Cited by 848Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsClinical Reasoning and Diagnostic SkillsCognitive Science and Education Research

Overcoming intuition: Metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning.

Alter, Adam L., Oppenheimer, Daniel M., Epley, Nicholas, Eyre, Rebecca N.·2007·Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Abstract

Humans appear to reason using two processing styles: System 1 processes that are quick, intuitive, and effortless and System 2 processes that are slow, analytical, and deliberate that occasionally correct the output of System 1. Four experiments suggest that System 2 processes are activated by metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency during the process of reasoning. Incidental experiences of difficulty or disfluency--receiving information in a degraded font (Experiments 1 and 4), in difficult-to-read lettering (Experiment 2), or while furrowing one's brow (Experiment 3)--reduced the impact of heuristics and defaults in judgment (Experiments 1 and 3), reduced reliance on peripheral cues in persuasion (Experiment 2), and improved syllogistic reasoning (Experiment 4). Metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency appear to serve as an alarm that activates analytic forms of reasoning that assess and sometimes correct the output of more intuitive forms of reasoning.

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Crossref · 10.1037/0096-3445.136.4.569

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  • Metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency activate more analytical reasoning processes.

    “Alter et al. (2007) demonstrated that metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency activate more analytical reasoning processes.”
  • Manipulating the activation of these heuristics can be used to improve metacognitive control: increasing subjective processing difficulty stimulates more metacognitive control and thereby improves participants' performance on reasoning tasks that benefit from a more analytic processing style.

    “Manipulating the activation of these heuristics (e.g., via priming) can be used to improve metacognitive control: increasing subjective processing difficulty (e.g., by using a degraded font) stimulates more metacognitive control and thereby improves participants' performance on reasoning tasks that benefit from a more analytic processing style [7].”

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Authors
Alter, A. L., Oppenheimer, D. M., Epley, N., & Eyre, R. N.
Affiliations
  • Princeton University (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
Venue
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Published
2007
Volume
136
Issue
4
Pages
569-576
ISSN
  • 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-2222
OpenAlex
W2138921773
Cited by
844
References
46
Citations by year
2026: 43 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 41 · 2023: 54 · 2022: 50 · 2021: 54 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 47 · 2016: 63 · 2015: 62 · 2014: 51 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 40
FWCI
17.22
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Experimental Psychology General (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation (051811; SES0241544)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
Keywords
metacognition, analytical thinking, intuitive thinking, heuristics, syllogistic reasoning, persuasion, peripheral cues, cognitive effort, dual-process theory
MeSH terms
Cognition, Decision Making, Humans, Judgment, Pilot Projects, Intuition

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