The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Subjective confidence in one's answers: The consensuality principle.
Abstract
In answering general-information questions, a within-person confidence-accuracy (C-A) correlation is typically observed, suggesting that people can monitor the correctness of their knowledge. However, because the correct answer is generally the consensual answer--the one endorsed by most participants--confidence judgment may actually monitor the consensuality of the answer rather than its correctness. Indeed, the C-A correlation was positive for items with a consensually correct answer but negative for items with a consensually wrong answer. Results suggest that the consensuality-confidence correlation may be mediated by 2 internal mnemonic cues that are correlated with consensuality: Consensual answers are reached faster and are selected more consistently by the same person on different occasions than nonconsensual answers. The results argue against a direct-access view of confidence judgments and suggest that such judgments will be accurate only as long as people's responses are by and large correct across the sampled items, thus stressing the criticality of a representative design.
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Cites
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Self-citationWhy People Fail to Recognize Their Own Incompetence
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Cited by
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Intuition, reason, and metacognition
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Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology
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Self-citationWhen are two heads better than one and why?
Koriat, A. (2012) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1216549 · Cited by 256
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Metadata
- Authors
- Koriat, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Published
- 2008-07
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 945-959
- ISSN
- 0278-7393 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1285
- OpenAlex
- W2090483808
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 3.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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