The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Précis of Breakdown of Will
Abstract
Behavioral science has long been puzzled by the experience of temptation, the resulting impulsiveness, and the variably successful control of this impulsiveness. In conventional theories, a governing faculty like the ego evaluates future choices consistently over time, discounting their value for delay exponentially, that is, by a constant rate; impulses arise when this ego is confronted by a conditioned appetite. Breakdown of Will (Ainslie 2001) presents evidence that contradicts this model. Both people and nonhuman animals spontaneously discount the value of expected events in a curve where value is divided approximately by expected delay, a hyperbolic form that is more bowed than the rational, exponential curve. With hyperbolic discounting, options that pay off quickly will be temporarily preferred to richer but slower-paying alternatives, a phenomenon that, over periods from minutes to days, can account for impulsive behaviors, and over periods of fractional seconds can account for involuntary behaviors. Contradictory reward-getting processes can in effect bargain with each other, and stable preferences can be established by the perception of recurrent choices as test cases (precedents) in recurrent intertemporal prisoner's dilemmas. The resulting motivational pattern resembles traditional descriptions of the will, as well as of compulsive phenomena that can now be seen as side-effects of will: over-concern with precedent, intractable but circumscribed failures of self-control, a motivated (“dynamic”) unconscious, and an inability to exploit emotional rewards. Hyperbolic curves also suggest a means of reducing classical conditioning to motivated choice, the last necessary step for modeling many involuntary processes like emotion and appetite as reward-seeking behaviors; such modeling, in turn, provides a rationale for empathic reward and the “construction” of reality.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting
Laibson, D. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555253 · Cited by 6,122
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
What is the role of dopamine in reward: hedonic impact, reward learning, or incentive salience?
Berridge, K. C., & Robinson, T. E. (1998) · Brain Research Reviews · doi:10.1016/s0165-0173(98)00019-8 · Cited by 4,127
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232669 · Cited by 4,042
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice
Tversky, A. (1972) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0032955 · Cited by 3,365
A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification: dynamics of willpower
Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.106.1.3 · Cited by 2,931
Specious reward: A behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse control.
Ainslie, G. (1975) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0076860 · Cited by 2,708
Cited by
Nigg, J. T. (2017) · Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry · doi:10.1111/jcpp.12675 · Cited by 1,518
Mesolimbic dopamine signals the value of work
Hamid, A. A., Pettibone, J. R., Mabrouk, O. S., Hetrick, V. L., Schmidt, R., Vander Weele, C. M., Kennedy, R. T., Aragona, B. J., & Berke, J. D. (2016) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.4173 · Cited by 824
Lane, R. D., Ryan, L., Nadel, L., & Greenberg, L. (2015) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x14000041 · Cited by 552
Arousal, avoidant and decisional procrastinators: Do they exist?
Steel, P. (2010) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2010.02.025 · Cited by 514
A unified framework for addiction: Vulnerabilities in the decision process
Redish, A. D., Jensen, S., & Johnson, A. (2008) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0800472x · Cited by 501
Metadata
- Authors
- Ainslie, G.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2005-10
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 635-650
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2170841047
- Cited by
- 201
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 6.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Précis of Breakdown of Will. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0140525x05000117
- The paper
- Ainslie, G. (2005). Précis of Breakdown of Will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x05000117
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.