The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Category-based induction.
Abstract
An argument is categorical if its premises and conclusion are of the form All members ofC have property F, where C is a natural category like FALCON or BIRD, and P remains the same across premises and conclusion. An example is Grizzly bears love onions. Therefore, all bears love onions. Such an argument is psychologically strong to the extent that belief in its premises engenders belief in its conclusion. A subclass of categorical arguments is examined, and the following hypothesis is advanced: The strength of a categorical argument increases with (a) the degree to which the premise categories are similar to the conclusion category and (b) the degree to which the premise categories are similar to members of the lowest level category that includes both the premise and the conclusion categories. A model based on this hypothesis accounts for 13 qualitative phenomena and the quantitative results of several experiments.
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Citations
Cites
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Conceptual Change in Childhood
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Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
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Self-citationBarsalou, L. W. (1983) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/bf03196968 · Cited by 1,879 · cited 2×
“We thank Lawrence Barsalou, Lee Brooks, Susan Gelman, Ellen Markman, Douglas Medin, Lance Rips, Joshua Stern, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful discussion. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Edward E. Smith, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 330 Packard Road, Arm Arbor, M…”
Categories and induction in young children
Gelman, S. A., & Markman, E. M. (1986) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(86)90034-x · Cited by 1,155
The development of induction within natural kind and artifact categories
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Inductive judgments about natural categories
Rips, L. J. (1975) · Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0022-5371(75)80055-7 · Cited by 465 · cited 4×
“Category-based induction was first examined by Rips (1975).”
InfluentialHorwich, P., & Ayer, A. J. (1973) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183724 · Cited by 414
The Logic of Plausible Reasoning: A Core Theory
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Osherson, D. N., Smith, E. E., & Shafir, E. B. (1986) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(86)80002-6 · Cited by 31
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Culture and systems of thought: Holistic versus analytic cognition.
Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.2.291 · Cited by 4,263
The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.
Sloman, S. A. (1996) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.119.1.3 · Cited by 3,848
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
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Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Metadata
- Authors
- Osherson, D. N., Smith, E. E., Wilkie, O., López, A., & Shafir, E.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 1990-04
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 185-200
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2164797238
- Cited by
- 900
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 8.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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