The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The priority heuristic: Making choices without trade-offs.
Open accessAbstract
Bernoulli's framework of expected utility serves as a model for various psychological processes, including motivation, moral sense, attitudes, and decision making. To account for evidence at variance with expected utility, the authors generalize the framework of fast and frugal heuristics from inferences to preferences. The priority heuristic predicts (a) the Allais paradox, (b) risk aversion for gains if probabilities are high, (c) risk seeking for gains if probabilities are low (e.g., lottery tickets), (d) risk aversion for losses if probabilities are low (e.g., buying insurance), (e) risk seeking for losses if probabilities are high, (f) the certainty effect, (g) the possibility effect, and (h) intransitivities. The authors test how accurately the heuristic predicts people's choices, compared with previously proposed heuristics and 3 modifications of expected utility theory: security-potential/aspiration theory, transfer-of-attention-exchange model, and cumulative prospect theory.
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Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232669 · Cited by 4,042
Motivational determinants of risk-taking behavior.
Atkinson, J. W. (1957) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0043445 · Cited by 3,706
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504
Self-citationPayne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173933 · Cited by 3,487
Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice
Tversky, A. (1972) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0032955 · Cited by 3,365
(2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803475 · Cited by 2,987
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Cited by
Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
Gigerenzer, G., & Brighton, H. (2009) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x · Cited by 1,801
Self-citationCokely, E. T., & Kelley, C. M. (2009) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s193029750000067x · Cited by 427
Heuristic decision making in medicine
Marewski, J. N., & Gigerenzer, G. (2012) · Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience · doi:10.31887/dcns.2012.14.1/jmarewski · Cited by 377
Self-citationStatistical Rituals: The Replication Delusion and How We Got There
Gigerenzer, G. (2018) · Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/2515245918771329 · Cited by 263
Self-citationThe case against economic values in the orbitofrontal cortex (or anywhere else in the brain).
Hayden, B. Y., & Niv, Y. (2021) · Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.1037/bne0000448 · Cited by 127
Metadata
- Authors
- Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., & Hertwig, R.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2006
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 409-432
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2108286413
- Cited by
- 745
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 20.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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