Dehumanized Perception: A Psychological Means to Facilitate Atrocities, Torture, and Genocide?

Social neuroscience has reliably shown that people normally activate a social-cognition neural network when viewing or thinking about other people.

“Social neuroscience has reliably shown that participants normally activate a social-cognition neural network to pictures and thoughts of other people”

• cites Amodio & Frith, 2006 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Overwalle, 2009 sourcePartly supported

  The Conclusions (p. 21) describe a social-cognition circuit involving the TPJ and mPFC when people infer others’ goals and traits. But “Identifying the social other” (pp. 7, 14) distinguishes viewing faces and bodies, which engages visual-perception regions; the paper does not establish that merely viewing pictures of other people normally activates the social-cognition circuit. (LLM, conf=0.83)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Manipulations of social goals validate the prediction: inferring preference significantly increases MPFC and STS activity to otherwise dehumanized targets.

“Besides manipulations of target persons, manipulations of social goals validate this prediction: Inferring preference, a mental-state inference, significantly increases MPFC and STS activity to these otherwise dehumanized targets (Harris & Fiske, 2007).”

• cites Harris & Fiske, 2007 sourcePartly supported

  The Task main effect and Discussion report significantly greater mPFC activity during vegetable-preference inference than during age judgments, including for the disgust-eliciting targets. They do not report a corresponding STS increase from preference inference: the STS finding is a separate comparison in which activity was greater for other social-group members than for the disgust-eliciting targets, collapsed across tasks. (LLM, conf=0.89)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

People anthropomorphize a range of inanimate objects and animals.

“People also anthropomorphize a range of inanimate objects and animals (Kwan & Fiske, 2008; Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007).”

• cites Kwan & Fiske, 2008Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007 sourcePartly supported

  In “Dimensions of Mind Perception” (page unavailable), respondents rated mental capacities in three nonhuman animals and a sociable robot, supporting the point that people attribute minds to animals and at least one nonliving entity. The paper does not establish anthropomorphism across a range of inanimate objects; the robot is the only such object studied. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

One indication of dehumanized perception may be reduced activation in the social-cognition neural network, including medial prefrontal cortex and superior temporal sulcus.

“One indication of dehumanized perception may be reduced activation in the social-cognition neural network (see Amodio & Frith, 2006; Overwalle, 2009, for reviews), including medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC; Harris & Fiske, 2006) and superior temporal sulcus (STS; Harris & Fiske, 2007).”

• cites Harris & Fiske, 2006 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Harris & Fiske, 2007 sourceSupported

The ACC has been active when participants needed to override a prepotent response to endorse sacrificing dehumanized targets.

“but more recently, has been active when participants needed to override a prepotent response to endorse sacrificing dehumanized targets (Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010).”

• cites Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010 sourcePartly supported

  The fMRI findings report ACC activation when participants judged sacrificing a low-warmth, low-competence target to save high-warmth, high-competence people; the paper also describes the former targets as dehumanized. But the General discussion says overriding moral aversion is a proposal, not an established explanation: participants may instead have felt less aversion, and the design cannot separate the effects of sacrificing the target from saving the ingroup. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Study 2 found that human-perception dimension ratings correlate with activation in brain regions beyond the social-cognition network, including areas implicated in disgust, attention, and cognitive control.

“Study 2 shows that these human-perception dimension ratings correlate with activation in brain regions beyond the social-cognition network, including areas implicated in disgust, attention, and cognitive control.”

Study 1 found that participants rate dehumanized targets differently on a number of human-perception dimensions.

“and rate them differently on a number of human-perception dimensions”

Study 1 found that participants fail to spontaneously think about the mental contents of dehumanized targets when imagining a day in their life.

“Study 1 demonstrates that participants do fail to spontaneously think about the contents of these targets’ minds when imagining a day in their life”

The 3:1 deviant-cell contrast analyses revealed no significant differences in adjectives, interpretive-action verbs, or descriptive-action verbs used in the descriptions of any type of social target.

“The 3:1 deviant-cell contrast analyses revealed no significant differences in adjectives, interpretive-action verbs, or descriptive-actions verbs used in the descriptions of any type of social target.”

Right anterior insula showed parametric modulation with warmth ratings, t(19) = −4.31, p < 4.76E−4, partial η2 = 0.49, at x = 38, y = 13, z = 15, 312 voxels.

“we found parametric modulation of the right anterior insula with warmth ratings, t(19) = −4.31, p < 4.76E−4, partial η2 = 0.49, at x = 38, y = 13, z = 15, 312 voxels”

No significant differences appear on perceived experience of complex emotions.

“No significant differences appear on perceived experience of complex emotions, separating apparent dehumanization from previous work on infra-humanization.”

No significant differences distinguished the total number of words used to describe the different social targets, F(3, 93) = .20, p = .90.

“No significant differences distinguished the total number of words used to describe the different social targets, F(3, 93) = .20, p = .90.”

Participants use significantly fewer mental-state verbs to describe a day in the life of dehumanized targets, t(86.22) = 2.52, p < .05.

