Why are some international agreements informal?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 115 of the 115 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Informal agreements are the most common form of international cooperation and the least studied. Ranging from simple oral deals to detailed executive agreements, they permit states to conclude profitable bargains without the formality of treaties. They differ from treaties in more than just a procedural sense. Treaties are designed, by long-standing convention, to raise the credibility of promises by staking national reputation on their adherence. Informal agreements have a more ambiguous status and are useful for precisely that reason. They are chosen to avoid formal and visible national pledges, to avoid the political obstacles of ratification, to reach agreements quickly and quietly, and to provide flexibility for subsequent modification or even renunciation. They differ from formal agreements not because their substance is less important (the Cuban missile crisis was solved by informal agreement) but because the underlying promises are less visible and more equivocal. The prevalence of such informal devices thus reveals not only the possibilities of international cooperation but also the practical obstacles and the institutional limits to endogenous enforcement.
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Mattes, M. (2012) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818311000336 · Cited by 50
Shaffer, G., & Pollack, M. A. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139107310.011 · Cited by 49
If an Arctic Ocean treaty is not the solution, what is the alternative?
Young, O. R. (2011) · Polar Record · doi:10.1017/s0032247410000677 · Cited by 48
“But it is clear that reliance on legally binding agreements is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve success in the development of international governance systems (Lipson 1991).”
BackgroundMechanisms of informal governance: evidence from the IEA
Colgan, J. D., & de Graaf, T. V. (2014) · Journal of International Relations and Development · doi:10.1057/jird.2014.4 · Cited by 47
Metadata
- Authors
- Lipson, C.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lipson, Charles
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 495-538
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2077729868
- Cited by
- 585
- References
- 115
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 25
- FWCI
- 22.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Organization (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Law and Aviation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Historical Influence and Diplomacy
- Keywords
- informal agreements, executive agreements, treaties, international cooperation, treaty ratification, Cuban Missile Crisis
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.