Annual Research Review: On the relations among self‐regulation, self‐control, executive functioning, effortful control, cognitive control, impulsivity, risk‐taking, and inhibition for developmental psychopathology

May combine two claims.

Poor self-regulation in some form is related to ADHD, internalizing and externalizing psychopathology, addiction, depression, bipolar disorder risk, schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorder, obsessive-compulsive and habit disorders, eating disorders, and some personality disorders.

“Poor SR in some form is related to ADHD and internalizing and externalizing psychopathology”

• cites Calkins et al., 2007Not checked yet

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• cites Eisenberg et al., 2009Not checked yet

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• cites Espy et al., 2011Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Executive function and cognitive control are not the same as self-regulation because they can serve other activities, but they account for the cognitive top-down part of self-regulation.

“Executive function and cognitive control are not identical to self-regulation because they can be used for other activities, but account for top-down aspects of self-regulation at the cognitive level.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

A taxonomy of self-regulation breakdowns linked to psychopathology requires distinguishing impulsivity, risk-taking, and disinhibition.

“a taxonomy of the kinds of breakdowns of self-regulation associated with psychopathology requires their differentiation”

May combine two claims.

Children's self-regulation informs social and intellectual developmental milestones and predicts academic, occupational, and health outcomes.

“Children’s SR informs social and intellectual developmental milestones”

• cites Blair & Razza, 2007Not checked yet

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• cites Kochanska, 1997Not checked yet

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• cites Padilla-Walker & Christensen, 2011Not checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The hierarchical perspective on self-regulation is consistent across literatures.

“This hierarchical perspective is consistent across literatures.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The field needs a domain-general construct of self-regulation that covers action, emotion, and cognition and includes both top-down and bottom-up regulatory processes.

“First, the field needs a domain-general construct of self-regulation that encompasses self-regulation of action, emotion, and cognition and involves both top-down and bottom-up regulatory processes.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Top-down aspects of self-regulation include early basic processes such as cognitive control and effortful control, and also complex executive functioning strategies for future conflict.

“Second, top-down aspects of self-regulation need to be integrated. These include (a) basic processes that develop early and address immediate conflict signals, such as cognitive control and effortful control, and (b) complex cognition and strategies for addressing future conflict, represented ty the regulatory application of complex aspects of executive functioning.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Self-regulation and self-control are sometimes used interchangeably to mean top-down control.

“they are used at times interchangeably (Kelley, Wagner, & Heatherton, 2015; McClelland & Cameron, 2012) to mean top-down control”

• cites Kelley et al., 2015Not checked yet

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• cites McClelland & Cameron, 2012Not checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Confusion has also arisen from conflating emotion with regulation and cognition with control.

“Matters also have been confused by sometimes conflating emotion with regulation (so handling an emotionally challenging task=SR) and cognition with control (so that handling a cognitively challenging task=self-control).”

May combine two claims.

Impulsivity is modulated by bottom-up reward valuation and by top-down biasing related to goals.

“It is modulated both by bottom-up reward valuation (part of the incentive approach system) and top-down biasing related to goals.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

In cue-activated automatic behavior, disinhibition and impulsivity are the same.

“In the case of cue-activated automatic behavior, disinhibition and impulsivity are the same.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Top-down processes engage to address novel problems, resolve conflict or co-activation, or prepare for an anticipated goal or challenge.

“They engage to address novel problems, to resolve conflict or co-activation (Table 1), or to prepare for an anticipated goal or challenge.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

Executive functioning is too broad for computational implementation or consensus measurement and must be operationalized more narrowly or fractionated to be useful in research.

“Because EF is too broad to enable computational implementation or consensus measurement, it must either be operationalized more narrowly or fractionated to be useful for research.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Executive functioning is invoked when automatized routines will not work or are not possible.

“EF is invoked when automatized routines will not work or are not possible”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Subcortical regions, especially the thalamus and hippocampus, participate indirectly in top-down regulation through information salience and updating.

