Cited by 345Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentEthics in Business and EducationPhilosophical Ethics and Theory

The intelligence of the moral intuitions: A comment on Haidt (2001).

Pizarro, David A., Bloom, Paul·2003·Psychological Review

Abstract

The social intuitionist model (J. Haidt, 2001) posits that fast and automatic intuitions are the primary source of moral judgments. Conscious deliberations play little causal role; they are used mostly to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have already occurred. In this article, the authors present evidence that fast and automatic moral intuitions are actually shaped and informed by prior reasoning. More generally, there is considerable evidence from outside the laboratory that people actively engage in reasoning when faced with real-world moral dilemmas. Together, these facts limit the strong claims of the social intuitionist model concerning the irrelevance of conscious deliberation.

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Crossref · 10.1037/0033-295x.110.1.193

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Gilligan, 1982, In a different voice.
  2. Schelling, 1984, Choice and consequence.

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Authors
Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P.
Affiliations
Yale University (US)
Venue
Psychological Review
Published
2003
Volume
110
Issue
1
Pages
193-196
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
OpenAlex
W2134783586
Cited by
345
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 36 · 2012: 18
FWCI
2.26
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
social intuitionist model, moral intuitions, moral judgment, moral psychology
MeSH terms
Cognition, Decision Making, Humans, Intelligence, Morals, Intuition

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