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Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach
Abstract
What makes international threats credible? Recent theories point to domestic audience costs—the domestic price a leader would pay for making foreign threats and then backing down. This article provides the first direct evidence of audience costs. The analysis, based on experiments embedded in public opinion surveys, shows that audience costs exist across a wide range of conditions and increase with the level of escalation. The costs are evident throughout the population, and especially among politically active citizens who have the greatest potential to shape government policy. Finally, preliminary evidence suggests that audience costs arise because citizens care about the international reputation of the country or leader. These findings help identify how, and under what conditions, domestic audiences make commitments credible. At the same time, they demonstrate the promise of using experiments to answer previously intractable questions in the field of international relations.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Tomz, M.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2007-10
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 04
- Pages
- 821-840
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2133685950
- Cited by
- 699
- References
- 56
- FWCI
- 77.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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