New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In contrast to logical criteria of rationality, which can be assessed entirely by reference to the system of preferences, substantive criteria of rational choice refer to an independent evaluation of the outcomes of decisions. One of these substantive criteria is the experienced hedonic utility of outcomes. Research indicates that people are myopic in their decisions, may lack skill in predicting their future tastes, and can be led to erroneous choices by fallible memory and incorrect evaluation of past experiences. Theoretical and practical implications of these challenges to the assumption of economic rationality are discussed.
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Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
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Self-citationAdvances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
Self-citationLoss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937956 · Cited by 6,432
Self-citationAnomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.1.193 · Cited by 5,019
Self-citationExperimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261737 · Cited by 3,194
Self-citationBounded rationality, ambiguity and the engineering of choice
March, J. G. (1978) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003600 · Cited by 1,539
When More Pain Is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better End
Kahneman, D., Fredrickson, B. L., Schreiber, C. A., & Redelmeier, D. A. (1993) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00589.x · Cited by 1,502
Self-citationDuration neglect in retrospective evaluations of affective episodes.
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Self-citationModeling Loss Aversion and Reference Dependence Effects on Brand Choice
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Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Self-citationRepresentativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Self-citationSlovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2007) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2005.04.006 · Cited by 1,537
Metadata
- Authors
- Kahneman, D.
- Venue
- Legal Theory
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1997-06
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 105-124
- ISSN
- 1352-3252 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-8048
- OpenAlex
- W2131487408
- Cited by
- 149
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 2.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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