Pretense and possibility—A theoretical proposal about the effects of pretend play on development: Comment on Lillard et al. (2013).
Open accessAbstract
The review by Lillard et al. (2013) highlighted the need for additional research to better clarify the nature of the relationship between pretend play and development. However, the authors did not provide a proposal for how to structure the direction of this future work. Here, we provide a possible framework for generating additional research. This theoretical proposal is based on recent computational approaches to cognition, in which counterfactual reasoning plays a central role in causal learning. We propose that pretend play initially emerges as a product of the cognitive mechanisms underlying human learning and then feeds back to become critical for enhancing the optimal functioning of these same processes. More specifically, we argue that pretending is in fact 1 of several forms of counterfactual reasoning, which is essential to causal cognition-and that the act of engaging in pretend scenarios may provide early opportunities to practice the skills that were initially responsible for its appearance. Here, we provide a brief overview of this theoretical framework, consider how these ideas may be integrated with the previous work covered in Lillard et al.'s (2013) review, and suggest some empirically testable questions to direct future directions.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Responding to Lillard et al.'s (2013) review, Walker and Gopnik argue that the field lacks a unifying theory of pretense and propose one: pretend play is a form of counterfactual reasoning, initially emerging from the cognitive mechanisms underlying causal learning and then feeding back to strengthen those same mechanisms. They offer this as a fourth, "interaction" model of play's role in development and derive testable predictions from it.
Key findings
As a theoretical comment, the paper reports no new primary data; its claims are proposals.
- The authors propose that pretending is "one of several forms of counterfactual reasoning," which is essential to causal cognition, and that engaging in pretend scenarios provides early practice with the skills initially responsible for its appearance.
- They argue causal cognition subsumes many domains covered in Lillard et al.'s review (theory of mind, tool use, conservation, problem solving, creativity, planning, self-regulation), so pretend play—contributing only the counterfactual component—should show uneven effects across domains. This is offered as an explanation for why Lillard et al. found no compelling evidence for pretend play effects on conservation, while syllogistic reasoning (reasoning about false premises) is a domain where evidence does seem to support a causal role.
- They cite Buchsbaum et al. (2012) as "the first empirical evidence" that pretend play and counterfactual reasoning share an underlying mechanism: preschool-aged children taught a novel causal system (an object activating a music-playing machine) who performed better on counterfactual questions also applied appropriate causal constraints in pretend play, with performance significantly correlated with causally coherent pretense, and correlations not due to age, executive function, or general cognitive development (conservation tasks).
- They note pretend play is most prominent between 3 and 5 years of age (Singer & Singer, 1990), and that children develop a causal theory of mind between ages 2 and 4.
Methods
Not a primary empirical study; a theoretical proposal/commentary.
- Design: conceptual argument integrating probabilistic modeling accounts of causal learning (e.g., Pearl, 2000; Gopnik et al., 2004; Griffiths et al., 2010) with the pretend play literature reviewed by Lillard et al. (2013).
- Evidence base: no new data; the authors summarize one prior correlational study from their lab (Buchsbaum et al., 2012) and describe ongoing work testing whether causal pretense scenarios improve children's subsequent counterfactual reasoning and inferences about complex and probabilistic causal systems.
- Analysis: none; the paper derives testable predictions and proposes a fourth model of play's developmental role (interaction), alongside Smith's (2010) three models (crucial, equifinality, epiphenomenon).
Limitations
Stated by the authors: the supporting empirical evidence (Buchsbaum et al., 2012) is "only initial, correlational data," and the proposed model may "ultimately [be] proven incorrect." Evident from the text: the proposal is programmatic—the key causal claim (that pretense practice improves counterfactual reasoning) is not yet tested in the reported work; the authors also acknowledge that pretend play's defining criteria (flexibility, positive affect, nonliterality, intrinsic motivation) are tied to spontaneity and are "extremely difficult to simulate in a laboratory setting."
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
5 of 13 cited sources checked · 5 supported · 0 flagged
- Study design and conductcitation
These results only provide initial, correlational data.
“However, these results only provide initial, correlational data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Buchsbaum et al., 2012 source
- Findingcitation
Children's performance on counterfactual reasoning questions was significantly correlated with their engagement in causally coherent pretense.