“However, as predicted, a 3:1 deviant-cell contrast revealed that participants use significantly fewer mental-state verbs to describe a day in the life of dehumanized targets, t(86.22) = 2.52, p < .05.”

Dehumanized targets were rated as having significantly more ups and downs in life, t(55.54) = 3.49, p < .05.

“Significantly more ups and downs in life appear for these social targets, t(55.54) = 3.49, p < .05”

No significant differences in mental-state verb use appear for any of the other social targets.

“No significant differences in mental-state verb use appear for any of the other social targets (see Figure 1 for means).”

Dehumanized targets were viewed as marginally less typically human, t(114) = −1.72, p = .09.

“participants also viewed them as marginally less typically human, t(114) = −1.72, p = .09.”

Left posterior insula showed parametric modulation with competence ratings, t(19) = 4.27, p < 5.21E−4, partial η2 = 0.49, at x = 38, y = 13, z = 15, 54 voxels.

“We also found parametric modulation of the left posterior insula with competence ratings, t(19) = 4.27, p < 5.21E−4, partial η2 = 0.49, at x = 38, y = 13, z = 15, 54 voxels”

Perceivers do not use mental-state verbs when describing dehumanized targets' daily life.

“and perceivers do not use mental- state verbs when describing dehumanized targets’ daily life.”

Perceivers describe it as more difficult to infer the content of dehumanized targets' minds and personality.

“perceivers describe it as more difficult to infer the content of their minds and personality”

Bilateral STS, a component of the social-cognition network, was correlated with rated ease of getting into other people's heads, similarity, and familiarity.

“Bilateral STS, a component of the social-cognition network, was correlated with rated ease of getting into other people’s heads, similarity, and familiarity (see Table 1)”

These human-perception dimensions correlate with parts of the brain implicated in disgust, conflict resolution, and attention, in addition to social-cognition neural regions.

“Moreover, these human-perception dimensions correlate with parts of the brain implicated in disgust, conflict resolution, and attention, in addition to social-cognition neural regions.”

Ratings of ups and downs in life activated a range of neural regions, including bilateral anterior insula, and visual regions implicated in attention such as Brodmann area 18 in occipital cortex, t(19) = 4.15, p < 5.97E−4, partial η2 = 0.48, at x = −22, y = −88, z = 20, 355 voxels.

“Finally, ratings of ups and downs in life activated a range of neural regions, including bilateral anterior insula, and visual regions implicated in attention such as Brodmann area 18 in occipital cortex, t(19) = 4.15, p < 5.97E−4, partial η2 = 0.48, at x = −22, y = −88, z = 20, 355 voxels.”

Ratings of typical humanity modulated activity in the anterior cingulate cortex, t(19) = −4.01, p < 7.69E−4, partial η2 = 0.46, at x = 5, y = 11, z = 42, 24 voxels.

“Ratings of typical humanity modulated activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), t(19) = −4.01, p < 7.69E−4, partial η2 = 0.46, at x = 5, y = 11, z = 42, 24 voxels”

Dehumanized perception-the tendency not to think spontaneously about what is in someone else's mind-may be a mechanism that enables cruel acts such as torture.

“Dehumanized perception, a failure to spontaneously consider the mind of another person, may be a psychological mechanism facilitating inhumane acts like torture.”

These results suggest that disengaging social cognition affects a number of other brain processes.

“These results suggest that disengaging social cognition affects a number of other brain processes”

This prior neural pattern suggests that participants may not consider the minds of dehumanized groups.

“This suggests participants may not consider these dehumanized groups’ minds.”

The authors' prior work shows that parts of the social-cognition network uniquely fail to engage for traditionally dehumanized targets such as homeless persons or drug addicts.

“our previous work shows that parts of this network uniquely fail to engage for traditionally dehumanized targets (homeless persons or drug addicts; see Harris & Fiske, 2009, for review)”

• cites Harris & Fiske, 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

This suggests that a neural network critical for social interaction may disengage when people view disgust-inducing people.

“This suggests that a neural network critical for social interaction (Frith & Frith, 2001) may disengage when people view these disgust-inducing people.”

Study 1 results are the first rating-data demonstration of reduced spontaneous social cognition to traditionally dehumanized people.

“The Study 1 results are the first rating-data demonstration of reduced spontaneous social cognition to traditionally dehumanized people.”

Dehumanized perception may be necessary to facilitate extremely inhumane acts like torture against other people by robbing them of moral protection.

“dehumanized perception may be necessary to facilitate extremely inhumane acts like torture against other people, robbing them of their moral protection”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Person perception sets moral norms for the social interaction that follows.

According to the Stereotype Content Model, disgust-inducing targets such as homeless people and drug addicts in US samples, and immigrants and poor people in all samples, are perceived as low on both warmth and competence.

“while disgust-inducing targets (homeless people and drug addicts in US samples; immigrants and poor people in all samples) are perceived as low on both trait dimensions (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007).”

• cites Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Participants are spontaneously inferring the contents of the dehumanized targets' minds less often than other social targets.

