CoChat

Real-world objects are not represented as bound units: Independent forgetting of different object details from visual memory.

Open access
Brady, Timothy F., Konkle, Talia, Alvarez, George A., Oliva, Aude · 2013 · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Cited by 121

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Are real-world objects represented as bound units? Although a great deal of research has examined binding between the feature dimensions of simple shapes, little work has examined whether the featural properties of real-world objects are stored in a single unitary object representation. In a first experiment, we found that information about an object's color is forgotten more rapidly than the information about an object's state (e.g., open, closed), suggesting that observers do not forget objects as entirely bound units. In a second and third experiment, we examined whether state and exemplar information are forgotten separately or together. If these properties are forgotten separately, the probability of getting one feature correct should be independent of whether the other feature was correct. We found that after a short delay, observers frequently remember both state and exemplar information about the same objects, but after a longer delay, memory for the two properties becomes independent. This indicates that information about object state and exemplar are forgotten separately over time. We thus conclude that real-world objects are not represented in a single unitary representation in visual memory.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/a0029649

Cites

9 of 9 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 9 references

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Brady, T. F., Konkle, T., Alvarez, G. A., & Oliva, A.
Venue
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Published
2013
Volume
142
Issue
3
Pages
791-808
ISSN
  • 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-2222
OpenAlex
W2133702902
Cited by
121
References
9
FWCI
2.61
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.