“Additionally, children's performance on counterfactual reasoning questions was significantly correlated with their engagement in causally coherent pretense.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Buchsbaum et al., 2012 source
- Findingcitation
A recent correlational study has established the first empirical evidence that pretend play and counterfactual reasoning may share the same underlying cognitive mechanism.
“For example, a recent correlational study has established the first empirical evidence that pretend play and counterfactual reasoning may share the same underlying cognitive mechanism (Buchsbaum et al., 2012).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Buchsbaum et al., 2012 source
- Findingcitation
Children who performed better in the counterfactual task also applied appropriate causal constraints in the context of their pretend play.
“Results indicated that children who performed better in the counterfactual task also applied appropriate causal constraints in the context of their pretend play.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Buchsbaum et al., 2012 source
- Interpretationreasoning
The very act of engaging in pretend play promotes the development of causal learning.
“but the very act of engaging in pretend play promotes the development of causal learning.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The ability to consider unreal events, to separate representations of those events from reality, and to think about the outcomes of those events if they had occurred is essential to learning.
- Premisecitation
The consideration of counterfactual possibilities is central to reasoning about causal structure.
“The consideration of counterfactual possibilities is therefore central to reasoning about causal structure.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The act of engaging in pretend scenarios may provide early opportunities to practice the skills that were initially responsible for its appearance.
“and that the act of engaging in pretend scenarios may provide early opportunities to practice the skills that were initially responsible for its appearance.”
- Also stated in: § Suggestions for Directing Future Research · hedged
“and that the act of engaging in pretend scenarios may in fact provide early opportunities to practice the skills that were initially responsible for its appearance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Also stated in: § Suggestions for Directing Future Research · hedged
- Interpretationreasoning
Causal cognition subsumes many of the domains covered in Lillard et al.'s review.
“Upon consideration of the topics that were covered in Lillard et al.'s (2013) review, we would argue that causal cognition subsumes many of these domains.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lillard et al., 2013 source
- Premisecitation
More theoretically sophisticated accounts of pretense have tended to interpret pretend play as an epiphenomenon of other abilities, such as metarepresentation or theory of mind, rather than as an activity that could shape learning or development.
“Moreover, more theoretically sophisticated accounts of pretense have tended to interpret pretend play as an epiphenomenon of other abilities, such as metarepresentation or theory of mind, rather than as an activity that could shape learning or development (Baron-Cohen, 1995;Currie, 1995;Leslie, 1987;Lillard, 2001;Nichols & Stich, 2000).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
The evidence does seem to support a causal role of pretense on development in the domain of syllogistic reasoning.
“Indeed, this domain is one in which the evidence does seem to support a causal role of pretense on development (Lillard et al., 2013).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lillard et al., 2013 source
- Interpretationreasoning
Pretend play provides children with the opportunity to practice the cognitive skills necessary for causal cognition.
“we argue that pretend play provides children with the opportunity to practice the cognitive skills necessary for causal cognition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bekoff & Byers, 1998
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Pretend play requires that children generate patterns of evidence from an initially false premise and reason about the outcomes of this alternative model of the world.
“Like learning and reasoning about causal models, pretend play requires that children generate patterns of evidence from an initially false premise and reason about the outcomes of this alternative model of the world.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
There is a lack of a coherent theoretical account of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie pretense (and play in general) that might underpin their beneficial effects on other areas of development.
“Lillard et al. failed to address what we believe to be the more fundamental issue: the lack of a coherent theoretical account of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie pretense (and play in general) that might underpin their beneficial effects on other areas of development.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Reasoning about causal relationships actively generates possible worlds, some factual and some counterfactual.
“Reasoning about causal relationships therefore actively generates possible worlds, some of which are factual (they exist) while others are counterfactual (they do not exist).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
These findings link pretend play with a distinctive human form of causal inference-counterfactual reasoning.
“These findings therefore link pretend play with a distinctive human form of causal inference-counterfactual reasoning.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Pretend play and counterfactual reasoning involve the same cognitive machinery: the ability to consider unreal events, to separate representations of those events from reality, and to think about the outcomes of those events if they had occurred.
“Pretend play and counterfactual reasoning involve the same cognitive machinery: The ability to consider unreal events, to separate representations of those events from reality, and to think about the outcomes of those events if they had occurred.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- May combine two claims. 4
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 6
May combine two claims.
FindingcitationThese correlations were not due to age, executive function, or general cognitive development.
