The recognition heuristic: A decade of research
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The recognition heuristic exploits the basic psychological capacity for recognition in order to make inferences about unknown quantities in the world. In this article, we review and clarify issues that emerged from our initial work (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002), including the distinction between a recognition and an evaluation process. There is now considerable evidence that (i) the recognition heuristic predicts the inferences of a substantial proportion of individuals consistently, even in the presence of one or more contradicting cues, (ii) people are adaptive decision makers in that accordance increases with larger recognition validity and decreases in situations when the validity is low or wholly indeterminable, and (iii) in the presence of contradicting cues, some individuals appear to select different strategies. Little is known about these individual differences, or how to precisely model the alternative strategies. Although some researchers have attributed judgments inconsistent with the use of the recognition heuristic to compensatory processing, little research on such compensatory models has been reported. We discuss extensions of the recognition model, open questions, unanticipated results, and the surprising predictive power of recognition in forecasting.
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Cites
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 · Cited by 9,984
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
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Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504 · cited 7×
“We ourselves have proposed and tested linear “recognition cue” models that treat recognition in a compensatory way (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationPayne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173933 · Cited by 3,487
Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice
Tversky, A. (1972) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0032955 · Cited by 3,365 · cited 3×
“include lexicographic rules, conjunctive rules, disjunctive rules, and elimination-by-aspects (Hogarth, 1980; Tversky, 1972).”
MethodSlovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision making.
Dawes, R. M. (1979) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.34.7.571 · Cited by 1,966
Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
Gigerenzer, G., & Brighton, H. (2009) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x · Cited by 1,801
Self-citationProbabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbölting, H. (1991) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.98.4.506 · Cited by 1,506 · cited 3×
“With certain knowledge about the criterion, no inference may be needed—one might simply make deductions using a local mental model (see Gigerenzer et al., 1991, Figure 2).”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationModels of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic.
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.1.75 · Cited by 1,352 · cited 8×
“In our original work, we had specified one condition for the ecological rationality of the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 87): Substantial recognition validity.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citation
Cited by
Risk, uncertainty, and heuristics
Mousavi, S., & Gigerenzer, G. (2014) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.02.013 · Cited by 335
“Experimental evidence indicates that people intuitively tend to rely on a heuristic when it is ecologically rational, and less so when it is not (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011).”
Self-citationHeuristics as adaptive decision strategies in management: HEURISTICS IN MANAGEMENT
Artinger, F., Petersen, M., Gigerenzer, G., & Weibler, J. (2015) · Journal of Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1002/job.1950 · Cited by 255
“Their study and many subsequent ones across a wide range of tasks showed that the recognition heuristic can be a very effective decision strategy, illustrating that under some circumstances ignorance can be bliss (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G.
- Venue
- Judgment and Decision Making
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2011-02
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 100-121
- ISSN
- 1930-2975 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2147981997
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 12.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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