The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The intelligence of the moral intuitions: A comment on Haidt (2001).
Abstract
The social intuitionist model (J. Haidt, 2001) posits that fast and automatic intuitions are the primary source of moral judgments. Conscious deliberations play little causal role; they are used mostly to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have already occurred. In this article, the authors present evidence that fast and automatic moral intuitions are actually shaped and informed by prior reasoning. More generally, there is considerable evidence from outside the laboratory that people actively engage in reasoning when faced with real-world moral dilemmas. Together, these facts limit the strong claims of the social intuitionist model concerning the irrelevance of conscious deliberation.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“The fact that cultural shifts and individual differences in moralization occur suggests that morality is not always intrinsic to stimuli, but may be the result of construing those actions as morally-relevant [22].”
From The Importance of Moral Construal: Moral versus Non-Moral Construal Elicits Faster, More Extreme, Universal Evaluations of the Same Actions (2012) · cites this paper as [22]
In the citing paper
“moral cognition is thought to involve the representation of intentions and outcomes as well as (vicariously experienced) emotional states”
From Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy (2012) · cites this paper as Pizarro and Bloom 2003
In the citing paper
“more automatic, bottom-up driven mapping and awareness of others emotional states in the context of self–other distinction (i.e., empathy) might be modulated by more controlled, top-down processes involved in attributing mind states (i.e., ToM)”
From Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy (2012) · cites this paper as Pizarro and Bloom 2003
Citations
Cites
James, W. (1891) · Personality Culture Society · doi:10.1037/11059-000 · Cited by 25,876
Lazarus, R. S. (1991) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195069945.001.0001 · Cited by 12,691
The expression of the emotions in man and animals.
Darwin, C. D. (1872) · J. Murray eBooks · doi:10.1037/10001-000 · Cited by 12,120
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development
GILLIGAN, C. (1993) · doi:10.4159/9780674037618 · Cited by 9,127
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
DeLamater, J., & Ward, A. (2013) · Handbooks of sociology and social research · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6772-0 · Cited by 7,590
Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.1.4 · Cited by 6,682
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986) · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-4964-1 · Cited by 5,219
Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change
Marquart, F., & Naderer, B. (2015) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-09923-7_20 · Cited by 5,011
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Gilligan, 1982, In a different voice.
- Schelling, 1984, Choice and consequence.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 301–344 of 344
(2013) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674350.002.0004
(2013) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674350.002.0003
(2013) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674350.002.0008
(2013) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674350.002.0006
(2014) · AD ALTA Journal of Interdisciplinary Research · doi:10.33543/0401
Spór o podstawy sądu moralnego. Neuronauki a filozofia moralna
Kaleciak, S. (2023) · Studia Nauk Teologicznych PAN · doi:10.24425/snt.2023.146524
(2014) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781118529683.ch3
Clarke, S. (2014) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781118529683.refs
Taking the Evolutionary Psychological Elephant by the Tusks
McGee, A. J., & Foster, C. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-49715-5_4
McHugh, C., Francis, K., Everett, J. A. C., & Timmons, S. (2024) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104616
Gibbs, J. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.002.0010
Gibbs, J. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.002.0008
Gibbs, J. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.005.0001
Gibbs, J. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.002.0004
Moshman, D. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.002.0006
Gibbs, J. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.002.0003
Gibbs, J. C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190878214.002.0007
(2024) · Journal of Interpersonal Relations Intergroup Relations and Identity · doi:10.33921/jljs3748 · Cited by 1
Approaching Moral Emotions and Moral Emotion Management in Election Campaigns: Introduction
Szabó, G. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-67023-7_2 · Cited by 1
Ethics and Professional Practice
Rodger, D. (2022) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781394322879.ch3
Conclusion: A Social Perspective on Moral Agency
Abbott, O. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-75181-3_10
Jonathan Haidt: Social Intuitionism and Moral Foundations Theory
Abbott, O. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-75181-3_9
Abbott, O. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-75181-3_6
Putting the Panic Back in Moral Panic Theory: A Case for Disproportionality
McCready, M. (2020) · University of North Texas Digital Library (University of North Texas) · doi:10.12794/metadc1752379
Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity
Benard, S., & Cho, S. (2025) · Handbooks of sociology and social research · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-93042-3_12 · Cited by 1
A Sketch of a Pragmatist Account of the Relational Constitution and Enactment of Moral Agency
Abbott, O. (2025) · Palgrave Studies in Relational Sociology · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-93941-9_11
Justifier une prise de décision en situation de dilemme : Aspects cognitifs et émotionnels
Latchimy, I. (2012) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/119f333dz8169z4a5cz8b3fzd3a9496fab0e
La rationalité des mortels : les pensées de mort perturbent les processus analytiques
Trémolière, B. (2013) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/9bfa750dz244dz4ac1za9adz8ccd26a9dac2 · Cited by 1
Neo-Kohlbergian, T., Mechler, H., & Thoma, S. J. (2013) · Emerald Group Publishing Limited eBooks · doi:10.1108/978-1-61735-867-820251061
Third- and concerned-party positions in moral dilemmas: Effect of empathy on ethical judgment
Nonami, H., Ohtomo, S., Aoki, T., Sugiura, M., Sakamoto, G., Oba, K., & Tashiro, Y. (2026) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0354169
Classical Utilitarianism and the Anxiety of Influence
Weinstein, D. (2026) · doi:10.1093/9780197912621.001.0001
Weinstein, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197912621.003.0001
Weinstein, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197912621.003.0007
Weinstein, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197912621.003.0011
Making Better Sense of Ideal Utilitarianism
Weinstein, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197912621.003.0009
Weinstein, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197912621.003.0012
Spreading the “Bonfire of Rubbish”
Weinstein, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197912621.003.0008
Weinstein, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197912621.003.0003
The “General Presumption” Afforded by Evolution
Weinstein, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197912621.003.0004
Weinstein, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197912621.002.0004
Weinstein, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197912621.003.0005
“The Pinnacle of Ethical Intuitionism”
Weinstein, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197912621.003.0010
Metadata
- Authors
- Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 193-196
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2134783586
- Semantic Scholar
- f8423057b706dfcb37f5a0271d4d69609b1ce457
- Cited by
- 345
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 36 · 2012: 18
- FWCI
- 2.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- social intuitionist model, moral intuitions, moral judgment, moral psychology
- MeSH terms
- Cognition, Decision Making, Humans, Intelligence, Morals, Intuition
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
