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Cited by 8,792Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentEthics in Business and EducationPhilosophical Ethics and Theory

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 246 of the 254 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Haidt, Jonathan·2001·Psychological Review
DOI 10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814
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Abstract

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent that rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.

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Citations

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Research works printed but not linked: 26

  1. Black, 1998, Neuronal plasticity and the developing brain., 31
  2. Chen, 1999, The heuristic-systematic model in its broader context., 73
  3. D'Andrade, 1984, Cultural meaning systems., 88
  4. Darwin, 1998, The descent of man.
  5. de Waal, 1982, Chimpanzee politics.
  6. Frijda, 1986, The emotions.
  7. Hare, 1993, Without conscience.
  8. Harrison, 1967, Ethical objectivism., Vols. 3-4, 71
  9. Huttenlocher, 1994, Synaptogenesis, synapse elimination, and neural plasticity in human cerebral cortex., Vol. 27, 35
  10. Kagan, 1984, The nature of the child.
  11. Kant, 1959, Foundation of the metaphysics of morals (L. W. Beck. Trans.).
  12. Kohlberg, 1969, Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization., 347
  13. Lapsley, 1996, Moral psychology.
  14. Margolis, 1987, Patterns, thinking, and cognition.
  15. Mednick, 1982, Biology and violence., 21
  16. Mischel, 1976, A cognitive social-learning approach to morality and self-regulation., 84
  17. Newcomb, 1943, Personality and social change: Attitude formation in a student community.
  18. Pavlov, 1927, Conditioned reflexes.
  19. Perkins, 1983, Difficulties in everyday reasoning., 177
  20. Premack, 1995, Origins of human social competence., 205
  21. Rozin, 2000, Disgust., 637
  22. Shweder, 1997, The "big three" of morality (autonomy, community, and divinity), and the "big three" explanations of suffering., 119
  23. Singer, 1994, Rethinking life and death.
  24. Solomon, 1993, The philosophy of emotions., 3
  25. Solomon, 1991, A terror management theory of social behavior., 93
  26. Williams, 1967, Rationalism., Vols. 7-8, 69

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Metadata

Authors
Haidt, J.
Affiliations
University of Virginia (US)
Corresponding author
Haidt, Jonathan
ORCID
Haidt, Jonathan
Venue
Psychological Review
Publisher
American Psychological Association (APA)
Published
2001
Volume
108
Issue
4
Pages
814-834
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
DOI
10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814
OpenAlex
W2123791568
Semantic Scholar
b74e8da297574fd071d4b48b7aa94ea16861aea6
Cited by
8,048
References
254
Citations by year
2026: 365 · 2025: 479 · 2024: 360 · 2023: 447 · 2022: 497 · 2021: 468 · 2020: 535 · 2019: 511 · 2018: 405 · 2017: 401 · 2016: 408 · 2015: 416 · 2014: 436 · 2013: 433 · 2012: 369
FWCI
16.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • National Institutes of Health (1r03da012606-01)
  • National Institute on Drug Abuse (1-RO3-DA12606-01)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
moral judgment, moral reasoning, social intuitionism, moral intuitions, automated assessment, evolutionary psychology of morality
MeSH terms
Emotions, Humans, Morals, Problem Solving, Social Perception, Social Values, Intuition

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