“Subcortical regions, particularly the thalamus and hippocampus, also participate indirectly in top-down regulation via information salience and updating.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

It is most useful to treat self-regulation as a broader, domain-general construct.

“it is most helpful to treat ‘SR’ as broader and domain-general”

May combine two claims.

Top-down operations can become automatized for particular contexts and remain regulatory.

“top-down operations can be automatized for particular contexts (e.g., due to learning; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000); now automatic, they remain regulatory”

• cites Bargh & Ferguson, 2000Not checked yet

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• cites Dijksterhuis & Strick, 2016Not checked yet

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• cites Marien et al., 2012Not checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Self-control is a narrower concept than self-regulation and is used exclusively in relation to top-down processes.

“Self-control, although it should not be limited to cognition, is a narrower concept. All theorists refer to self-control in relation to top-down process exclusively”

• cites Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996Not checked yet

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• cites Carver & Scheier, 1982, 2001Not checked yet

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• cites Magen & Gross, 2010Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Response inhibition is one component of impulsivity and also of compulsivity.

“It is one component of impulsivity but also of compulsivity.”

May combine two claims.

Fear avoidance, also called behavioral inhibition, is activated by novelty, uncertainty, or harm cues; it inhibits action and redirects attention to adapt to uncertainty.

“fear avoidance, also called behavioral inhibition (Table 1) is activated in response to novelty, uncertainty, or other cues for possible harm. It inhibits action and redirects attention (cognition) to more quickly adapt to uncertainty”

• cites Depue & Lenzenweger, 2006Not checked yet

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• cites Gray, 1982Not checked yet

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• cites Kagan & Snidman, 2004Not checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Top-down processes are subjectively deliberate, slow, sequential, require working memory, and are capacity-limited.

“Top-down processes are subjectively deliberate, slow, sequential, require working memory, and are capacity-limited”

May combine two claims.

Executive function, effortful control, and cognitive control are conceptually domain-general with respect to self-regulation of action, emotion, and cognition, although partially distinct neural systems are engaged in those regulatory contexts.

“EF, EC, and cognitive control are conceptually domain-general in relation to self-regulation of action, emotion, and cognition (although partially distinct neural systems are engaged in those different regulatory contexts).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Cognitive control is essentially the same as lower-level or basic executive function.

“Cognitive control is essentially the same as lower level, or basic EF functions.”

May combine two claims.

Effortful control may correlate with planning and other complex executive functions, but this correlation is explained by their mutual dependence on executive attention or cognitive control generally.

“While EC may be correlated with planning and other complex EF, this is explained by their mutual dependence on executive attention (or, likely, cognitive control generally).”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Risk-taking entails weighting probability features of a choice and discounts the probability of negative consequences relative to positive consequences.

“Risk-taking, in the decision-making context, entails weighting on probability (rather than temporal) features of a choice; it is the action that discounts the probability of negative consequences relative to probability of positive consequences.”

May combine two claims.

People automatize as much as possible because control is costly, and control depends on motivation, capacity, or both.

“we automatize as much as possible (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000), due to costs of control; control depends on motivation, capacity or both (Botvinick & Braver, 2015).”

• cites Bargh & Ferguson, 2000Not checked yet

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• cites Botvinick & Braver, 2015Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Effortful control is a top-down aspect of self-regulation and, at the trait level, represents many cognitive-control aspects of executive function, especially executive attention.

“EC, identified as top down aspects of self-regulation, represents at a trait level many of the cognitive control aspects of EF, and in particular executive attention.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Higher-level executive functions involve complex cognition and are extended elaborations of cognitive control.

“Higher-level EFs involve complex cognition and are extended elaborations of cognitive control.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Many self-regulation strategies, such as pre-commitment, are part of, uses of, or elaborations of executive function.

“Many strategies for self-regulation, such as pre-commitment, are part of, uses of, or elaborations of EF.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Self-regulation includes cognition as something that can be regulated.

“some definitions of SR extend it to include cognition as also regulated (Karoly, 1993). I agree”

• cites Karoly, 1993Not checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Humans can assemble a complex sequence of actions based solely on a mental representation, even for novel problems.

