The existence bias.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The authors demonstrate that people treat the mere existence of something as evidence of its goodness. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that an existing state is evaluated more favorably than an alternative. Study 3 shows that imagining an event increases estimates of its likelihood, which in turn leads to favorable evaluation; the more likely that something will be, the more positively it is evaluated. Study 4 shows that the more a form is described as prevalent, the more aesthetically attractive is that form. This indicates a causal relationship between aesthetic judgments and existence in a domain lacking choice among alternatives. Study 5 extends the existence bias to gustatory evaluation and demonstrates that the effect is not moderated by valence. Together these studies suggest that mere existence leads to assumptions of goodness; the status quo is seen as good, right, attractive, tasty, and desirable.
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Citations
Cites
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 · Cited by 9,984 · cited 1×
“Events that easily come to mind are seen as more probable (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), and imagining a possible event is one way to increase the availability of event-related thoughts (C. A. Anderson, 1983; Carroll, 1978; Koehler, 1991).”
BackgroundAttitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure
Zajonc, R. B. (1968) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0025848 · Cited by 6,745
Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937956 · Cited by 6,432 · cited 1×
“In fact, regret avoidance and loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) are the most common explanations for status quo bias (C. J. Anderson, 2003; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991).”
BackgroundStatus quo bias in decision making
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00055564 · Cited by 5,897 · cited 5×
“Research on status quo bias is typically concerned with individual decision making and choices with direct consequences to the decision maker (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988); the effects of status quo bias are generally ascribed to the avoidance of unwanted consequences that change may bring (C. J.…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialExposure and affect: Overview and meta-analysis of research, 1968–1987.
Bornstein, R. F. (1989) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.106.2.265 · Cited by 1,970 · cited 3×
“…1988); mere exposure effects occur when awareness of exposure is absent and are more pronounced when obtained under subliminal conditions (Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992); and people (those with amnesia and those under cognitive load) have been found to justify decisions…”
BackgroundJust world research and the attribution process: Looking back and ahead.
Lerner, M. J., & Miller, D. T. (1978) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.85.5.1030 · Cited by 1,687 · cited 1×
“Findings from various rationalization theories also suggest an increased preference for existing states (Jost et al., 2002; Kay et al., 2002; Lerner & Miller, 1978).”
BackgroundEstimating and testing mediation and moderation in within-subject designs.
Judd, C. M., Kenny, D. A., & McClelland, G. H. (2001) · Psychological Methods · doi:10.1037/1082-989x.6.2.115 · Cited by 846
Crutchfield, R. S. (1955) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/h0040237 · Cited by 820 · cited 1×
“At the same time, social influence is often absent in matters of taste (Crutchfield, 1955).”
BackgroundJost, J. T., Pelham, B. W., Sheldon, O., & Ni Sullivan, B. (2003) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.127 · Cited by 709
Status-quo and omission biases
Ritov, I., & Baron, J. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00208786 · Cited by 613 · cited 3×
“Findings suggest that status quo bias is due to a preference for inaction in matters of choice (C. J. Anderson, 2003; Ritov & Baron, 1992; cf. Schweitzer, 1994).”
BackgroundLieberman, M. D., Ochsner, K. N., Gilbert, D. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2001) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00323 · Cited by 317
Cited by
The Bias Against Creativity: Why People Desire but Reject Creative Ideas
Mueller, J. S., Melwani, S., & Goncalo, J. A. (2012) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797611421018 · Cited by 658
Esses, V. M., Hamilton, L. K., & Gaucher, D. (2017) · Social Issues and Policy Review · doi:10.1111/sipr.12028 · Cited by 436
Can Gender-Fair Language Reduce Gender Stereotyping and Discrimination?
Sczesny, S., Formanowicz, M., & Moser, F. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00025 · Cited by 380
The Psychology of Rituals: An Integrative Review and Process-Based Framework
Hobson, N. M., Schroeder, J., Risen, J. L., Xygalatas, D., & Inzlicht, M. (2018) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868317734944 · Cited by 354
Son Hing, L. S., Bobocel, D. R., Zanna, M. P., Garcia, D. M., Gee, S. S., & Orazietti, K. (2011) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0024618 · Cited by 252
Metadata
- Authors
- Eidelman, S., Crandall, C. S., & Pattershall, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Published
- 2009-11
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 765-775
- ISSN
- 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1315
- OpenAlex
- W2081048036
- Cited by
- 138
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 3.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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