The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The intelligence of the moral intuitions: A comment on Haidt (2001).
Abstract
The social intuitionist model (J. Haidt, 2001) posits that fast and automatic intuitions are the primary source of moral judgments. Conscious deliberations play little causal role; they are used mostly to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have already occurred. In this article, the authors present evidence that fast and automatic moral intuitions are actually shaped and informed by prior reasoning. More generally, there is considerable evidence from outside the laboratory that people actively engage in reasoning when faced with real-world moral dilemmas. Together, these facts limit the strong claims of the social intuitionist model concerning the irrelevance of conscious deliberation.
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“The fact that cultural shifts and individual differences in moralization occur suggests that morality is not always intrinsic to stimuli, but may be the result of construing those actions as morally-relevant [22].”
From The Importance of Moral Construal: Moral versus Non-Moral Construal Elicits Faster, More Extreme, Universal Evaluations of the Same Actions (2012) · cites this paper as [22]
In the citing paper
“moral cognition is thought to involve the representation of intentions and outcomes as well as (vicariously experienced) emotional states”
From Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy (2012) · cites this paper as Pizarro and Bloom 2003
In the citing paper
“more automatic, bottom-up driven mapping and awareness of others emotional states in the context of self–other distinction (i.e., empathy) might be modulated by more controlled, top-down processes involved in attributing mind states (i.e., ToM)”
From Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy (2012) · cites this paper as Pizarro and Bloom 2003
Citations
Cites
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GILLIGAN, C. (1993) · doi:10.4159/9780674037618 · Cited by 9,127
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
DeLamater, J., & Ward, A. (2013) · Handbooks of sociology and social research · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6772-0 · Cited by 7,590
Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.1.4 · Cited by 6,682
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Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change
Marquart, F., & Naderer, B. (2015) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-09923-7_20 · Cited by 5,011
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Gilligan, 1982, In a different voice.
- Schelling, 1984, Choice and consequence.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology
Haidt, J. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1137651 · Cited by 2,504
Exploring Intuition and its Role in Managerial Decision Making
Dane, E., & Pratt, M. G. (2007) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2007.23463682 · Cited by 1,620
The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment
Cushman, F. A., Young, L., & HAUSER, M. D. (2006) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01834.x · Cited by 1,061
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
Cushman, F. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006 · Cited by 990
Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making: A process dissociation approach
Conway, P., & Gawronski, B. (2013) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0031021 · Cited by 696
Metadata
- Authors
- Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 193-196
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2134783586
- Semantic Scholar
- f8423057b706dfcb37f5a0271d4d69609b1ce457
- Cited by
- 345
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 36 · 2012: 18
- FWCI
- 2.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- social intuitionist model, moral intuitions, moral judgment, moral psychology
- MeSH terms
- Cognition, Decision Making, Humans, Intelligence, Morals, Intuition
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