Cited by 799Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsDeath Anxiety and Social ExclusionEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 85 of the 85 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 50 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

The influence of mortality and socioeconomic status on risk and delayed rewards: A life history theory approach.

Open access
Griskevicius, Vladas, Tybur, Joshua M., Delton, Andrew W., Robertson, Theresa E.·2011·Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Abstract

Why do some people take risks and live for the present, whereas others avoid risks and save for the future? The evolutionary framework of life history theory predicts that preferences for risk and delay in gratification should be influenced by mortality and resource scarcity. A series of experiments examined how mortality cues influenced decisions involving risk preference (e.g., $10 for sure vs. 50% chance of $20) and temporal discounting (e.g., $5 now vs. $10 later). The effect of mortality depended critically on whether people grew up in a relatively resource-scarce or resource-plentiful environment. For individuals who grew up relatively poor, mortality cues led them to value the present and gamble for big immediate rewards. Conversely, for individuals who grew up relatively wealthy, mortality cues led them to value the future and avoid risky gambles. Overall, mortality cues appear to propel individuals toward diverging life history strategies as a function of childhood socioeconomic status, suggesting important implications for how environmental factors influence economic decisions and risky behaviors.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Across three experiments, mortality cues shifted financial risk and delayed-reward preferences in opposite directions depending on childhood socioeconomic status (SES). People from relatively resource-scarce childhoods became more present-oriented and risk-taking after mortality cues, whereas those from relatively resource-plentiful childhoods became more future-oriented and risk-averse.

Key findings

  • In Experiment 1, mortality cues interacted with childhood SES on risk taking, \(F(1, 93) = 6.86, p = .01\); at 1 SD below the childhood-SES mean, mortality increased risk taking, \(t(93) = 2.60, p < .05, \eta^2 = .07\), while at 1 SD above the mean there was a nonsignificant trend toward less risk taking, \(t(93) = 1.10, p = .27, \eta^2 = .01\). Current/expected SES did not significantly interact with prime, \(F(1, 93) = 2.30, p = .14\).
  • In Experiment 2, mortality cues again interacted with childhood SES for risk, \(F(1, 67) = 13.86, p < .001, \eta^2 = .17\): lower childhood SES participants took more risk after mortality cues, \(t(67) = 3.57, p < .01, \eta^2 = .14\), and higher childhood SES participants took less risk, \(t(67) = 2.84, p < .01, \eta^2 = .10\). For time preference, the interaction was \(F(1, 67) = 3.2, p = .048, \eta^2 = .046\); lower childhood SES participants preferred the present, \(t(67) = 1.62, p = .06, \eta^2 = .04\), and higher childhood SES participants preferred the future, \(t(67) = 1.71, p = .05, \eta^2 = .04\).
  • In Experiment 3, using childhood family income, mortality cues interacted with childhood SES on time preference, \(F(1, 40) = 7.55, p = .005\); at 1 SD above the mean, mortality increased future valuation, \(t(40) = 2.55, p = .023, \eta^2 = .12\), while at 1 SD below the mean there was a marginally significant increase in valuing the present, \(t(40) = 1.46, p = .08, \eta^2 = .04\).
  • Overall, the authors conclude that mortality cues can propel individuals toward diverging life-history strategies as a function of childhood SES, with implications for economic decisions and risky behavior.

Methods

  • Three experiments with university students: Experiment 1 had 97 participants (67 male, 30 female); Experiment 2 had 71 participants (36 male, 35 female; mean age = 20.8 years); Experiment 3 had 44 participants (mean age = 20.3 years). Participants were seated at computers and randomly assigned to mortality-prime or control conditions using a fictitious news article.
  • Dependent measures involved dichotomous financial choices assessing risk preference and temporal discounting. Childhood SES was measured with subjective items in Experiments 1 and 2 and with recalled household family income in Experiment 3; Experiment 1 also measured current/future SES.
  • Analyses used general linear models/ANOVA to test Prime × Childhood SES interactions, followed by simple-effects tests at ±1 SD of childhood SES. Experiment 2 used directed tests allocating .04 of alpha to the predicted direction and .01 to the unpredicted direction.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the sample had a relatively limited range of SES, which may have reduced power to detect the interaction and means the low-SES participants were relatively affluent compared with the full global and historical range; effects might be stronger at SES extremes.
  • The paper states that future research is needed on the psychological and physiological mechanisms, critical periods in childhood, distinctions between extrinsic and intrinsic mortality, and whether findings generalize to other types of risk and more diverse populations.
  • Evident from the text: all samples were university students, the financial choices were hypothetical lab measures rather than actual financial behavior, Experiment 3 had a small sample (\(N = 44\)), and several simple effects were marginal (\(p = .06\) or \(p = .08\)).

