, A. T., & Posner, R. A. (1980) · Harvard Law Review · doi:10.2307/1340428 · Cited by 51
Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control
Downs, G. W., & Rocke, D. M. (1987) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010222 · Cited by 44
The Panama Canal in American Politics: Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy
Lael, R. L., & Hogan, J. M. (1987) · Journal of American History · doi:10.2307/1904157 · Cited by 43
Arms Control with and without Agreements
Adelman, K. L. (1984) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20042181 · Cited by 42
Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention
Campbell, J. C., & George, A. L. (1983) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20041601 · Cited by 42
The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification
Glennon, M. J. (1983) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.2307/2200853 · Cited by 40
Adams, J. Ν., & Brownsword, R. (1987) · Research Portal (King's College London) · Cited by 38
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
Plimpton, F. T. P., & Henkin, L. (1974) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1121728 · Cited by 38
The Failure of World Monetary Reform, 1971-74
Triffin, R. (2017) · The SHAFR Guide Online · doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim280020412 · Cited by 37
Limits to Friendship: The United States and Mexico
Moseley, E. H. (2017) · The SHAFR Guide Online · doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim050070064 · Cited by 37
The State and American Foreign Economic Policy
Barkey, H. J., Ikenberry, G. J., Lake, D. A., Mastanduno, M., Vernon, R., Spar, D. L., & Carter, B. E. (1989) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.2307/3325058 · Cited by 36
Myers, D. P. (1960) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.2307/2195341 · Cited by 34
The Strategy of Treaty Termination, Lawful Breaches and Retaliations
Ginsburgs, G., & David, A. E. (1976) · The American Journal of Comparative Law · doi:10.2307/839964 · Cited by 33
Bevans, C. I. (1976) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.2307/2200414 · Cited by 32
Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention.
Dunn, K. A., & George, A. L. (1983) · Military Affairs · doi:10.2307/1987864 · Cited by 31
Bennett, E. M., & Ulam, A. B. (1984) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1856030 · Cited by 30
Reciprocal measures for arms stabilization: From daedalus Fall 1960
Schelling, T. C. (1961) · Survival · doi:10.1080/00396336108440237 · Cited by 29
Limits to Friendship: The United States and Mexico
Lowenthal, A. F., Pastor, R. Α., & Castenada, J. G. (1989) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20043951 · Cited by 28
Keeble, L. B. (1977) · Royal Australian Planning Institute Journal · doi:10.1080/00049999.1977.9656525 · Cited by 26
The Limits of Victory: The Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties
Liss, S. B., & Moffett, G. D. (1985) · Journal of American History · doi:10.2307/1904391 · Cited by 26
Evans, A. E. (1973) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.2307/2199177 · Cited by 24
Superpower detente: a reappraisal
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-4707 · Cited by 24
Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan
Ramseyer, J. M. (1991) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467880 · Cited by 21
Joll, J. (1973) · Cited by 21
The Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the Executive
Smith, G., & Johnson, L. K. (1984) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20042213 · Cited by 19
The Limits of Victory: The Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties
Smith, G., & Moffett, G. D. (1985) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20042396 · Cited by 13
Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945
(1956) · International Relations · doi:10.1177/004711785600100617 · Cited by 11
The Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the Executive
Johnson, L. K. (1985) · Michigan Law Review · doi:10.2307/1288789 · Cited by 11
America's Moment, 1918, American Diplomacy at the End of World War I
Walworth, A. (2017) · The SHAFR Guide Online · doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim100120005 · Cited by 7
Marshall, J., & Blitzer, W. (1990) · Middle East Report · doi:10.2307/3013288 · Cited by 5
Atiyah, P. S. (1978) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 5
The Technology, Strategy, and Politics of SDI
Cimbala, S. J. (2019) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429315220 · Cited by 5
Superpower detente: a reappraisal
Garthoff, R. L. (1989) · International Affairs · doi:10.2307/2622075 · Cited by 4
The law and practice of extradition
Stanbrook, I., & Qc, C. S. (1980) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 3
The SALT Agreements: Content - Application - Verification
Calvo, M. A., & Calvo-Goller, N. K. (1987) · Brill | Nijhoff eBooks · doi:10.1163/9789004636101 · Cited by 3
4 MAKING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Bradley, C. A. (2024) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.4159/9780674297746-005 · Cited by 3
America's Moment: 1918. American Diplomacy at the End of World War I
Kernek, S. J., & Walworth, A. (1977) · Journal of American History · doi:10.2307/1901906 · Cited by 2
