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Cited by 127Neural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsNeurotransmitter Receptor Influence on Behavior

The case against economic values in the orbitofrontal cortex (or anywhere else in the brain).

Open access
Hayden, Benjamin Y., Niv, Yael·2021·Behavioral Neuroscience
DOI 10.1037/bne0000448PMC PMC12398331
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Abstract

Much of traditional neuroeconomics proceeds from the hypothesis that value is reified in the brain, that is, that there are neurons or brain regions whose responses serve the discrete purpose of encoding value. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that the activity of many neurons covaries with subjective value as estimated in specific tasks, and has led to the idea that the primary function of the orbitofrontal cortex is to compute and signal economic value. Here we consider an alternative: That economic value, in the cardinal, common-currency sense, is not represented in the brain and used for choice by default. This idea is motivated by consideration of the economic concept of value, which places important epistemic constraints on our ability to identify its neural basis. It is also motivated by the behavioral economics literature, especially work on heuristics, which proposes value-free process models for much if not all of choice. Finally, it is buoyed by recent neural and behavioral findings regarding how animals and humans learn to choose between options. In light of our hypothesis, we critically reevaluate putative neural evidence for the representation of value and explore an alternative: direct learning of action policies. We delineate how this alternative can provide a robust account of behavior that concords with existing empirical data. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

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  • Adjudication between Q-values can be done in a variety of context-sensitive ways.

    “We think it can be done in a variety of context-sensitive ways [21].”

    From Phenomenal interface theory: a model for basal consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [21]

    The Introduction sections on alternatives to valuation and direct learning of policies describe several ways to choose between options, including context-sensitive policies. They do not establish that these methods adjudicate between Q-values; some explicitly avoid calculating option values. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Multiple sources of reward cannot or should not be linearly combined into a single scalar value.

    “Nor is it clear that multiple sources of reward can or should be linearly combined into a single scalar value [21,22].”

    From Phenomenal interface theory: a model for basal consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [21]

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Research works printed but not linked: 33

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Related

Authors
Hayden, B. Y., & Niv, Y.
Affiliations
  • University of Minnesota (US)
  • Princeton University (US)
ORCID
Venue
Behavioral Neuroscience
Publisher
American Psychological Association (APA)
Published
2021-04
Volume
135
Issue
2
Pages
192-201
ISSN
  • 0735-7044 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-0084
DOI
10.1037/bne0000448
PMC
PMC12398331
OpenAlex
W3161930903
Cited by
127
References
92
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 2
FWCI
13.41
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Behavioral Neuroscience (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Institute on Drug Abuse (R01 DA038615; R01 DA042065)
  • John Templeton Foundation
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience › Neurotransmitter Receptor Influence on Behavior
Keywords
orbitofrontal cortex, neuroeconomics, economic value, heuristics, decision-making, subjective value
MeSH terms
Animals, Brain, Choice Behavior, Humans, Neurons, Prefrontal Cortex

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