“Importantly, these correlations were not due to age, executive function, or general cognitive development (as indicated by performance on conservation tasks).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Buchsbaum et al., 2012 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningEngaging in pretend scenarios may be sufficient for the development of syllogistic reasoning because reasoning about false premises is definitional to pretend play.
“On the other hand, engaging in pretend scenarios may indeed be sufficient for the development of syllogistic reasoning-because, as the authors point out, reasoning about false premises is definitional to pretend play.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationPretend play promotes engagement in counterfactual reasoning, which is essential to learning causal relations across domains.
“pretend play promotes engagement in counterfactual reasoning, which is essential to learning causal relations across domains (see Gopnik, 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gopnik, 2009
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The ability to consider unreal events, to separate representations of those events from reality, and to think about the outcomes of those events if they had occurred is essential to learning.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe current state of the evidence is insufficient to draw strong conclusions regarding the nature of the relationship between pretend play and optimal development.
“It is abundantly clear from their review that the current state of the evidence is insufficient to draw strong conclusions regarding the nature of the relationship between pretend play and optimal development.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lillard et al., 2013 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningImagining new possible worlds, as in fiction and pretense, may be defined as the process by which the implied counterfactuals in our causal models become explicit.
“Imagining new possible worlds, as we do in fiction and pretense, may therefore be defined as the process by which the implied counterfactuals in our causal models become explicit.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningIf pretend play primarily contributes to the development of just one distinctive aspect of causal reasoning-the ability to consider counterfactual alternatives-then this constitutes only one of the many components that likely lead to development in each of these domains.
“However, if pretend play primarily contributes to the development of just one distinctive aspect of causal reasoning-the ability to consider counterfactual alternatives-then this constitutes only one of the many components that likely lead to development in each of these domains.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPretend play initially emerges as a product of the cognitive mechanisms underlying human learning and then feeds back to become critical for enhancing the optimal functioning of these same processes.
“We propose that pretend play initially emerges as a product of the cognitive mechanisms underlying human learning and then feeds back to become critical for enhancing the optimal functioning of these same processes.”
- Also stated in: § Suggestions for Directing Future Research · plain
“We therefore propose a fourth possibility-an interaction-in which pretend play initially emerges as a product of the cognitive mechanisms underlying human learning and then feeds back to become critical for enhancing the optimal functioning of these same processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § Suggestions for Directing Future Research · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenHistorically, there have been relatively few theories that have sought to provide a unifying theory of the role of pretend play.
“Historically, there have been relatively few theories that have sought to provide a unifying theory of the role of pretend play.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenPretending is one of several forms of counterfactual reasoning, which is essential to causal cognition.
“More specifically, we argue that pretending is in fact 1 of several forms of counterfactual reasoning, which is essential to causal cognition”
- Also stated in: § Suggestions for Directing Future Research · plain
“More specifically, we propose that pretending is in fact one of several forms of counterfactual reasoning, which is essential to causal cognition”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § Suggestions for Directing Future Research · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe proposed model of learning serves as a possible unifying theory underlying the role of pretend play.
“This model of learning therefore serves as a possible unifying theory underlying the role of pretend play that-even if ultimately proven incorrect-generates a set of empirically testable questions to direct future research.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The ability to consider unreal events, to separate representations of those events from reality, and to think about the outcomes of those events if they had occurred is essential to learning.
“These abilities are essential to learning.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The ability to disengage from the actual state of the world is necessary for moving beyond simple, data-driven learning to engage in inductive inference.
“In fact, the ability to disengage from the actual state of the world is necessary for moving beyond simple, data-driven learning to engage in inductive inference.”
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Pretend play in young children and the emergence of creativity
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Díaz-López, C., Palomo‐Carrión, R., Romay‐Barrero, H., et al. (2025) · Disability and Rehabilitation Assistive Technology · doi:10.1080/17483107.2025.2473021 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Play is intrinsically motivated, leading to active engagement and joyful discovery [29].”
Deneault, J., Lefebvre, O., & Rousseau, C. (2019) · Revue de psychoéducation · doi:10.7202/1061186ar · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Parmi elles, notons les capacités de raisonnement (entre autres le raisonnement contrefactuel), les habiletés sociales, le langage et les compétences narratives (Lillard et al., 2013; Walker & Gopnik, 2013).”
