The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Précis of Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science
Abstract
Beyond modularity attempts a synthesis of Fodor's anticonstructivist nativism and Piaget's antinativist constructivism. Contra Fodor, I argue that: (1) the study of cognitive development is essential to cognitive science, (2) the module/central processing dichotomy is too rigid, and (3) the mind does not begin with prespecified modules; rather, development involves a gradual process of “modularization.” Contra Piaget, I argue that: (1) development rarely involves stagelike domain-general change and (2) domainspecific predispositions give development a small but significant kickstart by focusing the infant's attention on proprietary inputs. Development does not stop at efficient learning. A fundamental aspect of human development (“representational redescription”) is the hypothesized process by which information that is in a cognitive system becomes progressively explicit knowledge to that system. Development thus involves two complementary processes of progressive modularization and progressive “explicitation.” Empirical findings on the child as linguist, physicist, mathematician, psychologist, and notator are discussed in support of the theoretical framework. Each chapter concentrates first on the initial state of the infant mind/brain and on subsequent domain-specific learning in infancy and early childhood. It then goes on to explore data on older children's problem solving and theory building, with particular focus on evolving cognitive flexibility. Emphasis is placed throughout on the status of representations underlying different capacities and on the multiple levels at which knowledge is stored and accessible. Finally, consideration is given to the need for more formal developmental models, and a comparison is made between representational redescription and connectionist simulations of development. In conclusion, I consider what is special about human cognition by speculating on the status of representations underlying the structure of behavior in other species.
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Cites
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Cited by
Lane, R. D., Reiman, E. M., Axelrod, B., Yun, L.-S., Holmes, A., & Schwartz, G. E. (1998) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/089892998562924 · Cited by 671
Is Alexithymia the Emotional Equivalent of Blindsight?
Lane, R. D., Ahern, G. L., Schwartz, G. E., & Kaszniak, A. W. (1997) · Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/s0006-3223(97)00050-4 · Cited by 420
Vernon, D., Metta, G., & Sandini, G. (2007) · IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation · doi:10.1109/tevc.2006.890274 · Cited by 414
Aggression and Moral Development: Integrating Social Information Processing and Moral Domain Models
Arsenio, W. F., & Lemerise, E. A. (2004) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00720.x · Cited by 332
Hulstijn, J. (2002) · Second Language Research · doi:10.1191/0267658302sr207oa · Cited by 250
Metadata
- Authors
- Karmiloff-Smith, A.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1994-12
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 693-707
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2092703247
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 40.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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