Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: When people behave against their better judgment.

Veronika Denes-Raj, Seymour J. Epstein·1994·Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Abstract

When offered an opportunity to win $1 on every "win" trial in which they drew a red jelly bean, subjects frequently elected to draw from a bowl that contained a greater absolute number, but a smaller proportion, of red beans (e.g., 7 in 100) than from a bowl with fewer red beans but better odds (e.g., 1 in 10). Subjects reported that although they knew the probabilities were against them, they felt they had a better chance when there were more red beans. Similar, but less extreme results were obtained on "lose" trials, where drawing a red bean meant losing $1. These results were predicted from the concretive and experiential principles of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Nonoptimal choices in the laboratory were significantly correlated with heuristic responses to relevant vignettes and with self-reported gambling in real life.

Cites (1)

  1. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
    Tversky, Amos, Kahneman, Daniel · 1975 · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making

Show all 1 references

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: When people behave against their better judgment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0022-3514.66.5.819
The paper
Denes-Raj, V., & Epstein, S. J. (1994). Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: When people behave against their better judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.66.5.819

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