“Participants are spontaneously inferring the contents of the dehumanized targets’ minds less often than other social targets.”

Members of social categories perceived as low on both warmth and competence reliably elicit more disgust than other social categories.

“Members of social categories (e.g., homeless people, drug addicts) perceived as low on both warmth and competence reliably elicit more disgust than do other social categories (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).”

• cites Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Dehumanized perception may be related to the dehumanized target eliciting disgust instead of at least partially positive social emotions generally felt in the presence of other people.

“Dehumanized perception may be related to the dehumanized target eliciting disgust instead of the at least partially positive social emotions generally felt in the presence of other people.”

The just described neural data do not actually show that dehumanized targets fail to engage participants in spontaneous social cognition.

“However, the just described neural data do not actually show that dehumanized targets fail to engage participants in spontaneous social cognition.”

Propaganda depicting Tutsi in Rwanda as cockroaches and Hitler's classification of Jews as vermin may have facilitated atrocities like torture and genocide.

“Indeed propaganda depicting Tutsi in Rwanda as “Inyenzi” or cockroaches, and Hitler’s classification of Jews in Nazi Germany as vermin may have facilitated atrocities like torture and genocide”

Different types of verbs and adjectives provide different levels of abstraction.

“Different types of verbs and adjectives provide different levels of abstraction (Semin & Fiedler, 1988).”

• cites Semin & Fiedler, 1988 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Overall, these findings support the hypothesis that dehumanized targets are rated significantly lower on 10 out of 14 rating dimensions that in past research are social psychological or folk dimensions of dehumanization.

“Overall, these findings support the hypothesis, showing that dehumanized targets are rated significantly lower on 10 out of 14 rating dimensions that in past research are social psychological or folk dimensions of dehumanization.”

People may spontaneously think about the minds of other social targets who elicit social emotions such as pride, envy, or pity.

“People may spontaneously think about the minds of other social targets who elicit social emotions such as pride (American heroes, ingroups), envy (business people, rich people), or pity (elderly people, disabled people).”

People can spontaneously infer mental states even for targets without actual minds.

“People can spontaneously infer mental states even for targets without actual minds.”

• cites Heberlein, Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2004 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Heider & Simmel, 1944 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

These results hint at complex psychological mechanisms potentially involved in atrocities against humanity.

“and hints at some of the complex psychological mechanisms potentially involved in atrocities against humanity”

The more warm participants view a social target, the less activation in anterior insula.

“suggesting that the more warm participants view a social target, the less activation in anterior insula.”

Increased competence ratings of social targets result in increased posterior insula activation.

“such that increased competence ratings of social targets result in increased posterior insula activation.”

The more participants rated a social target as typically human, the less activity in the ACC.

“suggesting that the more participants rated a social target as typically human, the less activity in the ACC.”

Outgroups are not perceived as experiencing complex human emotions to the same extent as ingroups, a phenomenon termed infra-humanization.

“Outgroups are not perceived as experiencing complex human emotions to the same extent as ingroups, a phenomenon termed infra-humanization (Leyens et al., 2001, 2003).”

• cites Leyens et al., 2001 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Leyens et al., 2003 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Dehumanization facilitates behavior generally not reserved for human beings because perceiving a person implies a number of moral rules and norms that govern the social interaction.

“Moreover, dehumanization facilitates behavior generally not reserved for human beings because perceiving a person implies a number of moral rules and norms that govern the social interaction.”

Participants spontaneously think about the minds of dehumanized targets less often than the minds of other social targets.

“Specifically, participants spontaneously think about the minds of dehumanized targets less often than the minds of other social targets.”

People spontaneously fail to consider another person's mind if that person elicits predominantly disgust, a phenomenon characterized as dehumanized perception.

“People spontaneously fail to consider another person’s mind if that person elicits predominantly disgust, a phenomenon we characterize as dehumanized perception.”

Dehumanized perception of extreme outgroups suggests that they are perceived as unlike all other people.

“Dehumanized perception of extreme outgroups suggests that they are perceived as unlike all other people.”

Discriminatory or inhumane behaviors may not seem to matter because one fails to consider the person's mental experience.

“Thus, discriminatory or inhumane behaviors may not seem to matter because one fails to consider the person’s mental experience (Fiske, Harris, & Cuddy, 2004).”

• cites Fiske, Harris, & Cuddy, 2004 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Research in this topical issue shows negative relationships between violence and likelihood of developing posttraumatic stress disorder in two separate instances of genocide and mass killings.

“For instance, research in this topical issue shows negative relationships between violence and likelihood of developing posttraumatic stress disorder in two separate instances of genocide and mass killings (PTSD; Weierstall, Schalinski, Crombach, Hecker, & Elbert, 2011; Weierstall, Schaal, Schalinski,”

• cites Weierstall, Schalinski, Crombach, Hecker, & Elbert, 2011Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Weierstall, Schaal, Schalinski, Dusingizemungu, & Elbert, in pressNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

These ratings rely on the social-cognition neural network.

“suggesting that these ratings rely on the social-cognition neural network.”