The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hájek, A.
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2003-12
- Volume
- 137
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 273-323
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2128785381
- Cited by
- 427
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 138.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.