The Good Neighbors: America, Panama, and the 1977 Canal Treaties
McPherson, A. L. (2017) · The SHAFR Guide Online · doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim190140212 · Cited by 2
The Safeguard Issue in the Uruguay Round-A Comprehensive Approach
Kleen, P. (1989) · Journal of World Trade · doi:10.54648/trad1989037 · Cited by 2
Easton, C., & Rollyson, C. E. (1989) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 1
Steel Voluntary Restraint Agreements and Steel-Using Industries
Wassink, D., & Carbaugh, R. J. (1991) · Journal of World Trade · doi:10.54648/trad1991023 · Cited by 1
Research works printed but not linked: 37
- Garthoff, 1989, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 86
- Congress U.S. , Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress, Senate Report no. 92–591,92d Congress, 2d sess., 1972, pp. 3–4
- Mnookin and Kornhauser , “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law,” pp. 952–53
- George Alexander calls these elements “a pseudoagreement.” For the text of the agreement, see Department of State Bulletin, 26 06 1972, pp. 898–99
- Baxter , “International Law in 'Her Infinite Variety,'” pp. 554–55
- Schelling, 1985, Strategy and Arms Control, 77
- Bilder , Managing the Risks of International Agreement, pp. 49–51
- Ulam, 1983, Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970–1982, 260
- Petzinger, 1987, The Texaco-Pennzoil Wars
- Gooch, 1928, British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1898–1914, 3, 266
- Fein Esther B. , “Soviets Confirm Nazi Pacts Dividing Europe,” The New York Times, 19 08 1989, pp. 1
- Reuter, 1983, Disorganized Crime: Illegal Markets and the Mafia
- Bronckers, 1985, Selective Safeguard Measures in Multilateral Trade Relations: Issues of Protectionism in GA TT, European Community, and United States Law
- Marx, 1976, Goldwyn: A Biography of the Man Behind the Myth, 8
- 1954, The War Years, September 4, 1939—March 18, 1940, 8, 166
- McNair, 1961, The Law of Treaties
- 1986, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 32, 3111
- 1982, The President's press conference statement of 13 May 1982, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 18, 635
- 1982, Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 709
- 1985, President's statement of 10 June 1985, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 21, 770
- Leifer, 1989, Third Party China?, 1
- 1990, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control, 3
- 10.1093/iclqaj/29.4.549 · DOI · Paper page
- 1968, Anatomy of Law, 36
- Iran, 1983, A Review of the Imposed War
- 10.1086/296069 · DOI · Paper page
- 1985, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1981, 35, 238
- Schachter , “The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements,” p. 296 · DOI · Paper page
- Tanner James and Sullivan Allanna , “OPEC Peace May Be Short-Lived as Debate Looms on New Quotas,” Wall Street Journal, European edition, 12 06 1989, pp. 1
- 1982, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 18, 635
- 1973, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 23, 3435
- 1989, The Oxford English Dictionary, 17, 527
- 1975, International Legal Materials, 14, 1293
- Gumbel Peter , “Bonn Has Documents Soviets Don't Want Very Much to Find,” Wall Street Journal, European edition, 23–24 06 1989, pp. 1 and 10
- Fein Esther B. , “Soviet Congress Condemns ‘39 Pact That Led to Annexation of Baltics,” The New York Times, 25 12 1989, pp. 1
- Toscano, 1966, An Introduction to the History of Treaties and International Politics, 1, 42
- Elias, 1974, The Modern Law of Treaties
Cited by
Chayes, A., & Chayes, A. H. (1993) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027910 · Cited by 1,002
Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000
Elkins, Z., Guzman, A. T., & Simmons, B. A. (2006) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818306060279 · Cited by 946
“…multiple signings per host , which leads us to frame the issue as one of credible commitments rather than costly signals that reveal type + Both frameworks could , however , explain a competitive dynamic to sign BITs + 32 + See Abbott et al + 2000 ; Lipson 1991 ; and Guzman 2002 + observed !”
Büthe, T., & Milner, H. V. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00340.x · Cited by 914
International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs
Simmons, B. A. (2000) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586210 · Cited by 683
How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory
Guzman, A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305562.001.0001 · Cited by 510
Metadata
- Authors
- Lipson, C.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lipson, Charles
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 495-538
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2077729868
- Cited by
- 585
- References
- 115
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 25
- FWCI
- 22.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Organization (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Law and Aviation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Historical Influence and Diplomacy
- Keywords
- informal agreements, executive agreements, treaties, international cooperation, treaty ratification, Cuban Missile Crisis
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.