Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of subjective conscious experience: A Gestalt Bubble model
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A serious crisis is identified in theories of neurocomputation, marked by a persistent disparity between the phenomenological or experiential account of visual perception and the neurophysiological level of description of the visual system. In particular, conventional concepts of neural processing offer no explanation for the holistic global aspects of perception identified by Gestalt theory. The problem is paradigmatic and can be traced to contemporary concepts of the functional role of the neural cell, known as the Neuron Doctrine. In the absence of an alternative neurophysiologically plausible model, I propose a perceptual modeling approach, to model the percept as experienced subjectively, rather than modeling the objective neurophysiological state of the visual system that supposedly subserves that experience. A Gestalt Bubble model is presented to demonstrate how the elusive Gestalt principles of emergence, reification, and invariance can be expressed in a quantitative model of the subjective experience of visual consciousness. That model in turn reveals a unique computational strategy underlying visual processing, which is unlike any algorithm devised by man, and certainly unlike the atomistic feed-forward model of neurocomputation offered by the Neuron Doctrine paradigm. The perceptual modeling approach reveals the primary function of perception as that of generating a fully spatial virtual-reality replica of the external world in an internal representation. The common objections to this “picture-in-the-head” concept of perceptual representation are shown to be ill founded.
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Cites
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Cited by
A materialist theory of the mind
(2017) · Advances in Consciousness Research · doi:10.1075/aicr.95.c1 · Cited by 820
Natural selection and veridical perceptions
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(2008) · Cited by 61
Life and Understanding: The Origins of “Understanding” in Self-Organizing Nervous Systems
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lehar, S.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2003-08
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 375-408
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2049901870
- Cited by
- 157
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 5.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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