The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders?
Open accessAbstract
We examine the relation between the cost of debt financing and a governance index that contains various antitakeover and shareholder protection provisions. Using firm-level data from the Investors Research Responsibility Center for the period 1990–2000, we find that antitakeover governance provisions lower the cost of debt financing. Segmenting the data into firms with the strongest management rights (strongest antitakeover provisions) and firms with the strongest shareholder rights (weakest antitakeover provisions), we find that strong antitakeover provisions are associated with a lower cost of debt financing while weak antitakeover provisions are associated with a higher cost of debt financing, with a difference of about 34 basis points between the two groups. Overall, the results suggest that antitakeover governance provisions, although not beneficial to stockholders, are viewed favorably in the bond market.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
(2001) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 27,577
Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(93)90023-5 · Cited by 25,754
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
Newey, W. K., & West, K. D. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913610 · Cited by 16,936
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 2×
“For a review on the takeover market see Agrawal and Jaffe (2003), and for corporate governance see Shleifer and Vishny (1997).”
BackgroundFINANCIAL RATIOS, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND THE PREDICTION OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
Altman, E. I. (1968) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00843.x · Cited by 14,888
Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests
Fama, E. F., & MacBeth, J. D. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260061 · Cited by 14,258
A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and AutocorrelationConsistent Covariance Matrix
Newey, W., & West, K. (1986) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/t0055 · Cited by 12,278
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy
Ohlson, J. A. (1980) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490395 · Cited by 5,989
Economic Forces and the Stock Market
Chen, N.-F., Roll, R., & Ross, S. A. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296344 · Cited by 5,231
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335
The market for corporate control
Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90004-1 · Cited by 4,141
Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis.
Smith, K. V., Elton, E. J., & Gruber, M. J. (1982) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2327857 · Cited by 3,012
Parsimonious Modeling of Yield Curves
Nelson, C. R., & Siegel, A. F. (1987) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296409 · Cited by 2,909
Smith, C. W., & Warner, J. B. (1979) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(79)90011-4 · Cited by 2,894
Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers
Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003575 · Cited by 2,772
A Note on Robust Variance Estimation for Cluster‐Correlated Data
Williams, R. L. (2000) · Biometrics · doi:10.1111/j.0006-341x.2000.00645.x · Cited by 2,501 · cited 1×
“For pooled cross-sectional regressions the reported t-statistics are calculated using unbiased and consistent estimates of the standard errors as described in Williams (2000) and Woolridge (2002), which control for both heteroskedasticity and clustering of errors related to the GIndex.”
Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00067-9 · Cited by 1,812
Self-citationFirm Performance and Board Committee Structure
Klein, A. (1998) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467391 · Cited by 1,761
Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia
Stein, J. C. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261524 · Cited by 1,673
Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments
Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C., & Smith, C. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90047-5 · Cited by 1,599
Explaining the Rate Spread on Corporate Bonds
Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J., Agrawal, D., & Mann, C. (2001) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00324 · Cited by 1,575
International Corporate Governance
Denis, D. K., & McConnell, J. J. (2003) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/4126762 · Cited by 1,358
Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices
CREMERS, K. J. M., & NAIR, V. B. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00819.x · Cited by 1,220
Bhojraj, S., & Sengupta, P. (2003) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/344114 · Cited by 1,189
Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures
Comment, R., & Schwert, G. W. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00823-j · Cited by 751
The effect of capital structure when expected agency costs are extreme
Harvey, C. R., Lins, K. V., & Roper, A. H. (2004) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.07.003 · Cited by 535
Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth
DeAngelo, H., & Rice, E. M. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90016-8 · Cited by 475
Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures
Almazán, A., & Suárez, J. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00536 · Cited by 452
Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences
Thistle, P. D., & Auerbach, A. J. (1989) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1059508 · Cited by 436
Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J., & Blake, C. R. (2001) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00410 · Cited by 390
Corporate Diversification: What Gets Discounted?
Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00492 · Cited by 383
Self-citationBond Markets, Analysis and Strategies.
Stutzer, M., Fabozzi, F. J., & Fabozzi, T. D. (1989) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2328630 · Cited by 357
Measuring investment distortions arising from stockholder–bondholder conflicts
Parrino, R., & Weisbach, M. S. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00015-x · Cited by 336
Bondholder Wealth Effects in Mergers and Acquisitions: New Evidence from the 1980s and 1990s
Billett, M. T., King, T. D., & Mauer, D. C. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00628.x · Cited by 335
The wealth effects of second-generation state takeover legislation
Karpoff, J. M., & Malatesta, P. H. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90085-8 · Cited by 323
An empirical investigation of the impact of ‘antitakeover’ amendments on common stock prices
Linn, S. C., & McConnell, J. J. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90017-x · Cited by 294
Event risk, covenants, and bondholder returns in leveraged buyouts
Asquith, P., & Wizman, T. A. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90026-v · Cited by 246
Econometrics of Corporate Governance Studies
(2002) · The Econometrics of Corporate Governance Studies · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2576.003.0004 · Cited by 195
Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns
Agrawal, A., & Jaffe, J. F. (2003) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/4126741 · Cited by 175
Do Spin‐offs Expropriate Wealth from Bondholders?
Maxwell, W. F., & Rao, R. P. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00598 · Cited by 172
Self-citationCorporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s
Holmstrom, B., & Kaplan, S. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8220 · Cited by 166
The Econometrics of Corporate Governance Studies
Bhagat, S., & Jefferis, R. H. (2002) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2576.001.0001 · Cited by 159
Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of Corporate Law
Bhagat, S., & Romano, R. (2002) · American Law and Economics Review · doi:10.1093/aler/4.2.380 · Cited by 149
The Effect of Capital Structure When Expected Agency Costs are Extreme
Harvey, C. R., Lins, K. V., & Roper, A. H. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8452 · Cited by 126
Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm Shareholder Welfare
Harris, E. G. (1990) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555472 · Cited by 124
Contractual Resolution of Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts
Lehn, K. M., & Poulsen, A. B. (1991) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467238 · Cited by 90
How Corporate Governance Affects Firm Value: Evidence on Channels from KoreaPreprint
Black, B. S., Kim, W., Jang, H., & Park, K. S. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1365945 · Cited by 37
Cited by
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
MASULIS, R. W., WANG, C., & XIE, F. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x · Cited by 1,772
The effect of pro-environmental preferences on bond prices: Evidence from green bonds
Zerbib, O. D. (2019) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.10.012 · Cited by 1,379
Creditor rights, information sharing, and bank risk taking
Houston, J. F., Lin, C., Lin, P., & Ma, Y. (2010) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.02.008 · Cited by 955
Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview
Gillan, S. L. (2006) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.11.002 · Cited by 875
Metadata
- Authors
- Klock, M. S., Mansi, S. A., & Maxwell, W. F.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 693-719
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-6916
- OpenAlex
- W3121983875
- Cited by
- 613
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 87.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.