The DOI matches its Crossref record; 147 of the 147 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Précis of The Modularity of Mind
Abstract
The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the “New Look” or “interaetionist” view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive to the organism's beliefs and desires. In fact, according to modularity theory, perceptual processes are computationally isolated from much of the background knowledge to which cognitive processes have access. The postulation of autonomous, domain-specific psychological mechanisms underlying perceptual integration connects modularity theory with the tradition of faculty psychology, in particular, with the work of Franz Joseph Call. Some of these historical affinities, and some of the relations between faculty psychology and Cartesianism, are discussed in the book.
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Cites
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences
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Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences.
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Handbook of Sensory Physiology
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Cited by
Harnad, S. (1990) · Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena · doi:10.1016/0167-2789(90)90087-6 · Cited by 4,235
“According to Fodor and Pylyshyn, this is a severe limitation, because many of our behavioral capacities appear to be symbolic, and hence the most natural hypothesis about the underlying cognitive processes that generate them would be that they too must be symbolic.”
BackgroundInfluentialIs vision continuous with cognition?: The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception
Pylyshyn, Z. (1999) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x99002022 · Cited by 1,243
Richardson-Klavehn, A., & Bjork, R. A. (1988) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.39.020188.002355 · Cited by 983
Universal moral grammar: theory, evidence and the future
Mikhail, J. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.12.007 · Cited by 887
Boekaerts, M., & Niemivirta, M. (2000) · Handbook of Self-Regulation · doi:10.1016/b978-012109890-2/50042-1 · Cited by 798
Metadata
- Authors
- Fodor, J. A.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1985-03
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-5
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2129270174
- Cited by
- 646
- References
- 147
- FWCI
- 66.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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