The DOI matches its Crossref record; 245 of the 254 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Abstract
Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent that rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.
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In the citing paper
“However, since moral values appear to be deeply-held, stable across time, and resistant to change 11 – 13 , a parallel literature on moral cognition makes a different prediction: insofar as punishment is a method of restoring justice following a moral violation, punitive preferences should be less susceptible to group influence.”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [13]
In the citing paper
“The behaviour of individuals living in communities is regulated by moral norms and values 158-162 .”
From Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response (2020) · cites this paper as [159]
In the citing paper
“Haidt [26], for example, has argued that quick, automatic processes drive moral judgment while reflective processes play a more ad hoc role.”
From Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy (2024) · cites this paper as [26]
In the citing paper
“Research from social psychology suggests that when individuals encounter others who use fundamentally different moral philosophies to guide behavior, we tend to judge those others as immoral, rather than simply using a different moral perspective (Haidt, 2001(Haidt, , 2012)).”
From Taking Stock of Moral Approaches to Leadership: An Integrative Review of Ethical, Authentic, and Servant Leadership (2019) · cites this paper as Haidt, 2001
In the citing paper
“Influential theories in psychology maintain that our moral sense is shaped by the social world (1)”
From Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks (2017) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Most existing research takes a dyadic perspective to study the social transmission of morality; typically, one person (such as a child) is exposed to another's ideas (e.g., parent) through behavior or communication (1,2).”
From Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks (2017) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“As noted, other research suggests that moral judgments are often based on moral intuitions or heuristics [1], leading to quick and simple judgments.”
From The Importance of Moral Construal: Moral versus Non-Moral Construal Elicits Faster, More Extreme, Universal Evaluations of the Same Actions (2012) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Moreover, disgust also affects our moral judgment [38,40,42].”
From Fatal attraction: the intuitive appeal of GMO opposition (2015) · cites this paper as [42]
In the citing paper
“This caveat might have contributed to the similar results in the meta-analyses on moral cognition and on ToM (rather than on empathy), given that emotion processing is thought to play a paramount role in real-world moral cognition (Krebs 2008; Tangney et al. 2007; Haidt 2001).”
From Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy (2012) · cites this paper as Haidt 2001
Citations
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response
Bavel, J. J. V., Baicker, K., Boggio, P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., Crockett, M. J., Crum, A. J., Douglas, K. M., Druckman, J. N., et al. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0884-z · Cited by 4,964
Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations.
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0015141 · Cited by 4,560
Self-citationReflective and Impulsive Determinants of Social Behavior
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_1 · Cited by 3,984
Metadata
- Authors
- Haidt, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Virginia (US)
- Corresponding author
- Haidt, Jonathan
- ORCID
- Haidt, Jonathan
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2001
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 814-834
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2123791568
- Semantic Scholar
- b74e8da297574fd071d4b48b7aa94ea16861aea6
- Cited by
- 8,048
- References
- 254
- Citations by year
- 2026: 365 · 2025: 479 · 2024: 360 · 2023: 447 · 2022: 497 · 2021: 468 · 2020: 535 · 2019: 511 · 2018: 405 · 2017: 401 · 2016: 408 · 2015: 416 · 2014: 436 · 2013: 433 · 2012: 369
- FWCI
- 16.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institutes of Health (1r03da012606-01)
- National Institute on Drug Abuse (1-RO3-DA12606-01)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- moral judgment, moral reasoning, social intuitionism, moral intuitions, automated assessment, evolutionary psychology of morality
- MeSH terms
- Emotions, Humans, Morals, Problem Solving, Social Perception, Social Values, Intuition
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