Economic Roots of Civil Wars and Revolutions in the Contemporary World
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
To explain the distribution of civil wars, guerrilla warfare, and revolutionary outbreaks, the literature on modern political violence has shifted, broadly speaking, from a modernization perspective that emphasized the role of material conflict and of grievances to a more recent research program that stresses the geographical and organizational opportunities that insurgents may have to engage in violence. Drawing on those lines of inquiry equally, this article offers an integrated analytical model that considers both the motives and the opportunities of states and rebels. Civil wars, guerrillas, and revolutionary outbreaks are seen as a result of the nature and distribution of wealth in each country. Systematic and organized violent conflicts are most likely in economies where inequality is high and wealth is mostly immobile, that is, in societies where those worse off would benefit substantially from expropriating all assets. Violence is conditional on the mobilizational and organizational capacity of challengers and on the state capacity to control its territory. The theory is tested on data on civil wars from 1850 to 1999 for the whole world and on data on guerrilla warfare and revolutionary episodes spanning the years from 1919 to 1997 across all countries.
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Citations
Cites
The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1369 · Cited by 8,517 · cited 4×
“Showing that non-European countries where Europeans faced high mortality rates and where the latter emigrated in small numbers resulted in stagnant political economies, some recent empirical work has attributed the outcome of underdevelopment to the design of inefficient political institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001).…”
BackgroundInfluentialEthnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
La Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261013 · Cited by 5,485
States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China
Skocpol, T. (1979) · Cambridge University Press · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815805 · Cited by 5,408
Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset
GLEDITSCH, N. P., WALLENSTEEN, P., ERIKSSON, M., SOLLENBERG, M., & STRAND, H. (2002) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343302039005007 · Cited by 3,846 · cited 7×
“…to the three most recent and probably best documented data sets on civil wars after World War II: Fearon and Laitin (2003), the Uppsala-Prio data set developed by Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Sambanis (2004).11 The data on guerrillas is taken from Banks (1997) and cover the period from 1919 to 1997.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialAlesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1024471506938 · Cited by 3,432
Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/421174 · Cited by 2,460 · cited 1×
“Contradicting part of the existing literature (such as Collier and Hoeffler 2004 and De Miguel et al. 2004), economic crises are not correlated with more violence.”
ResultBoix, C. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804960 · Cited by 2,211
Self-citationSensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset
Hegre, H., & Sambanis, N. (2006) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002706289303 · Cited by 1,286
Cited by
Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison
CEDERMAN, L.-E., WEIDMANN, N. B., & GLEDITSCH, K. S. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000207 · Cited by 1,028
“2 Using a different conceptualization of vertical inequality conditioned on factor mobility, Boix (2008) reports a strong effect on internal conflict.”
BackgroundInequality, Grievances, and Civil War
Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Buhaug, H. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139084161 · Cited by 978
Democracy, Development, and the International System
BOIX, C. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000402 · Cited by 527
Self-citationThe Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine's Orange Revolution
BEISSINGER, M. R. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055413000294 · Cited by 320
Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule
HAGGARD, S., & KAUFMAN, R. R. (2012) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000287 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Boix, C.
- Venue
- World Politics
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 2008-04
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 390-437
- ISSN
- 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3338
- OpenAlex
- W2029890963
- Cited by
- 150
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 24.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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