“Humans, however, can assemble a complex sequence of actions based solely on a mental representation, even for novel problems”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Effortful control can be provisionally understood as the trait-level representation of using cognitive control for self-regulation.

“EC, while still undergoing empirical investigation of its relations with cognitive control and EF, can be understood provisionally as the trait level representation of the use of cognitive control for SR.”

May combine two claims.

Risk-taking involves either excessive valuation of possible reward, excessive devaluation of possible harm, or both.

“Either possible reward is excessively valued (computationally, over-predicted) or possible harm is excessively devalued (under-predicted) or both (Casey, 2015; Ernst, 2014).”

• cites Casey, 2015Not checked yet

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• cites Ernst, 2014Not checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Executive functioning, effortful control, and cognitive control are closely related but come from different intellectual traditions in clinical, developmental, and cognitive sciences.

“I will argue that EF, effortful control, and cognitive control are closely related but arise from different intellectual traditions in clinical, developmental, and cognitive sciences.”

May combine two claims.

Working memory is part of effortful control, although it is unclear whether this is due to shared involvement of executive attention.

“we can provisionally conclude based on recent empirical work that working memory is part of EC—although it’s unclear if this is due to shared involvement of executive attention.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Executive functioning allows people to resolve immediate conflict and to manage future conflicts or goals in the present.

“EF thus allows people both to resolve immediate conflict (e.g., ignoring a distractor), and to manage, in the present, future conflicts/goals”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Broad definitions of self-control implicitly reduce self-control to the top-down aspects of self-regulation.

“Such broad definitions implicitly simplify self-control to the top-down aspects of SR”

May combine two claims.

Risk-taking is low-control and low-avoidance.

“Panel 3.C illustrates that risk-taking is low-control and low avoidance (e.g., low fear).”

May combine two claims.

Two basic bottom-up appetitive processes are each modulated by top-down control.

“Two basic bottom-up appetitive processes are emphasized; they are each modulated by top-down control.”

• cites Carver et al., 2009Not checked yet

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• cites Depue & Lenzenweger, 2006Not checked yet

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• cites Ernst, 2014Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Most research has prioritized the high reward response in risk-taking, but emerging literature suggests that low avoidance motivation, or discounting of punishment probability, is associated with risk-taking.

“While most research has prioritized a focus on the high reward response seen in risk-taking (Shulman et al 2016), as noted earlier emerging literature suggests that low avoidance motivation (discounting of punishment probability) is associated with risk-taking (Casey, 2015; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010).”

• cites Shulman et al 2016Not checked yet

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• cites Casey, 2015Not checked yet

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• cites Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Risk-taking is related to strong reward motivation, and its distinguishing feature may be concurrently suppressed estimation of punishment probability.

“Whereas risk-taking is clearly related to strong reward motivation (approach), its distinguishing feature in fact may be concurrently suppressed estimation of punishment-probability.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Soldiers may learn to make snap decisions as a successful adaptation to frequent combat.

“For example, some youth in dangerous inner city environments appear to adaptively discount the future (Ramos, Victor, Seidl-de-Moura, & Daly, 2013) and as noted, soldiers may learn to make snap decisions as a successful adaptation to frequent combat (Carey, 2016).”

• cites Carey, 2016Not checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

A gating mechanism allows bottom-up signals to update goal representations.

“A gating mechanism allows bottom-up signals to update goal representations.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Approach is related to immediacy valuation in discounting models.

“Note that approach is related to immediacy valuation in the discounting models discussed earlier.”

May combine two claims.

Compulsive and habit disorders overlap with impulsivity in involving breakdowns in response inhibition, but they do not necessarily involve breakdown in delay discounting or in decision preferences for earlier versus later payoffs.

“Compulsive and habit disorders overlap with impulsivity in that they involve breakdowns in response inhibition, but they do not necessarily involve breakdown in delay discounting or in decision preferences for earlier versus later payoffs.”

May combine two claims.

Nearly all psychopathology shares a general P factor, while specific components fit into two or more correlated lower-level domains in adults and children in a bifactor structure.

