The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work
Abstract
In modern democracies political parties exist because (1) they reduce transaction costs in the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas and (2) help overcome the dilemma of collective action. In Western Europe political parties are the central mechanism to make the constitutional chain of political delegation and accountability work in practice. Party representatives in public office are ultimately the agents of the extra-parliamentary party organization. In order to contain agency loss parties rely on party-internal mechanisms and the institutionalisation of party rights in public rules and, in contrast to US parties, they apply the full range of ex ante and ex post mechanisms. Generally, the role of party is weaker the further down the chain of delegation.
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Citations
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‘Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies'
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Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies
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Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
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“To rational principals, accountability is largely about enforcing compliance with their stipulated preferences, goals, norms and regulations (Auel 2007; Müller 2000, 327–9; Whitaker, Altman-Sauer, and Henderson 2004, 115).”
The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment
Dalton, R. J., McAllister, I., & Wattenberg, M. P. (2002) · Parties Without Partisans · doi:10.1093/0199253099.003.0003 · Cited by 269
Koch, M. T., & Fulton, S. A. (2011) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381610000824 · Cited by 260
Metadata
- Authors
- Müller, W. C.
- Venue
- European Journal of Political Research
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2000-05
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 309-333
- ISSN
- 0304-4130 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-6765
- OpenAlex
- W2062403243
- Cited by
- 494
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 88.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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