The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corruption and government size: A disaggregated analysis
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Glaeser, E. L., & Saks, R. E. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.007 · Cited by 788
The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires
Di Tella, R., & Schargrodsky, E. (2003) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/345578 · Cited by 620
Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption
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CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION: WHAT HAS PAST DECADE'S EMPIRICAL RESEARCH TAUGHT US? A SURVEY
Dimant, E., & Tosato, G. (2018) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12198 · Cited by 342
The institutional economics of corruption and reform: theory, evidence, and policy
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-0389 · Cited by 320
Metadata
- Authors
- Goel, R. K., & Nelson, M. A.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 1998-10
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 107-120
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W1521905678
- Cited by
- 399
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 7.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.