BackgroundThe Effect of Group Reminiscence Therapy on Depression in Women With Type II Diabetes
Jooj, R., Dashtbozorgi, B., Shahbazian, H. B., & Latifi, S. M. (2016) · Jundishapur Journal of Chronic Disease Care · doi:10.17795/jjcdc-30667 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Conexiones etnomatemáticas en el aula con el trompo de tapitas
Palacio, K. A. M., Hernández, Y. Y. U., & Araújo, A. A. (2024) · Avances de Investigación en Educación Matemática · doi:10.35763/aiem25.6404 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Bonus, J. A., Dore, R. A., Wilson, J. M., Freiberger, N., & Lerner, B. (2023) · Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.appdev.2023.101603 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Fährnisse der Spielbegleitung und die Hemmung von Exploration
Weißhaupt, M. (2024) · Verlag Julius Klinkhardt eBooks · doi:10.35468/6070-16 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Ahmad, J., Anwar, M., Anwar, A., et al. (2014) · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Casey, E. M., Dewhirst, C. B., Unsicker-Durham, S. K., Nahar, G., & Wescoup, S. M. (2022) · Journal of Research in Childhood Education · doi:10.1080/02568543.2022.2027581 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“…and other cognitive skills, physical and social development, language and early math skills, creativity, imagination, and more (Ansari et al., 2015; Bodrova & Leong, 2015; Fisher et al., 2008; Møller, 2015; Nath & Szücs, 2014; Pesce et al., 2016; Toub et al., 2016; Walker & Gopnik, 2013).”
BackgroundPretending Not to Know Reveals a Capacity for Model-Based Self-Simulation
Mazor, M., Firestone, C., & Phillips, I. (2026) · Psychology Science · doi:10.1177/09567976251409747 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“…simulations in pre-tense behavior (Nichols & Stich, 2000; Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013), a role for pretense in the development of reasoning about causation (Walker & Gopnik, 2013), and hard constraints on capacity to deceive (DePaulo et al., 2003; Verschuere et al., 2023; Walczyk et al., 2003).”
Casey, E. M., Arledge, B., Naghash, F., Spivey, E., Norris, J. E., Zhang, H., Mahmoud‐Elhaj, D., Rajala, R., & Ethridge, L. E. (2026) · Journal of Experimental Child Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2026.106542 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Demokratie und Partizipation in Hochschullernwerkstätten
:null (2024) · Verlag Julius Klinkhardt eBooks · doi:10.35468/6070 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
A Naturalistic Philosophy of Play
Gindele, N. C. (2015) · DukeSpace (Duke University) · Cited by 1 · see citing works
The Child as an Active Learner
Sim, Z. L. (2016) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Relationship between teachers' roles, types of language and children's responses during play
Gaviria-Loaiza, J. (2025) · Library, Museums and Press - UDSpace (University of Delaware) · doi:10.58088/681w-4265
Kirikua, H. T. M., Maithya, P., & Ronoh, A. (2021) · International Journal of Education (IJE) · doi:10.5121/ije2021.9303
Pretensive Shared RealityPreprint
Kapitány, R., & Goldstein, T. R. (2021) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/2djsc
Die rituellen Strukturen des Spiels – Ihre Ambivalenz, ihre Bildungsrelevanz & ihre VerdrängungPreprint
Weißhaupt, M. (2024) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/92hjx
Tillis, S. (2026) · doi:10.1017/9781009703475.023
Experiential play training transforms elementary educators into play advocates
Casey, E. M., Spivey, E., & Berube, J. (2026) · Frontiers in Education · doi:10.3389/feduc.2026.1788023
Recalling and caring childhood imaginary friends as sympoiesis
Sintonen, S., & Keränen, V. (2026) · Contemporary Issues in Early Childhood · doi:10.1177/14639491261484064
- Authors
- Walker, C. M., & Gopnik, A.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- ORCID
- Walker, Caren M.
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2013
- Volume
- 139
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 40-44
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W1995019377
- Semantic Scholar
- 036f879ce1b085f337236d2d11f300e5e18004bf
- Cited by
- 40
- References
- 45
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 2
- FWCI
- 6.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.escholarship.org
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology › Developmental and Educational Neuropsychology
- Social Sciences › Education › Early Childhood Education and Development
- Keywords
- pretend play, counterfactual reasoning, causal cognition, causal learning, cognitive modeling, child development
- MeSH terms
- Child Development, Female, Humans, Male, Play and Playthings
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-17.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-17.
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