The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Perils of Unearned Income
Abstract
In addition to the internal risk of deposition, which is modeled using selectorate politics (Bueno de Mesquita et al.2003), leaders risk being deposed by mass political movements such as revolutions. Leaders reward supporters with either public goods, which reward the whole of society, improve economic productivity, and increase the ability of revolutionaries to organize, or private goods. If confronted with a revolutionary threat then leaders respond by either suppressing public goods—which prevents revolutionaries organizing—or increasing public goods, so citizens have less incentive to rebel. Unearned resources, such as natural resource rents or aid, increase the likelihood of revolutionary onset and effect how leaders best respond to the threat. The results address the resource curse, the potentially pernicious effects of foreign aid and incentives to democratize.
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Cites
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Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth
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The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 9×
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Modernization: Theories and Facts
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Cited by
What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?
Ross, M. L. (2015) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359 · Cited by 1,146
Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability
Morrison, K. M. (2009) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818309090043 · Cited by 594
Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Finance
De Mesquita, B. B., & Smith, A. (2010) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00463.x · Cited by 475
Self-citationThe Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival
AHMED, F. Z. (2012) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000475 · Cited by 441
Gervasoni, C. (2010) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887110000067 · Cited by 412
Metadata
- Authors
- Smith, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2008-07
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 780-793
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2043975160
- Cited by
- 230
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 26.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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