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/a0022403

Cites

85 of 85 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

13 tests recomputed · 0 with the reported and recomputed p on opposite sides of .05

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 of 50 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

Show all 65 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 12
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 23
32 of 32
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Life history strategy is sensitized by events experienced during childhood.

    “Throughout this paper, we have assumed that life history strategy is sensitized by events experienced during childhood.”
1 of 1

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Statistics that don’t add up

Each reported p-value recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom.

  • Inconsistent p-value: t(40) = 2.55, p = .023

    Minor

    The paper reports p = .023 here; recomputing from the test statistic and its degrees of freedom gives p = .015 (two-tailed). The check cannot tell whether the statistic or the p-value is the misprint.

    Reported p = .023 · recomputed p = .015

  • Inconsistent p-value: F(1, 93) = 2.30, p = .14

    Minor

    The paper reports p = .14 here; recomputing from the test statistic and its degrees of freedom gives p = .133. The check cannot tell whether the statistic or the p-value is the misprint.

    Reported p = .14 · recomputed p = .133

2 of 2

Statistics recomputed

Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.

  • Doesn’t add upF(1, 93) = 2.3reported p = .14 · recomputed p = .133

    “F(1, 93) = 2.30, p = .14”

  • Doesn’t add upt(40) = 2.55reported p = .023 · recomputed p = .015

    “t(40) = 2.55, p = .023”

  • Not confirmedF(1, 67) = 3.2reported p = .048 · recomputed p = .078

    “F(1, 67) = 3.2, p = .048”

  • ConsistentF(1, 93) = 6.86reported p = .01 · recomputed p = .010

    “F(1, 93) = 6.86, p = .01”

  • Consistentt(93) = 2.6reported p < .05 · recomputed p = .011

    “t(93) = 2.60, p < .05”

  • Consistentt(93) = 1.1reported p = .27 · recomputed p = .274

    “t(93) = 1.10, p = .27”

  • ConsistentF(1, 67) = 13.86reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F(1, 67) = 13.86, p < .001”

  • Consistentt(67) = 3.57reported p < .01 · recomputed p < .001

    “t(67) = 3.57, p < .01”

  • Consistentt(67) = 2.84reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .006

    “t(67) = 2.84, p < .01”

  • Consistentt(67) = 1.62reported p = .06 · recomputed p = .110

    “t(67) = 1.62, p = .06”

    The paper states a one-tailed test

  • Consistentt(67) = 1.71reported p = .05 · recomputed p = .092

    “t(67) = 1.71, p = .05”

    The paper states a one-tailed test

  • ConsistentF(1, 40) = 7.55reported p = .005 · recomputed p = .009

    “F(1, 40) = 7.55, p = .005”

    The paper states a one-tailed test

  • Consistentt(40) = 1.46reported p = .08 · recomputed p = .152

    “t(40) = 1.46, p = .08”

    The paper states a one-tailed test

13 of 13

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Self-check results appear here once an independent check has confirmed them.

Citations

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Show all 85 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Charnov EL Life history invariants 1993 Oxford University Press Oxford, England
  2. Horn HS Rubenstein DI Krebs JR Davies NB Behavioral adaptations and life history. Behavioural ecology: An evolutionary approach 1984 279 300 Blackwell Oxford, England 2nd ed.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., Delton, A. W., & Robertson, T. E.
Affiliations
  • University of Minnesota (US)
  • University of New Mexico (US)
  • University of California, Santa Barbara (US)
Corresponding author
Griskevicius, Vladas
Venue
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Published
2011
Volume
100
Issue
6
Pages
1015-1026
ISSN
  • 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1315
OpenAlex
W2172137497
Cited by
790
References
85
Citations by year
2026: 51 · 2025: 60 · 2024: 64 · 2023: 49 · 2022: 84 · 2021: 62 · 2020: 67 · 2019: 52 · 2018: 54 · 2017: 71 · 2016: 51 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 34 · 2013: 26 · 2012: 19
FWCI
15.86
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • VU Research Portal (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation (0843764)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Death Anxiety and Social Exclusion
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
risk preferences, delay discounting, life history theory, socioeconomic status, child poverty, resource constraints, risky decision making, evolutionary psychology
MeSH terms
Adult, Arousal, Attitude to Death, Child, Cues, Decision Making, Female, Gambling, Humans, Individuality, Internal-External Control, Life Change Events, Life Expectancy, Male, Motivation, Personality Development, Poverty, Sex Factors, Social Class, Social Environment, Young Adult

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