The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario.
Open accessAbstract
Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.
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Citations
Cites
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
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People thinking about thinking peopleThe role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”
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“In Experiment 1a, as in Schnall et al. (2008), disgust was induced by means of “fart sprays”.”
MethodThe social neuroscience of empathy
Singer, T., & Lamm, C. (2009) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04418.x · Cited by 1,981
Self-citationDamage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05631 · Cited by 1,545
Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 · Cited by 1,231
The neural basis of human moral cognition
Moll, J., Zahn, R., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Krueger, F., & Grafman, J. (2005) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn1768 · Cited by 930
Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe
Wheatley, T., & Haidt, J. (2005) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01614.x · Cited by 851
Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Eslinger, P. J., Bramati, I. E., Mourão-Miranda, J., Andreiuolo, P. A., & Pessoa, L. (2002) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.22-07-02730.2002 · Cited by 721
The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment
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“, 2001), and beliefs moral scenarios (Young et al., 2006).”
Young, L., Camprodon, J. A., Hauser, M., Pascual-Leone, A., & Saxe, R. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0914826107 · Cited by 584
The role of anterior insular cortex in social emotions
Lamm, C., & Singer, T. (2010) · Brain Structure and Function · doi:10.1007/s00429-010-0251-3 · Cited by 566
Self-citationPsychopaths know right from wrong but don’t care
Cima, M., Tonnaer, F., & Hauser, M. D. (2010) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsp051 · Cited by 362
Cited by
Things rank and gross in nature: A review and synthesis of moral disgust.
Chapman, H. A., & Anderson, A. K. (2013) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0030964 · Cited by 326
Bauman, C. W., McGraw, A. P., Bartels, D. M., & Warren, C. (2014) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12131 · Cited by 323
Does Incidental Disgust Amplify Moral Judgment? A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Evidence
Landy, J. F., & Goodwin, G. P. (2015) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691615583128 · Cited by 288
Disordered Social Cognition: Alexithymia and Interoception
Brewer, R., & Bird, G. (2020) · The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior · doi:10.1017/9781108131797.036 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Ugazio, G., Lamm, C., & Singer, T.
- Venue
- Emotion
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 579-590
- ISSN
- 1528-3542 (ISSN-L)
- 1931-1516
- OpenAlex
- W2156660575
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 5.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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