The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Private Investment and the Institutionalization of Collective Action in Autocracies: Ruling Parties and Legislatures
Open accessAbstract
Despite the absence of formal institutions to constrain opportunistic behavior, some autocracies successfully attract private investment. Prior work explains such success by the relative size of the autocrat's winning coalition or the existence of legislatures. We advance on this understanding by focusing on the key constraint limiting coalition size and legislative efficacy: organizational arrangements that allow group members to act collectively against the ruler. We introduce three new quantitative measures of the ability of ruling party members to act collectively: ruling-party institutionalization, the regularity of leader entry, and the competitiveness of legislative elections. These characteristics are robustly associated with higher investment. Our evidence also points to an effect on the risk of expropriation in non-democracies.
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Cites
Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression
Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2005) · Identification and Inference for Econometric Models · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614491.006 · Cited by 7,211
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1024471506938 · Cited by 3,432
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
Gandhi, J. (2008) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510090 · Cited by 1,910
Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression
Stock, J., & Yogo, M. (2002) · doi:10.3386/t0284 · Cited by 1,842
Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization
Brownlee, J. (2007) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511802348 · Cited by 1,070 · cited 1×
“Brownlee (2007) argues that parties serve to hold elite coalitions together; the analysis here can be seen as describing organizational prerequisites for elite cohesion.”
Background
Cited by
Corrupting the Cyber-Commons: Social Media as a Tool of Autocratic Stability
Gunitsky, S. (2015) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592714003120 · Cited by 465
Gehlbach, S., & Keefer, P. (2011) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2011.04.002 · Cited by 429
Self-citationSubnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments
Reuter, O. J., & Robertson, G. B. (2012) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381612000631 · Cited by 335
Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects
Brancati, D. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-052013-115248 · Cited by 279
The Autocratic Welfare State: Old-Age Pensions, Credible Commitments, and Regime Survival
Knutsen, C. H., & Rasmussen, M. (2018) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414017710265 · Cited by 146
Metadata
- Authors
- Gehlbach, S., & Keefer, P.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2012-04
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 621-635
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W3124002238
- Cited by
- 219
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 35.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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