“A hierarchical structure is also seen in which nearly all psychopathology shares a general or ‘P’ factor, while specific components of psychopathology fit into two or more, correlated, lower-level domains in adults (Caspi et al., 2014; Lahey et al., 2012) and in children (Noordhof, Krueger, Ormel, Oldehinkel, & Hartman, 2015) in a bifactor structure.”

• cites Caspi et al., 2014Not checked yet

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• cites Lahey et al., 2012Not checked yet

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• cites Noordhof, Krueger, Ormel, Oldehinkel, & Hartman, 2015Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

The stability factor comprises low Neuroticism, high Conscientiousness, and high Agreeableness, and is related to Constraint in the three-factor model of personality.

“The ‘stability’ factor comprises low Neuroticism (N), high Conscientiousness (C), and high Agreeableness (A). It is related to Constraint in the 3-factor model of personality (Tellegen, 1985).”

• cites Tellegen, 1985Not checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Impulsive risk-taking is risk-taking without reflection in response to immediate opportunity, and it is often but not inevitably maladaptive.

“Thus, impulsive risk-taking is risk-taking without reflection, in response to immediate opportunity. It too is often, but not inevitably, maladaptive.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Computational models feature a similar hierarchical structure for the cross-sectional assembly of self-regulation.

“Computational models feature a similar hierarchical structure for the cross-sectional assembly of self-regulation.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Plasticity comprises high Extraversion and Openness to Experience.

“Plasticity comprises high Extraversion (E) and Openness to Experience (O) in the big Five framework.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

High control and high approach might represent a tendency for deliberate or planful preference for immediate rewards based on learning history.

“The upper right quadrant of panel 3.B (high control, high approach) might represent a tendency for deliberate or planful preference for immediate rewards based on learning history.”

May combine two claims.

Addictions can begin as impulsivity characterized by altered delay discounting but end as disorders of disinhibition.

“Addictions can begin as impulsivity characterized by altered delay discounting, but end as disorders of disinhibition (inability to inhibit response to drink cue).”

May combine two claims.

Adolescents are more sensitive to cues for reward and punishment than children or adults but have suppressed sensitivity to punishment context, that is, ambiguity risk.

“Casey (2015) reviewed animal and human studies indicating that adolescents, while more sensitive to cues for reward and punishment than children or adults, have suppressed sensitivity to punishment context (i.e., ambiguity risk).”

• cites Casey (2015)Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Response inhibition is part of impulsivity but not identical to it, and disorders of response inhibition are not necessarily characterized by impulsivity.

“Thus, response inhibition is part of impulsivity but not identical to it; disorders of response inhibition are not necessarily characterized by impulsivity.”

May combine two claims.

When discounting by time, people discount small rewards more steeply than large rewards; when discounting by probability, people discount large rewards more than small rewards.

“One example is the differential magnitude effect: when discounting by time, people discount small rewards more steeply than large rewards. But when discounting by probability, the reverse occurs—people discount large rewards more than small rewards (Mitchell & Wilson, 2010).”

• cites Mitchell & Wilson, 2010Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Impulsivity and risk-taking can be distinguished in concept and empirically, but they can overlap in practice as impulsive risk-taking.

“While readily distinguished in concept and empirically, they can overlap in practice, which is impulsive risk-taking.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Constraint entails focusing on long-term payoff and avoiding immediate temptation, and is the inverse of impulsivity.

“Constraint entails focusing on long-term payoff and avoiding immediate temptation, among many other lower-order facets. It is the inverse of impulsivity.”

May combine two claims.

Children with ADHD show steeper discounting of future rewards and a riskier style on gambling tasks compared with typically developing children.

“For example, children with ADHD show both steeper discounting of future rewards (Patros et al., 2016), and riskier style on gambling tasks (Dekkers, Popma, Agelink van Rentergem, Bexkens, & Huizenga, 2016) compared to typically developing children.”

• cites Patros et al., 2016Not checked yet

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• cites Dekkers, Popma, Agelink van Rentergem, Bexkens, & Huizenga, 2016Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Venturesomeness is related to extraversion and incentive approach, with relative devaluation of uncertainty or possible loss, regardless of immediacy.

