The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking
Open accessAbstract
Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena – from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic – precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.
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Cites
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Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
Frederick, S. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005775196732 · Cited by 5,256
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Reflective and Impulsive Determinants of Social Behavior
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Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious
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“A radically different solution to explain how we know that our intuition can be trusted or we need to engage in deliberation is to simply assume that System 1 and System 2 operate in parallel (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996).”
BackgroundThe time course of perceptual choice: The leaky, competing accumulator model.
Usher, M., & McClelland, J. L. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.3.550 · Cited by 2,152
How (and where) does moral judgment work?
Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)02011-9 · Cited by 1,945
Diffusion decision model: Current issues and history
Ratcliff, R., Smith, P. L., Brown, S. D., & McKoon, G. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.01.007 · Cited by 1,630
Cited by
Hou, C., Zhu, G., & Sudarshan, V. (2025) · British Journal of Educational Technology · doi:10.1111/bjet.13613 · Cited by 72
Corser, R., Voss, R. P., & Jasper, J. D. (2024) · Journal of Numerical Cognition · doi:10.5964/jnc.12473 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- De Neys, W.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2022-09-02
- Volume
- 46
- Pages
- e111-e111
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W4294193440
- Cited by
- 180
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 25.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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