Expression theory and the preference reversal phenomena.

Goldstein, William M., Einhorn, Hillel J.·1987·Psychological Review
DOI 10.1037//0033-295x.94.2.236

Cites (1)

  1. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
    Tversky, Amos, Kahneman, Daniel · 1975 · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making

Show all 1 references

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    Slovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa L., Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G. · 2004 · Risk Analysis
  2. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
    Kahneman, Daniel, Frederick, Shane · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
  3. The Affect Heuristic
    Slovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa, Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G. · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
  4. “Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment.”
    Dawes, Robyn M., Faust, David, Meehl, Paul E. · 1989 · Science
  5. The affect heuristic
    Slovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa L., Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G. · 2007 · European Journal of Operational Research

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Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Expression theory and the preference reversal phenomena. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0033-295x.94.2.236
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Goldstein, W. M., & Einhorn, H. J. (1987). Expression theory and the preference reversal phenomena. Psychological Review. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.94.2.236

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