“In more contemporary work, venturesomeness is related to extraversion and to incentive approach (Table 2), with relative devaluation of uncertainty or possible loss (Sharma et al., 2014), regardless of immediacy.”

• cites Sharma et al., 2014Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

An inflexible application of a behavior is probably maladaptive on average but can be adaptive in particular niches or contexts.

“The latter is probably maladaptive on average; but can be adaptive in particular niches or contexts (see Appendix S1 for more discussion of the multi-layered issue of specifying adaptiveness; see Block & Block, 1980, for a related perspective).”

• cites Block & Block, 1980Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Conscientiousness may emerge from earlier development of effortful control or from elaboration of sensitivity to negative avoidance signals supporting emergence of effortful control.

“For example, the trait of Conscientiousness may emerge from earlier development of effortful control (Eisenberg, Duckworth, Spinrad, & Valiente, 2014; Nigg, 2006) or even earlier from elaboration of sensitivity to negative avoidance signals supporting emergence of EC (Nigg, 2006).”

• cites Eisenberg, Duckworth, Spinrad, & Valiente, 2014Not checked yet

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• cites Nigg, 2006Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Response disinhibition, impulsivity, and risk-taking can overlap but can also be differentiated in different behaviors or psychopathologies.

“It illustrates that while response disinhibition, impulsivity, and risk-taking can certainly overlap, they can also be differentiated in different behaviors or psychopathologies.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Mental flexibility depends on inhibition and working memory.

“For example, planning is an extended application of working memory and action selection; mental flexibility depends on inhibition and working memory; SR coping strategies often entail planning.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Self-regulation, including top-down control, is broader than impulsivity or risk-taking because it refers to state or response optimization even when there is no decision context.

“However, SR, including top-down control, is broader than impulsivity or risk taking, as it refers to state or response optimization even when there is no decision context (e.g., shooting a free throw; hitting the musical note to set the tone for a group to sing; balancing on a bicycle).”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Earlier-developing aspects are part of the assembly of later-developing aspects.

“Earlier-developing aspects are part of the assembly of later-developing aspects.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Higher-order traits of temperament and personality refer to the tendency to use short-term and long-term strategies and describe an individual's typical response bias.

“Higher order traits of temperament and personality refer to the tendency to utilize the short-term and long-term strategies and describe an individual’s typical response bias (e.g., appetitive approach--extraversion; cost-avoidance--neuroticism; exertion of top-down control—effortful control).”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Basic top-down processes are generally congruent with effortful control and cognitive control but not with the complex cognition aspect of executive function or associated future-oriented strategies.

“It is generally congruent with EC and with cognitive control (which can be used for non SR purposes also), but not with the complex cognition aspect of EF or associated future-oriented strategies.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Inflexible impulsivity and impulsive risk-taking are not a complete converse of self-regulation because impulsivity and risk-taking are defined in relation to decision contexts.

“Inflexible impulsivity and impulsive risk-taking are not, however, a complete converse of SR, because impulsivity and risk-taking are defined in relation to decision contexts.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Higher-order executive functions are combinations of lower-order processes that assemble developmentally as well as behaviorally and computationally.

“Higher order EF are combinations of lower order processes that assemble developmentally as well as behaviorally and computationally.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Bottom-up processes emerge and mature earlier than top-down processes.

“Here my intent is simply to recall that (a) bottom-up processes emerge and mature earlier than top-down processes and (b) different aspects of SR mature at different rates within both bottom-up and top-down domains.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Planning is an extended application of working memory and action selection.

“For example, planning is an extended application of working memory and action selection; mental flexibility depends on inhibition and working memory; SR coping strategies often entail planning.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The temporal reach of self-regulation increases with development.

“Further, the temporal reach of SR increases with development.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Self-regulation coping strategies often entail planning.

“For example, planning is an extended application of working memory and action selection; mental flexibility depends on inhibition and working memory; SR coping strategies often entail planning.”